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Abstract.
The Intention of this thesis Is to develop a Process chrlstology which Is valid and coherent with respect to the principles of Whitehead's Process philosophy and adequate with respect to Christian faith.
As Indicated by the title, the study moves from Whitehead's vision to the chrlstologloal adventure. Although this necessitates that the criteria are essentially philosophical, it is stressed that the discussion finds its Inspiration in faith. For that reason the second chapter describes the Process christologies of Norman Pittenger. John Cobb, Schubert Ogden and David Griffin. That discussion isolates the major questions and issues which arise. Chapter three Is an examination of the philosophical principles of Whitehead's vision. A central thesis of the work is that the theory of "initial aims" is Inadequate to account for the Idea of a Divine purpose relevant to human beings. I Illustrate why this is so and, after presenting a Process theory of the "self", describe how the notion of purpose mediated in history is Intelligible. Chapter four Is a synthesis between the issues raised in the second chapter and the philosophical themes of chapter three. This chapter presents the chrlstology which is valid with respect to Whitehead's vision. The following chapter observes that the Church is an essential aspect of Process chrlstology, and then evaluates Christ and the Church with respect to some of the themes of Biblical and traditional chrlstology. The Intention Is to justify Its status as an appropriate expression of faith, although it is accepted that the essential subjectivity of faith renders an objective evaluation Impossible.
The final chapter offers some concluding remarks, noting particularly how Process chrlstology Is a theology of liberation; freedom and responsibility.
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Introduction,
I
"Medio tutlssimus ibis" (1).
"A fool... Is a man who never 
tried an experiment In his life." (2)
(1) Ovid. Metamorphoses 11.137.
(2) Erasmus Darwin. Letter from Marla Edgeworth to Sophy Buxton. 9th. March 1792.
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Introduction.
These two quotations highlight, and vividly contrast, two possible 
approaches to a thesis of this nature. It Is my belief that In order to 
even begin to do justice to Whitehead, It is desirable to follow the 
adventure of the second quotation rather than the safety of the middle 
way. This study JLa Intended to be something of an experiment, an 
Intention which I have attempted to encapsulate In the title.
A title Is more than a mere device with which to Interrupt the 
blank monotony of the opening page. It betrays - or perhaps more 
accurately, It ought to betray - the Initial position of the author and 
the direction In which he Intends to develop the discussion. I describe 
my Initial position as "Whitehead's Vision", avoiding the more general 
"Process philosophy" for three reasons. First, as John Cobb notes, 
"Process philosophy In the broadest sense Includes all modes of thought 
that see event, change or becoming as more fundamental categories for 
the understanding of the world than substance and being. "(3). He 
mentions Heraclitus, Protagoras, Buddhist philosophy, Hume, Hegel, 
Bergson, Teilhard, James, Dewey, Heidegger and Sartre as being, In at 
least some respects, representatives of that philosophical theme. If we 
assume that Cobb's sample Is accurate - a reasonable assumption - then a 
work which Includes the term "Process" In Its title Is boasting of a 
relevance which extends to all those studying some aspects of that vast 
field. In contrast, the phrase "Whitehead's vision" conveys a more 
modest - and realistic - field of Interest, concentrating on a specific 
aspect of Process thought. Having made that qualification, It Is 
nevertheless true that the term "Process philosophy" has become a
(3) Concilium no.75. "Man in Process" p31. Hartshorne's list is even more extensive - "Indeed, since Kant, and with the exceptions of Bradley, Boyce, Bussell, Nicolai Hartmann, Santayana, Weiss and Findlay, metaphysics or speculative philosophy has been almost exclusively process philosophy." pi00, "Ideas and Theses of Process Philosophers" In AAB Studies la Religion no.5 1973.
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generic description for Whiteheadian philosophy: for this reason, and
for the sake of convention and convenience, I shall use the term In the 
subsequent discussion. It will, however, carry the Whiteheadian
connotation. Second, the use of the word "vision" is quite deliberate. 
Whitehead did not Intend his philosophy to be considered as a closed, 
finalised "system" (4). To plagiarize Heraclitus* famous dictum, no man 
can use the same philosophy twice: as we have already noted "change" is
the key word. But, once again, we Immediately add a clause to this 
observation. For the sake of clarity It Is quite legitimate to employ 
Whitehead’s philosophy it were a "system". One must simply note
those areas where either Whitehead himself left ambiguities or
omissions, or where the "system" exhibits flaws which require further 
analysis. The third point In favour of the term "Whitehead’s vision" Is 
that It reflects my cwn personal bias towards the "Whiteheadian" aspects 
of Process thought. Partly because I agree with Sponhelm that
"Whitehead remains the normative and seminal thinker for process 
thought"(5), and partly because I find his presentation and method 
generative of inspiration for further Investigation. As the discussion 
develops one notes several places of divergence among Process thinkers, 
at which point the tone of this discussion will tend to follow the 
Whiteheadian version or derivative. Of course, this Is not to be taken 
as a slavish, or even a strict, adherence, it is simply meant to 
indicate the prevailing atmosphere Into which the discussion Is born and 
In which It must survive. Hopefully also, the atmosphere will be
(4) See, for example. Process and Reality (PR) p4,"Philosophers can never hope finally to formulate thesemetaphysical first principles." But Hocking (pl6 "Whitehead as I knew Him" In Kline,G.L., (Ed) Alfred North Whitehead: Essays onhis Philosophy, ANWEP) "His achievement Is undoubtedly a system".
(5) Faith and Process p57. Note also Hartshorne's claim that, "to me it Is really obvious that as metaphysician Whitehead has In this century had no superior, and I question if there has beeneven a close competitor." Creativity In American Philosophy.p103.
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conducive to a flourishing discussion! It will be noted that this study 
Is not intended to be a survey of Whitehead's own thought, its phases of 
development or Its final construction. For that reason It Is not 
necessary to examine In any great detail questions the Interests of 
which are solely Internal to Whitehead. The Interest In Whitehead lies 
with the Impact of the overall effect, not with the delicate subtleties 
of the constituents (6). I now draw attention to the next part of the 
title, the phrase "the Possibilities for the Chrlstologloal Adventure". 
Could this rather cumbersome phrase have been replaced by the concise 
"Chrlstology"? I think that to have used the single word would have 
detracted quite dramatically from the Intention behind the chosen title. 
This discussion is not primarily concerned with & chrlstology, rather It 
considers the task of formulating chrlstology. During our exploration 
of the mansion which Is Whitehead's vision several routes for 
chrlstology will be revealed - other doors will be closed. This study 
Is concerned with the Interplay between these possibilities, existing 
Process christologies and the potential of new directions. One of the 
key questions will be to ascertain by what criteria one Is able to 
distinguish between valid and Invalid chrlstologloal options. In 
addition, the dynamic aspect of this activity - as opposed to the rather 
static state Implied by the single word "chrlstology" - reflects 
appropriately the motif of the first part of the title. No apology Is 
necessary for the use of Whitehead's cwn word "Adventure", precisely 
because the Intention here Is to follow his own desire for adventurous 
thought. However, I remain conscious that adventure Is not a licence to 
roam ar^here - one must avoid becoming one of the "damned fools" 
referred to by Whitehead (7).
(6) For example, one major question which concerned Dorothy Emmet is whether Whitehead intended to Imply Platonic Ideas via his doctrine of Eternal Objects. Emmet,D. Whitehead's Phllosophv Organism. Chapter 5.
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The dynamic of the title extends beyond that mentioned above. The 
title as a whole exhibits a vector quality. It flows from one topic to 
the next, from Whitehead’s vision to the chrlstologloal adventure. This 
is an asymetrlcal movement, a point to which I return when I consider my 
method In more detail.
Prior to a description of the method It is necessary, or at least 
desirable, to offer some explanation of the motives behind this work. 
Why are the two aspects, "process" and "chrlstology" worthwhile topics 
for study, and why Is their product - conveniently labelled "process 
chrlstology" - considered to be of value? In the world of the late 
twentieth century the Idea of "thought for thought's sake" is an 
expensive luxury - somewhat difficult to reconcile to the starving 
millions, the threat of nuclear genocide or the possibilities for 
ecological disaster. At some stage, therefore. It is essential to 
demonstrate hew and where a study of this kind Is capable of 
contributing to the world beyond Itself. This will be the subject - or 
at least the Intention - of the final chapter. One notes that If that 
replies to the general criticism that metaphysics Is merely a 
speculative Irrelevance, It does not respond adequately to philosophical 
objections to Whitehead's form of metaphysics (8). In the present 
context It suffices to state an awareness of these objections and accept 
that Whitehead's philosophical method Is not without criticism. There 
is one particular aspect of Whitehead's philosophy which must be given a
(7) See Price,L, Dialogues jgf Alfred Worth Whitehead p250 Also c.f. Mrs. Whitehead, "it is an adventure to be born." (ibid.)
(8) Lewis Ford (Explorations jji Whitehead's Philosophy EWP p305ff. ) considers just a few examples of the "contemporary revolt" against metaphysics. The positivist - linguistic veto, pragmatists who reject the notion of a priori deductions grounded on absolute "certainty" and, according to Ford, the "most pressing objection, the claim that It is too Leibnlzlan - that it is a dogmatic, pre-crltlcal enterprise which refuses to take Kant's transcendental turn seriously."(p307). See also Emmet's chapter "Whitehead's Defence of Rationalism" ch II, op.cit.
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special mention. His use of language provokes Intense reaction, "I am 
usually offended by an author who presumes to require me to learn a 
whole new vocabulary that Is private to him (as Whitehead did In Process 
and Realltv)."(9). Whitehead would not have intended to cause such 
offence. Although he does employ familiar terms In unfamiliar ways 
(such as "feeling"), he does so only in the Interests of clarity and 
precision. One need not dwell on the problems of his esoteric 
terminology. It Is sufficient to be aware of the difficulties which can 
arise.
Despite these objections, the philosophical (general and specific) 
and the linguistic. It Is, nevertheless, quite justified to suggest, as 
the basic presupposition of this study, that Whitehead's vision Is 
valid. It must be stressed that this does not involve any claim for 
final or dogmatic authority, merely an invitation to put his philosophy 
to work, to test the conceptuality In the world of experience. This Is 
not sheer pragmatism because the pragmatic aspect Is balanced by the 
four conditions which Whitehead considered crucial to a definition of 
metaphysics or to the Ideal of speculative philosophy. He wrote, "the 
philosophical scheme should be coherent, logical, and. In respect to Its 
interpretation, applicable and adequate."(10).
He defines these four conditions as follows. Coherence "means that 
the fundamental ideas.... presuppose each other so that in isolation 
they are meaningless... It Is the Ideal of speculative philosophy that 
its fundamental notions shall not seem capable of extraction from each
(9) Dlxon,J.R., Psychology js£. laiML» pXIV. Dorothy Emmet wrote, "Whitehead's books, as a reviewer remarked, are written by Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, and when Dr. Jekyll begins a chapter you are never sure that Mr. Hyde Is not going to finish it." ("Alfred North Whitehead", no.6 in a series "Makers of Modern Thought", The Student Movement June 1938. Found as a loose page In Thornton's Incarnate Lord.)
(10) PR p3.
Introduction.
other."(11). The notion of "logical" Is given Its ordinary meaning, the
"lack of contradiction". As Whitehead noted, these terms apply to the
rational side of philosophy. The empirical side is covered by 
"applicable". Implying that "some Items of experience are interpretable" 
by the scheme, and "adequate" which Insists that "there are not Items 
Incapable of such Interpretation. "(12).
It Is Important to note the Interaction between the rational and 
the empirical (13). It is revealing to quote Just two passages from
Whitehead's major works.
"In the dark there are vague presences, doubtfully feared ; in the silence, the irresistible causal efficacy of nature presses Itself upon us; In the vagueness of the low hum of Insects In an August woodland, the Inflow Into ourselves of feelings from enveloping nature overwhelms us; In the dim consciousness of half-asleep, the presentations of sense fade away, and we are left with the vague feeling of influences from vague things around us."(14).
"Nothing can be omitted, experience drunk and experience sober, experience sleeping and experience waking, experience drowsy andexperience wide - awake, experience self - conscious and experience self - forgetful, experience intellectual and experience physical, experience religious and experience sceptical, experience anxious and experience care - free, experience anticipatory and experience retrospective, experience happy and experience grieving, experience dominated by emotion and experience under self - restraint, experience In the light and experience In the dark, experience normal and experience abnormal."(15).
Such poetic richness and the vivid appeal to Incorporate the 
Intensity and width of the vast spectrum of human experience Illustrate
(11) PR p3.
(12) PR p3. Hartshorne notes that Pierce's splendid phrase "critical canmonsensism" Is equivalent to Whitehead's definition of metaphysics. Creativity ifi American PhllsSQPhy p284.
(13) This is highlighted by Christian who describes Whitehead's view of metaphysics as follows; It must,a) evoke the concrete experience with which it begins.b) construct a logical and coherent categorlal scheme.c) use the abstract categories to Interpret the concrete experiences. M. Interpretation ^  Whitehead's Metaphysics p284.
(14) PR p176.
(15) Adventures of Ideas p226.
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the Importance of the empirical In Whitehead's philosophical thought. I 
employ a quotation from James Crenshaw's book Old Testament Wisdom 
because, although he Is not referring to Process thought, the sentiment 
he expresses therein Is pertinent, "It believes that all essential 
answers can be learned in experience, pregnant with signs about reality 
itself. The human responsibility is to search for that Insight and thus 
to learn to live In harmony with the cosmos. It follows that optimism 
Is at the center."(16). This emphasis on human experience and human 
responsibility is the primary reason why Process thought is a worthwhile 
activity.
The second justification one can put forward In favour of the 
pursuit of, and adherence to. Process categories is that the philosophy 
relates well to other branches of knowledge. I refer particularly to 
the scientific enterprise. It Is a dangerous business to make strong 
claims for interdisciplinary agreement and certainly I would not wish to 
do that here. What I do suggest Is that Process conceptualities ask the 
right kind of questions, raising the appropriate Issues in an 
appropriate language (17). Rather than attempting to claim exact 
agreement I point to the similarities of the search. Furthermore, to
(16) pl8.
(17) For example, Hartshorne notes that, (Louvain Studies vol.7 no.2, 1978; "Can We Understand God"), "Quantum physics has uncovered evidence to suggest that strict determinism cannot be applied to atoms accepting that on the atomic level there Is a real - though slight - power for free decision." He uses the term "psychlcallsm" to refer to this "freedom", a preferable term to "panpsychism" which does Imply conscious "souls" occupying all things. Nevertheless, the latter remains a useful term "if the conditions of its use are understood."(Christian, op.cit. p20.). It is interesting to note that Whitehead appears to have developed his philosophy of Organism without knowledge of Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle. See Folse,H.J. "The Copenhagen Interpretation Of Quantum Theory and Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism."(Tulane Studies vol.xxiii 1974 p32: Studies in Process Philosophy Xa. Whittemore,R.C, (ed). Also relevant, Heisenberg's Gifford lectures. Physios and Philosophy 1958.
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move away from the scientific enterprise, Whitehead’s philosophy 
provides a metaphysical basis for understanding aesthetics, beauty or, 
more generally, those qualities usually attributed to the study of the 
Arts (18).
The third reason I give for adherence to Whiteheadian categories is 
simply that for iflfe, they provide an explanation of "my" world. In May's 
expression It Is verified by Its "general success In practice."(19). 
Although on a wider philosophical basis that rather localised 
justification for this research may not be objectively valid. It retains 
an important subjective validity.
But that is only one side of the coin. It is also necessary to 
justify the concern for the chrlstologloal adventure. I suggest three 
reasons. First, as a matter of empirical fact, millions of people have 
dedicated their lives to Jesus of Nazareth - or Christ - and It Is no 
exaggeration to say that his effect on subsequent history is greater 
than that of any other Individual. Why? It Is essential that our 
philosophical activity attempts to provide an answer to that question. 
That Is what Whitehead meant when he said that metaphysics had to be 
applicable and adequate. Second, and apart from the numerical force of 
the claims about Christ one must also note the nature of these claims. 
Christian faith makes some quite extraordinary suggestions about Jesus. 
Again, It would be quite foolhardy to accept (or dismiss!) them without 
due consideration of the original phenomenon. Thirdly, It Is obvious 
that Christianity and the Church - considered merely as a 
soclo-polltlco-economlc force rather than a religious Institution -
(18) See, for example, Process Studies 13/1 Spring 1983, a special issue dedicated to "The Arts, Aesthetics and Process Philosophy". A musical example Is seen In "The Method of Abstraction: A Musical Analysis." Ibid. 15/1 spring 1986, Stephen Schlcesser.
(19) The Philosophy of Whitehead p47.
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remains a powerful and formative element In our society. And, as 
Whitehead noted, "the essence of Christianity Is the appeal to the life 
of Christ... "(20). So, even If one's Interest lies solely with
"society" - the processes of Its development and structure - one is led
to consider this appeal to Christ and, ultimately therefore, back to 
Christ himself. It is this generalised concern which forces this 
discussion away from a consideration of a "chrlstology": the argument
contains no test by which to evaluate possible answers to the crucial 
question, which chrlstology? Hence the concern here must be to examine 
the general Issue, how might a chrlstology be formulated within the
vision of Whitehead? The prize for the successful completion of this
venture Is a "Process Chrlstology", which will - It Is hoped - benefit 
our understanding of the world. But that Is to anticipate the future I 
Prior to that It is necessary to describe the method by which the task 
is to be performed.
As I have noted previously, the dynamics of the title are 
asymetrlcal. The discussion will examine the implications of
Whitehead's vision for the chrlstologloal adventure. Not vice versa. 
This Implicit affirmation of the primacy of philosophy over faith 
requires further consideration because It Is a relationship which forms 
the basis of the method for this study. The relationship Is complex and 
Sponhelm's book Faith and Process is largely dedicated to an examination 
of these Issues. The method can be represented In two ways. The first 
revolves around Neville's statement that, "the genuine theological issue 
Is which conception of God Is best, not which one corresponds to the 
object of thelstic faith and worship which, for all that, might be 
false."(21). One notes that the criterion of adequacy of a theological
(20) Adventures af Ideas pl67.
(21) Greattvltx a M  Qoà p75.
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conception Is not merely compatibility with "thelstic faith and worship" 
but hinges upon that which Is "best". Clearly, however, "best" Is 
Itself a relative term and as It stands It cannot be used as a criterion 
for anything. In order to translate Neville’s claim into a functioning 
definition It is necessary to further define the idea of "best".
Invoking Ogden continues the argument, "not only is It evident that
Christian faith alone is an insufficient ground for theology’s
assertions, but it is also clear that such assertions cannot even be 
established as meaningful except by establishing a thelstic metaphysics 
which Is true Independently of specifically Christian faith"(22). 
Neville's "best" becomes compatibility with Ogden's "thelstic 
metaphysics". To rephrase this, the criterion employed In this study Is 
a correspondence with a thelstic metaphysics rather than with thelstic 
faith.
There are two Initial responses to this claim. First, It might be 
objected that this reduces "genuine theology" to metaphysics. Second, 
It leaves open one very obvious question; which thelstic metaphysics? 
The reply Is common to both these points because one of the conditions 
for the second requires that the first Is not true. Genuine theology Is 
not reducible to metaphysics - and any metaphysics which suggests that 
It Is must be refuted. The essential reason why this Is so Is 
Illuminated by a quotation from Mellert who says of religion, "its chief 
contribution Is Its familiarity with the particular... Philosophy by 
Itself Is always speculative and general, and as such is always plagued 
with the suspicion of Inapplicability."(23).
It Is at this stage that the discussion makes Its primary leap of
(22) "The task of Philosophical Theology" In The Future stPhilosophical Theologv. Evans,R. (Ed. ), p80.
(23) Mellert,R. What Is Process Theology? p35.
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faith because, In response to the question of which metaphysics, I 
assume that Whitehead’s vision provides a satisfactory solution. In 
defence of this It Is pleaded that it is not a blind leap of faith. 
There are empirical reasons why Process philosophy Is an adequate 
metaphysical basis for this study. Some of these reasons - the ones 
which tend to have direct relevance - will be discussed as the study 
progresses. This method contrasts with that of Ogletree, who writes, 
"the present task Is to examine his (Hartshorne’s) conclusions in the 
light of the Christian’s confession of Jesus Christ. The Intent is to 
show that a critical explication of the central motif of Christian faith 
confirms in general the results of his own inquiry."(24). Ogletree 
advocates "the central motif of faith" to be the criterion against which 
any philosophical Inquiry should be judged. The latter part of his 
quotation abbreviates to "faith confirms philosophy", which is,
essentially, the direct counterpart of Neville’s requirement (25). One 
can generalize these two positions. Ogletree represents a "faith
seeking understanding" approach, while Ogden’s ccmpatlblllty with 
thelstic metaphysics Is more In line with "philosophy finding faith".
Although a method such as Ogletree’s has a value In, for example, 
providing a statement of faith In a respectable philosophical Idlcan, It 
Is Impotent to Inspire real development within faith. It merely accepts 
"faith" as given. That limitation surely mitigates against Ogletree’s 
study being considered as "genuine theology" because It falls to 
question itself In the hope of transcending its initial position and 
advocating real growth. It Is, rather, a description of a philosophical 
study about theology - followed by an evaluation with respect to the
(24) "A Chrlstologloal Assessment of Dipolar Theism". Process Phi]i.Qg.p.Bb5r s M  £h£iaLti.aa Thought (ppct) p337.
(25) It Is worthwhile noting here that Neville himself does not actually abide by his own rule In respect to the formulation ofhis theology. This will be clear in chapter three.
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content of faith. Note Whitehead's cwn statement that "philosophy finds 
religion and modifies It... "(26), which Is a significant contribution.
It Incorporates the sense In which the criteria are philosophical, the 
notion of real change and, most Importantly, the form of the quotation 
Illustrates that theology Is not reducible to philosophy (27). 
Furthermore, It highlights the fact that the task of philosophy is an 
active one (the dynamic of the title) not a merely analytical exercise.
It is perhaps tempting to Interpret this method as extolling the 
Intellectual supremacy of speculative philosophy - nothing could be 
further from the truthI Note, for example, Whitehead's "the effort 
after the general characterization of the world around us is the romance 
of human thought."(28). The crucial point Is that the speculation is - 
and must be - of the world. So when Sponhelm correctly notes that 
"metaphysics - left to Its own general pursuits - could not be expected 
to Identify any particular In its unique significance"(29), the welcome 
Implication Is that philosophy must find religion. The simple fact that 
religion Is a part of the world Is a sufficient requirement that It is
essential data. Or, as Cobb expresses the same point, "ultimately,
then, data for theology must be sought In experience, and when knowledge 
of God Is sought, experience of God must provide the data. "(30).
(26) PR pi5.
(27) But see Sponhelm, op.clt. p330 footnote no. 85. "At times he comes near collapsing the distinction, as when he writes (Religion In the Making 31) that 'the doctrines of rationalreligion aim at being that metaphysics which can be derived fr<mthe supernormal experience of mankind In Its moments of finest Insight.'". It might be objected that I am confusing "religion" and "theology" In this analysis, in defence I only wish to avoid linguistic pedanticlsm.
(28) Nature and Life pi. (my emphasis.)
(29) op.clt. p263. Sponhelm is making the same point as Mellert (note 23).
(30) "Theological Data and Method", Journal st. Religion 33/3 1959 p215.
- 13 -
Introduction,
Philosophy is not (necessarily - it can be!) an abstract arid threat to 
religious ccmfort. Rather, when employed correctly, it seeks the data 
of religion and modifies It with the Intention of complementing and 
complimenting mankind's religious quest. The modification can be 
constructive; it Is not the Intention of philosophy to replace the data 
of religion. In another context, Whitehead wrote that "reason is the 
safeguard of the objectivity of religion; It secures for it the general 
coherence denied to hysteria."(31).
However, and referring to the quotation from Sponhelm, how does Cne 
reach historical particulars from a consideration of abstract 
generalizations? Or, If one Is concerned with the speculative 
categories of Process thought how Is one led to nurture an Interest in 
the person Jesus of Nazareth? Simply to say that In the study of 
Whiteheadian philosophy "nothing Is omitted.." is, although valid, not a 
sufficient response. Clearly, for example, In this thesis the number of 
"omissions" Is far greater than the number of "Inclusions" - even If 
only religious topics are considered. How Is it possible to justify - 
In the light of the requirement that nothing Is omitted - that this 
study concentrates on Jesus, rather than, say, the Buddha, or one of any 
number of religious figures? Cultural conditioning? That is obviously 
a significant factor, the effects of Buddha In St. Andrews as I write 
this are (at least as far as I am aware) considerably less than the 
effects of the Christ. But there Is more to the situation than merely 
that implied by the effect of one’s environment, and this_ls where faith 
plays a particularly important role. Sponhelm says, "while the topic Is 
likely posed by faith, the handling of the topic seems largely 
controlled by metaphysical discussion" (32) which captures the sense In
(3 1) Religion In the Making p53.
(32) op.cit. pl60.
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which faith provides the Inspiration behind the Issues which metaphysics 
"finds" and "modifies". Thus In a crucial sense, faith is prior to 
metaphysics because, without faith, metaphysics, at least as far as its 
relevance for religion Is concerned, would be lost In a self - 
referential vacuum: data less.
The above description Is perhaps a definition of "genuine 
theology". The movement from topics inspired by faith, through 
metaphysical analysis and, finally, the synthesis or re-constructlon 
which results from the "modifications". That at least Is the Intention 
which Is hopefully reflected in the method employed here.
Before describing the precise layout of the thesis It Is worthwhile 
looking at the methodological question from a slightly different angle. 
This second way of deriving the method, Is based upon a central theme of 
Bultmann's thought - the difference between theology and philosophy. 
Bultmann suggested that the fundamental distinction lies In the fact 
that philosophy believes that man - as man - can attain authentic 
existence, whereas theology Insists that "man cannot free himself from 
inauthentlclty but that he can only be freed by being encountered by 
God's love"(33). The question one can ask here Is to what extent this 
claim retains validity when the "philosophy" In question Is that of 
Whitehead's vision? To rephrase that, does the Process philosophy of 
Whitehead promote an anthropology which supports authentic existence 
without an appeal to Christ? Or, Is that central theme of Christianity 
merely a particular expression of something which Is already an inherent 
motif of Process philosophical thinking?
In order to reply to those questions, it is necessary to present an 
account, from within the framework of Process philosophy and theology,
(33) Griffin A Process Chrlstology p77.
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of the human person and ask whether this is deficient without the appeal 
to Christ. Of course, a corollary of this must be to show exactly how 
that appeal to Christ is able to function in the terms allowed by the 
philosophy. Here again, one notes that It is faith which promotes this 
question, for It Is faith which is making the claim that authentic 
existence is possible only in relation to Christ. This claim of faith
leads on to - indeed it provokes - the attention of philosophical
\
enquiry which, in turn, must examine its own content and the content of 
faith.
From these two descriptions of the method it follows that the study 
must take a particular form. There are essentially three parts, the 
Inspiration of faith, the analysis by philosophy and a synthesis. These 
are supplemented by an evaluation and a conclusion.
The first of these, the "inspiration" Is designed to encapsulate 
the essence of the Christian faith. Not In order to present a 
definitive content to faith but to evoke and promote Issues and debate 
for further discussion. One must recognise that having made the claim 
that the first section Illustrates Christian faith, the manner In which 
this claim Is manifested In practice Is somewhat restricted - by the 
limits of time and space if not Intention. For, what is Christian 
faith? In order to restrict the answer to that question to manageable 
proportions I shall employ the services of Process theologians who have 
been engaged In the field of chrlstology. Inevitably this will 
Introduce a degree of bias into what might be termed the "essential 
elements" of Christianity, but not without justification. Each of these 
theologians represents a strand of Christian tradition which, by virtue 
of their humanity and faith, they have Interwoven into their Process 
chrlstology. It Is not a symptom of arrogance therefore that one can 
portray these thinkers as representatives of the Christian faith. The
- 16 -
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third chapter deals with the issues raised by the second, and analyses 
them in the terms of Whiteheadian philosophy. This, to employ Ogden's 
expression, is the chapter which describes the "theistic metaphysics". 
The fourth chapter is a synthesis between the Whiteheadian analysis and 
"faith" in which it is intended to develop a "Process Christology" loyal 
to the former and adequate to the latter. Chapter five is an attempt to 
evaluate this Process christology with respect to some of the 
traditional and Biblical issues, with the explicit hope of justifying 
its "faith" status. Chapter six offers some personal comments and 
conclusions about the study.
The philosophical discussion may, at times, appear to have lost all 
connection with the central christological theme of the work. During 
these times one should recall Sponheim's invitation, "put on your shoes, 
for though God may be here, we come not to worship but to work."(34).
(34) op.cit. p53.
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It might seem rather trivial to state, but an adventure in 
christology must start somewhere. That is, there must be some material 
which we are able to discuss or, perhaps more precisely, a reason must 
exist which promotes the christological adventure. This content or 
motivating power is the inspiration of faith. It is the purpose of this 
chapter to introduce how Process theologians have handled the 
christological task and note hew they combine statements of faith with 
their interpretation of Whitehead. It is not the intention here to 
analyse too critically these developments but rather to present them in 
such a way as to enable a harvest of ideas to be gathered which will 
promote the study in various directions in subsequent chapters. It is 
also worth mentioning that the presentation of Process christologies in 
this chapter is not intended to be a complete account but merely a 
survey of some of the important issues and themes which are relevant. 
These themes are the specific christological "particulars" which cannot 
be generated by the metaphysical categories, but must, of course, - and 
this is the subject of chapter three - be valid with respect to those 
categories.
The Process theologian who makes the most obvious statement of 
faith in his approach to christology is Norman Pittenger. He provides 
us with a complete and definitive account of his departure point, 
suggesting that christology is grounded upon three "essential elements". 
These are, "the firm conviction that in some fashion we meet God in the 
event of Jesus Christ. Second, there is the equally firm conviction 
that God is thus met in a genuine, historically conditioned, and 
entirely human being. Third there is the assurance that God, met in 
that man, and the man in whom God is met, are in relationship one with 
the other, in a manner or mode which is neither accidental nor 
incidental but the most complete interpenetration - and this means that
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the relationship or union, as the ancient formulations call it, must be 
conceived after the analogy of personal union rather than after seme 
model which suggests a less secure and abiding togetherness of God and 
man."(1). One might ask to what extent these definitions do, in fact, 
represent valid starting points for christology. There is a sense in 
which they might equally well be considered to be conclusions to the 
christological adventure because they consist of definitions concerning 
Jesus Christ. In. this context the three "essential elements" are 
regarded as faith's invitation to Process philosophy, the categories of 
which Pittenger then uses as a tool to develop and expound that belief 
into a rational "Christology". He justifies that step by advocating a
"valid ohristocentrism - by which I mean that God - in - Christ, God
defined by Christ, is normative for our understanding of the whole 
creation in its relationship with God and vice versa."(2). Christology, 
for Pittenger, is seen as being normative for mankind's understanding of 
more general issues relevant to creation's relation to the Creator. One 
of the most remarkable features of his christology is its consistency 
throughout his published works, a tribute to the "faith seeking 
understanding" method he employs. He makes one point very clear, "Let 
me confess that if I felt that the abiding assurances of my faith as a 
Christian could not thus fit in, I should have to decide whether to 
abandon the faith or abandon the conceptuality. In that case, as a 
Christian, I should feel obliged to abandon the conceptuality."(3). It
(1) Christology Reconsidered p7. The phrase "personal union" is the crux of Pittenger's Christology and will be clarified as the discussion proceeds. It is worth noting the shift (it is a shift in terminology rather than a change in intention) frcm the "four affirmations" in Word Incarnate pi 1.1. Jesus is truly human.2. Christ is truly divine.3. Jesus Christ is one person.4. Jesus Christ is intimately related to the more general action,presence and revelation of God.
(2) .GbKlstsiggy B&GOPg&dsrGd p3.
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is important to note that one of the corollaries of a "faith seeking 
understanding" approach is that one must possess a defined content to 
"faith" prior to the search for "understanding". That is why 
Pittenger*s starting point, the three essential elements, reads as if it 
was a conclusion to christology. That requirement is a crucial one 
because it raises the "faith" question which concerns the origin and 
nature of the faith which is to be understood. For Pittenger, "faith" 
is . understood to imply loyalty to the tradition of faith, the free 
spirit of Anglicanism, bound to the tradition but not imprisoned by it 
(4). New the question has shifted % what is the tradition? At one 
level this problem is easily solved because the Anglican loyalty to 
tradition actually implies loyalty to the Anglican tradition which, for 
all its idiosyncracies, certainly has a defined content.
There are two points which must be made concerning this approach to 
christology. Its most beneficial aspect is that it enables one to get 
to grips immediately with the christological issues. When performed in 
and for a community of believers this is invaluable. Faith is made 
relevant and significant because it is given the "understanding" 
achieved when it is expounded by a rational system. On the other hand, 
and in this context a detrimental point, there is only a limited 
potential for theological growth because the method avoids confrontation 
with philosophical principles which are assumed to be normative. Its 
criteria are self - referential and there is no intention to challenge 
the truth of the "faith". That is what Pittenger states when he 
"confessed" to a willingness to "abandon the conceptuality" but not the 
faith (5). The issue is further complicated by the fact that faith, 
defined in some sense as a faithfulness to the tradition of faith,
(3) ibid. pl44.
(4) See Christian Century 49 "What is Liberal Catholicism?"
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suffers inevitably from a degree of inherent confusion. Pittenger 
quotes Wiles', "true continuity with the age of the Fathers is to be 
sought not so much in the repetition of their doctrinal conclusions or 
even in building upon them, but rather in the continuation of their 
doctrinal aims" (6). He continues, "the faithfulness is thus to the 
basic doctrinal aims, to the Patristic objectives rather than to the 
terminology, the specific world-view, or the specific formulations of 
our fathers in Christian faith (?)• That, widely accepted, sense of 
continuity with the Fathers, or the tradition of the Church, is, as 
stated, entirely suited to Pittenger's task. The problem is, how does 
one define the "basic doctrinal aims" and, more importantly, how are 
they kncwn? He is able to refer those questions to "tradition", it is 
the tradition of the Church which illustrates which tradition is 
normative and those which were rejected. I remain unconvinced that such 
a method does not involve an arbitrary decision concerning the
resolution of those problems. We must however accept that Pittenger's
aim is to "state the meaning of the old things - the scriptural witness, 
the experience of Christian worship, and the new life in Christ which 
constitutes salvation"(8) and note that the tool he employs is that 
provided by Process conceptualities. It must be stressed that the 
philosophy plays only a secondary role. It is merely the supporting 
cast which allows the lead performer to blossom. Its value lies solely
(5) Moltmann has commented that modern christology "assumes faith, but rarely states why one should have faith."(Crucified God p97). It is my intention to formulate christology in such away that it does speak intelligibly to the "dilemma of theintellectual who inhabits the borderlands between belief and unbelief."(Sutherland,S., Faith and Ambiguity pi). The novels of Dostoyevsky eloquently evoke this ambiguity.
(6) Christology Reconsidered p4. See Making s£, C&rigtlaa Doctrine. Wiles.M., p173.
(7) ibid. p5.
(8) ibid. p5.
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in its ability to articulate what is given as normative by the 
manifestation in Christ of the God - World relationship. We can 
conclude, therefore, that Pittenger*s approach to christology is not the 
one I am advocating in this study. Whereas I have assumed Whitehead's 
vision to be "normative", he places "faith" in that position and
subsequently uses the tools of philosophy to expound that faith. But, 
and this is more important, that difference in the method must not be 
allowed to detract from our examination of his christology.
He states, "everything that I am trying to say in these pages is to 
be regarded as nothing other than a variation on the theme of love"(9). 
This emphasis is derived from Scotist theology, for which the categories 
of Process are well adapted or, perhaps more accurately, adaptable (10). 
Furthermore, if his general theme is "love", the specific christological 
theme is that the incarnation is the exemplary instance of this love 
relationship. Or, to express that slightly differently, ".... the 
relationship which is actualized in Jesus Christ is potential in 
men."(11). Pittenger is anxious to make the point that the God - Christ 
relationship is just one aspect of the more general God - World 
relationship. Christ does not stand outside the system, rather he
exemplifies it, an echo of Whitehead's famous dictum about God.
It is not sufficient, however, simply to say that Christ is the
exemplary instance of the God - World relationship. One must also show
how, given the tools of Process philosophy, Pittenger explicates this
(9) ibid. p21.
(10) Scotist theology insists that the purpose of the incarnation was the manifestation of God's love for all men. See Hew Catholic Encyclopedia 4, Balic.C. For a brief account of why Process theologians generally prefer the tradition of Scotus see Mellert,R., op.cit. p86. Pittenger's emphasis on "love" highlights the extent to which his thou^t is underlined by Hartshorne's notion of a Social God.
(11) Word Incarnate p5.
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idea. It is convenient, although somewhat artificial, to approach that 
issue from two angles. First, I consider hew Pittenger deals with the 
person of Christ and second, how he understands Christ to be important
for others. That is just one aspect of the distinction between
christology and soteriology and it must be remembered that the survey 
does not seek to divorce one from the other: it is merely a matter of
presentation.
Lewis Ford provides what is an adequate characterisation of 
Pittenger's position when he describes it as a "total obedience" 
solution (12). That is, Jesus responded in total obedience to a Divine 
initiative. But it is all too easy to balance the Divine initiative
with creaturely response simply by invoking the obedience of the latter
to the invitation of the former. It is necessary to show how this 
obedience is credible in terms of the metaphysic. There are two aspects 
to this verification. He must be able to shew how the Divine initiative 
is present and how the creature is able to respond.
Pittenger suggests that God acts in three ways. The initial aim, 
the "lure towards fulfilment" and the fact of mutual prehension, noting 
that these are all aspects of God's "loving persuasion."(13).
His use of the theory of the initial aim can be summarized by one 
of his sentences, "(Jesus) made his own subjective aim identical with 
the initial aim which God provided him."(14). This suggests that the 
individual man, Jesus, received from God an initial aim which he
(12) Ford,L., Lure of God p51. Pittenger's position follows the Antiochene school with its stress on the humanity of Jesus. An "obedience" solution to the christological problem (how to relate Jesus to God in a "special" way) Identifies the human response of Jesus to be crucial.
(13) Christology Reconsidered d139.
(14) ibid. p59.
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accepted as his cwn subjective aim. At this stage in the discussion it 
is sufficient to note that Pittenger is employing "initial aims" in 
direct connection with a human being. This raises the question, which 
will be examined in detail in chapter three, of whether it is a valid 
use at Process categories to combine the theory of initial aims with a 
Process account of a human person. The language of initial aims is part 
of the esoteric world of Whitehead's vision but in his next sentence 
Pittenger makes his point in the vernacular, "(Jesus) accepted for his 
own purpose the purpose which God had for him." He equates the two, but 
in the next chapter I shall question whether the macrocosmic perception 
of "purpose", relevant to a human individual, is capable of being
conveyed by the microcosmic understanding of initial aims, without 
making additional comments. He continues, "this vocation or purpose was 
conveyed to him through such experiences as meditation upon the Jewish 
Scriptures, hearing the preaching of John the Baptist, undergoing John's 
baptism, etc." which expresses the sense in which "purpose" is mediated 
through society. Thus we can glimpse the difference between this 
mediated sense of purpose and the direct "initial aim which God provided 
him" notion which was implied earlier.
The second mode of God's action is described as the lure towards
fulfilment, which is the lure towards the "realization of true
selfhood. "(15). Two comments must be made. Firstly, I think he has
over emphasized the distinction between this lure and the provision of 
the initial aim. Whitehead wrote, "(God) is the lure for feeling, the 
eternal urge of desire. His particular relevance to each creative 
act... constitutes him the initial 'object of desire' establishing the 
initial phase of the subjective aim. "(16). In the light of that
(15) ibid. p139.
(16) PR p344.
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quotation it is difficult to understand Pittenger's description of the 
lure as the "other side, as it were, of the initial aim" because the 
lure is that which is given in the initial aim, the goal, the "object of 
desire". More important, however, is the second point. Pittenger 
introduces the notion of the "realization of true self-hood", which is 
crucially important. One of the tasks of chapter three must be to 
examine that notion and develop an account of how it is possible to 
realize true self-hood. Pittenger, it must be noted, does not attempt 
that analysis beyond his statement of the lure towards fulfilment.
His third point concerns the fact of mutual prehension between God 
and the world. God is present and active in every cause and in every 
effect so that one can say, "thus every occasion... is an incarnation 
of the divine dynamic which we call by the name of God"(17) or, in the 
words of Hopkins, "The world is charged with the grandeur of God."(18). 
Process theology is thoroughly incarnational. Thus, the christological 
problem which is particularly appropriate to Process thought is how God 
is present in Jesus in a special or unique way.
In terms of Pittenger*s obedience solution it is evident that this 
"specialness" must exist "in the filial obedience of the man (Jesus) to 
the divine imperative, in the freely chosen decisions which the man 
made, in the response of 'yes* to the love that is God."(19). He is 
aware that the accusation that this is merely a moral union is relevant 
and he is correct to reply that, "in this respect the moral is the 
metaphysical - once we have come to see that love is not simply a matter 
of desirable human behaviour but is the very basis of the universe and 
the grounding reality in all creative advance."(20).
(17) PR pl4l.
(18) "God'8 Grandeur".
(19) Christology Reconsidered d143.
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The recurring theme in Pittenger's obedience christology is the 
balance between the divine initiative and the creature's response, the 
generation of possibilities and the freedom of actualization. He 
achieves equilibrium by concentrating on the quality of Jesus' response 
and it is that quality which mEikes God's presence in Jesus "special". 
In this way it is unproblematic for him to maintain the congruity of 
God's act with respect to Jesus and his action in the world. The 
example he gives is that of Mary, who exercised her freedom to respond
to God, "fiat mihi secundum verbum This inevitably implies
a pelagian quality. I use the term as a description only, not as a
judgement despite its unfortunate "heretical" connotations (22). 
Pittenger himself is anxious to avoid that label, the charge of being a 
"sophisticated modem version of the Pelagian heresy" is "entirely 
unjustified; in fact it is nonsense."(23). One can appreciate his point 
when he says "the flinging - about of such terms means nothing and 
proves nothing" but the corollary which follows is that if - as seems
likely in a response based christology - the Process account does in
fact involve pelagian ideas, the theologian need not fear that fact. 
One is inclined to suspect that Pittenger's loyalty to the eloquent, 
and, of course, anti-pelagian, tradition is the motivating factor here, 
rather than any significant theological reason to abandon the
(20) ibid. pl43. This complicates the definition of Pittenger's method. If, as he says, his theology is a variation on the theme of love then, since love is the "grounding reality" and, being the moral, is therefore metaphysical, one can say that his theology Ig. metaphysical. He closes the distinction between faith and philosophy because he defines "faith" in terms of love, and love is metaphysical. One should also be aware of the danger inherent in this emphasis on love. Love is a human emotion and unless one understands its use in a metaphysical sense as being more than - although it includes - that human meaning, one is left with an extreme anthropomorphic metaphysics.
(21) ibid. p82.
(22) See Griffin, A ■Pr.Q.oejg.a Christology p2l8.
(23) Christology Reconsidered p64.
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descriptive term.
A further corollary of a "congruity" approach is the familiar 
"different in degree or kind" type question. Obviously, the reply must 
be that Jesus is different in degree. There can be no reason why that 
should be unacceptable to any sincere believer because, as Pittenger 
notes, "it is much more adequate to the faith than a portrayal of Jesus 
Christ as so different in kind frcm other instances of God's presence 
and activity in the affairs of men and in their experience that he 
becomes, to all intents and purposes, an anomaly."(24). An irrelevant 
Christ is no Christ at all. Although he dedicates a whole chapter to 
this issue, the problem can best be resolved by invoking the one 
principle that solves the problem with a minimum of effort. Process 
philosophy is a one - substance cosmology, implying that there is no 
difference in kind, "though there are gradations of importance, and 
diversities of function, yet in the principles which actuality 
exemplifies all are on the same level. The final facts are, all alike, 
actual entities."(25). Although that resolves the issue at its most 
fundamental level, the question remains, hew different in degree? 
Pittenger is certainly correct when he notes that critics tend to assume 
that those who hold a degree - Christology must necessarily be talking 
about a very slight difference. On the contrary it is possible, as we 
shall see later, to propose a major difference in the "degree". 
Briefly, all actual entities are unique and furthermore they are 
Interestingly unique. That is, their uniqueness is not merely due to a 
metaphysical abstraction but it is a significant difference. Each 
actual entity, for example, has a unique potential according to its 
unique spatio - temporal coordinates and its contribution (concrescence)
(24) Christology Reconsidered pill. See Hick,J., "Christology at the Cross Roads" in Prospect for Theology. Healey,F.G.(Ed).
(25) PR pl8.
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will be the one appropriate to its cwn situation. Hence there is a very 
real difference between the "most trivial puff of existence in far off 
empty space"(26) and the complexities of a highly developed society. 
But in a more important respect, to attempt to quantify the difference 
is to miss the point. Pittenger's emphasis is on z*esponse, or the 
manner in which an initiative is appropriated by a receiving subject. 
Consequently, the extent to which an individual regards Jesus as 
"different" is subject dependent. Just as the God - Jesus relationship 
depends upon Jesus* response to God, the Christian's relationship to 
Jesus is dependent upon that individual ' s appropriation of him. There 
is no degree of difference which is fixed on an absolute scale. 
Likewise, one must also consider the Church, which is the community 
response to Jesus. The Church is, in a manner which forms the ' subject 
of a later chapter, the objectified response to Jesus and, as such, 
becomes the objectification of the "difference", as appropriated by that 
particular worshipping community.
The essential subjectivity of the answer to the "difference in 
degree" problem is supported by Pittenger's discussion of "importance". 
He writes, "the subjective apprehension of any occasion as 'important' 
is integral to the whole complex; the 'important' does not impose itself 
coercively by some sort of historical or logical necessity apart from 
such apprehension. "(27). As he notes, this is the use of "Importance" 
which Whitehead describes in, particularly. Modes ^  Thought, "one 
characterization of importance is that it is that aspect of feeling 
whereby a perspective is imposed upon the universe of things felt. In 
our more self conscious entertaiment of the notion, we are aware of 
grading the effectiveness of things about us in proportion to their
(26) PR pl8.
(27) Christology Reconsidered pi03.
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interest."(28). An event becomes important when the confrontation with 
that event becomes irresistible, so that the "intensity of feeling leads 
to publicity of expression."(29). It must be emphasised that the term 
"irresistible" does not imply metaphysical necessity, but an invitation 
which requires our free consent. As Rattigan states, "(Pittenger) 
maintains that it is possible to designate as important those occasions 
which objectively have a compelling quality and which subjectively evoke 
an unusually vivid response."(30). The demand for the objective element 
is paramount and Pittenger suggests that objectivity exists insofar as 
"the occasion actually is present to awaken our response; it is not a 
figment of our imagination."(31). It is conceivable that an event which 
is assumed to be important could be imaginary or, at least, imaginary in 
the extent of its importance, and Pittenger is aware of the dangers 
inherent in defining "importance" solely on the basis of a subjective 
apprehension.
Prior to looking at Pittenger’s defence of the claim that Jesus* 
importance is not an illusion, we note hew he deduces the "decisiveness" 
of Jesus from this analysis. Once an event assumes the status of 
importance it "becomes definitive for us. It has a quality of 
decisiveness in our ongoing thought and action."(32). Hence one can say 
that Jesus is decisive for me or, in the community sense, for us. And, 
perhaps equally significant, one can make that claim without the 
"arrogance in claims made by Christians for the finality of their cwn
(28) Modes of Thought p11, cited by Sponheim, Faith and Process p6l.
(29) Mellert op.cit. pi14. In this quotation we see the foundations for the community response, based upon similar public expressions.
(30) Rattigan.M.T., "Christology and Process Thought" p137.
(31) Christology Reconsidered piDC.
(32) ibid. pi00.
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faith."(33).
However, if Pittenger has suoceeded in showing how one can make the 
claim for decisiveness, does he also demonstrate that such a claim is 
valid? Does he show that the event - in this case the "Jesus event" - 
satisfies the objective quality? To some extent such a justification is 
unnecessary. It is sufficient to note that the claim is merely 
decisiveness for Nevertheless, one intuits that some explanation
must be available and forthcoming, firstly, to satisfy humanity's social 
requirements (individual "worlds" or islands are not possible for an 
animal whose nature is to relate) and, secondly, simply to satisfy one's 
cwn curiosity. Pittenger argues to the objective importance of the 
"Jesus event" on the basis that "faith and worship and life and mission 
are based on the disclosure in act of God in Jesus Christ as nothing 
other than 'pure unbounded love'."(34). "Love" is the key to his
verification.
I seem to recall that there was once a fashion for posters and
stickers which proclaimed "Jesus is Love". If my memory is correct, 
these were particularly prevalent on the guitars of enthusiastic chorus 
leadersI That is precisely the message Pittenger requires although, of 
course, it is necessary to demonstrate how the claim is valid. He looks 
particularly at two examples, the community inspired by Jesus and the 
sense in which Jesus is the focus of God's activity (35).
The Epistle to the Ephesians states Jesus’ relationship to the
Church, viewing them both as "intimately and necessarily part of the 
total Christ - event. "(36). Similarly, "the Church is the Body of
(33) ibid. p88. One notes that it is not possible to claim that Jesus is decisiveness for anyone else, unless they are prepared to make the "decisive for me" statement.
(34) ibid. p94.
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Christ, in St. Paul's phrase, because by its means the specific 
awareness of love brought near to men in Christ is known... "(37). The 
Church is a historical reality, well documented and with facts available 
to be known. Thus, the underlying claim made by Pittenger is that, 
because the Church, which is the Body of Christ, demonstrates God's 
love, therefore we can assume Jesus was a demonstration of God's love. 
The effect, the Church, exhibits love, hence the cause, Jesus, must have 
been that love. One notes, however, that, even assuming the general 
validity of Pittenger's argument, it does not provide infallible 
justification of the claim that "Jesus is Love". The argument from the 
nature of the Church has another side. The Church has not always 
exhibited the love of God, indeed there are times when one could not 
envisage anything more remote from the truth. The history of the Church 
is not exclusively the history of love. Nevertheless, Pittenger has 
identified the bridge between ourselves in the twentieth century and 
Jesus, by noting the intimate association between Jesus and the Church.
His second point concerns Jesus as the focus of God's activity in 
the world - the locus of the incarnation. Essentially, one must realise 
that Jesus cannot be divorced from his environment ; we must "avoid the 
fallacy of falsely abstracting a single human being or a particular 
historical occurrence form its context."(38). Our concern, in the
(35) This is not Intended to be a direct reflection of Pittenger's method. He justifies the claim for decisiveness in three ways, community, location of the incarnation and Whitehead's notion of "importance". I have used the third point to illustrate how he is able to derive "decisiveness" and the first two points to show how that claim is verified. ïfy argument for doing so is that, unless one presupposes the possibilities generated by the notion of "importance", the verification of decisiveness is redundant. The notions of "community" and the "locus of the incarnation" represent the twin foundations of Pittenger's christology, its historical reality and the faith of the Church.
(36) ibid. p94.
(37) ibid. p97.
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christological adventure, must be with the whole "Jesus event". God's
dealings with the people of Israel, the legalistic attitudes of the 
Pharisees, the attitudes of the disciples, are all facets of "Jesus".
Similarly, our concern must also lie with subsequent events in addition
to antecedent ones, hence our discussion of Jesus must not neglect the 
response to him, the Church. It is not possible to present a complete 
picture of Jesus without incorporating his past and future in the 
account. Pittenger relates the three tenses by claiming that Jesus, in 
his relationship to God, acts as a focus of all the more general (past 
and future) instances of God's activity with men, "the decisiveness 
which Christians ought to claim is for the divine activity in the world 
of creative advance, given expression in a distinctive fashion in the 
Christ event."(39). To those who claim that Jesus is the sole focus of 
God's activity - in other words, to claim that it is only through Jesus 
that one comes to know God - Pittenger retorts, "we can only trust that 
God is more generous in spirit."(40).
To summarize, we noted that Pittenger's christology is a response 
or obedience type, in which Jesus, he claims, is the exemplary instance 
of what it means for a human being to respond to God. This raises two 
questions. Firstly, hew is it possible to understand God's initiative 
and second, how does the Process account of the human person interpret 
the possibilities for a response? An understanding of that 
relationship, generally between all men and God and, specifically, 
between Jesus and God, is central. Of particular interest was the
simplistic identification of the theory of initial aims with the idea of 
initiative and response. He emphasises the quality of Jesus' response
(38) ibid. p99.
(39) ibid. p99.
(40) ibid. p90.
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and hence characterizes the uniqueness of Jesus anthropologically. It 
is a hummn response. The notion of response is also central to the way 
in which Jesus becomes important. We, in our subjective response to 
him, apprehend Jesus as being decisive for us. His analysis of 
"importance" raises two issues for further discussion, in chapter three. 
One must show how the categories of Process philosophy are potent to
demonstrate hew an event in the past retains sufficient impact for it to
become "important" for a future event and, how that future event (now 
considered as a present event), is able to apprehend a past event in
such a way that it can be decisive. That, philosophical debate, relates
to the next point in which Pittenger highlights the way in which the 
Church is a vital element of christology. Indeed, we noted that he 
identifies the past, present and future as being relevant to a 
description of Jesus, who is the focus of all God's activity. This also 
necessitates an understanding of hew the three tenses are related in an 
account of the historical process.
Whereas Pittenger commenced the christological adventure from a 
position loyal to the faith tradition, Cobb approaches the subject 
rather differently. He states, "a decade ago I argued that Christology 
is possible only where the notions of God and man have been 
clarified.... I still believe that to speak of God as having become 
incarnate in a human being presupposes that we knew something of what we 
mean by the terms 'God' and 'human being’."(41 ). It might be argued 
that the search for knowledge about God and man is metaphysics and, in 
that sense, Cobb places metaphysics in a position of primacy. This is 
implied when he considers the nature of the ideal data for theology, 
"the data for Christian theology must be primitive interpretations of 
Christian experience unconditioned by relativizing factors - an abstract
(41 ) Christ a Pluralistic Igg preface p13.
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ideal. If these data are to be systematized consistently with one 
another and with all other human knowledge, they must be in relation to, 
and in terms of, an adequate and consistent interpretation of all facts, 
that is an adequate philosophy. "(42). Whereas Pittenger uses the
categories of Process philosophy to handle the primitive data as deduced 
frcm the "basic doctrinal aims", Cobb places greater emphasis on the 
philosophical quest, and allows reciprocal communication between 
metaphysical knowledge of God and man and faith. Hence he summarizes 
his method, "the ideal solution is a Christology in which historical 
wisdom and aliveness to present issues fructify each other."(43). For 
that reason, Cobb makes rather more explicit and rigorous use of Process 
philosophy than does Pittenger, "in his project of process 
interpretation Cobb is more faithful to Whitehead than Pittenger who, by 
contrast, tends to 'twist' Whitehead for the purpose of expounding 
Christian faith. "(44). This is not to suggest that Cobb is not also 
critical of Whitehead. Indeed, he advocates reform in almost all 
aspects of the Whiteheadian conceptualities. His competence in dealing 
with the metaphysical abstractions coupled with a desire to explicate 
his theology place Cobb in an excellent position from which to embark on 
the christological adventure (45).
(42) "Theological Data and Method" p222. It is worth noting that in 1 Christian Natural Theology Jesus is mentioned only rarely.
(43) Christ In & Pluralistic Aga p22.
(44) Kao,C.T., "The Particularity and Universality of the Incarnation" pi10.
(45) In the chapter entitled "A Whiteheadian doctrine of God" (Christ in a Pluralistic Ag& ch.V and reprinted in PPCT) Cobb engages in five areas of revision; God as actual entity, God and Time, God and space, God and Eternal objects and God and creativity. In other areas of Process thought Cobb has carried the debate considerably further than Whitehead himself. Particularly relevant in this context will be his contribution to the Process account of the human being.
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The question proposed by Cobb in his article "A Whiteheadian 
Christology" is "hew can we affirm the unique presence of God in Jesus 
in such a way as to avoid detracting from his humanity and yet explain 
his strange authority? ....It may prove useful today to demonstrate 
that Christians can think of Jesus' relation to God as decisively unique 
without involving themselves in absurdity, or irrational acceptance of 
dogma."(46).
In a brief but crucial passage Cobb describes what he sees as the 
chief problem associated with classical christology, "in classical 
philosophy it Is possible to understand how a form is present in a human 
being without distorting or destroying his humanity, but it is 
unintelligible how one substance can enter into another without 
displacing some part of that other substance. ...When the images are 
psychological, much the same results are reached. For God to be present 
and active in Jesus means in classical conceptualities that some aspect 
of what otherwise have been the human Jesus was replaced by God. "(47). 
The most striking defect of classical christology is, therefore, the 
notion of one substance in another. In chapter three I shall discuss in 
greater detail how, in Process terms, it is possible to conceive of the 
presence of one entity in another and, equally crucial, without the 
notion of displacement. Then, according to Cobb, it will be possible to 
affirm the presence and activity of God in Jesus without "detracting 
from his humanity". Cobb's terminology reveals the extent to which this 
presence is real and significant, "A is genuinely and effectively 
present in B, and B would not be what it is apart from this presence. B
(46) PPCT p383. That quotation illustrates the relation between faith and philosophy for Cobb. Faith poses the question (the assumption of uniqueness) but its explanation must be within the limits of philosophy (the avoidance of absurdity and irrationality).
(47) ibid. p384.
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does not first exist and then incorporate A, rather this incorporation 
is constitutive of B's coning into existence."(48). However, he then 
notes, "by itself it does not solve the problem of christology" because 
two additional questions are relevant, "does or can this mode of 
presence apply to God's relation to men?" and, if so, "can we
meaningfully speak of differences in the mode of God's presence in
different men?"(49).
The initial response to Cobb's first question is to repeat 
Whitehead's dictum that God is not an exception. But, as Cobb then
comments, "Interpreters of Whitehead differ in the extent to which they 
differentiate God from actual occasions and the relation of God to 
actual occasions from the relation of actual occasions to each 
other."(50). Cobb himself concludes, "the answer... is affirmative."
God is prehended datum and, as such, is present to an occasion in 
exactly the same way in which any other prehended data are present. 
Indeed, he continues, "we must say that (God) is present in every actual 
occasion. " (51 ). However, the crux of the argument is not the necessary 
presence of God but the possibilities for "presence" which result from 
that necessity.
That consideration provides a satisfactory reply to the first 
issue, but it renders the second aspect more complex. If, as Cobb
asserts, God is present in all occasionsj that does not imply anything
distinctive about Jesus. To rephrase that, "if the mode of prehension
(48) ibid. p385. A and B are "two successive occasions ofhuman experience".
(49) ibid. p385.
(50) ibid. p385. That understates the case! Note for example Sherburne's naturalistic interpretation of Whitehead (see chapter three).
(51) ibid. p385.
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of God by all entities were identical, then the mode of God's presence 
in all entities would be identical, and there would be no possibility of 
asserting that the mode of God's presence in Jesus is unique."(52). In 
order to establish the "difference" (or "uniqueness") factor Cobb 
presents an account of how diversity, with regard to the presence of 
God, is introduced.
Be makes the transition from the language of "prehension" to the 
language of "initial aims" and, because all occasions have a prehension 
of God, states, "the derivation of the initial aim frcm God is common to 
all occasions."(53).
There are three ways in which diversity is introduced. The first 
of these is simply that God's aim for each occasion differs so that, 
"God's presence in every occasion is concretely unique."(54). Given 
that, it is clear that one affirms the "unique presence" of God in 
Jesus. However, that is really to say very little, for it will also be 
noted that Jesus is "unique" in precisely the same way in which every 
other cx3casion is "unique". God's presence in Jesus is unique to Jesus, 
just as God's presence in a particular grain of sand is unique to that 
grain. Diversity is also introduced because "the prehensive 
objectification of God need not be restricted to the initial aim. "(55). 
Clarifying this point he says, "the initial aim ... might be that the 
occasion prehend wider purposes of God or enjoy a peculiar sense of 
intimacy or oneness." This appears to be a derivative of the previous 
point because the additional prehensions are, according to Cobb,
(52) ibid. p386. This contrasts with Pittenger, whose formula"what is actualized in Jesus is potential in all men" is designedto emphasise congruity rather than uniqueness.
(53) ibid. p387.
(54) ibid. p387.
(55) ibid. p388.
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motivated by the initial aim. Thus, it is the initial aim whioh 
introduces the diversity insofar as the initial aim requires other 
prehensions. The third manner in which diversity is introduced results 
frcm the "degree to which God's aim for an occasion is realized."(56). 
This is the freedom for self - determination which is enjoyed by all 
occasions, and is the point made by Pittenger in his response 
Christology. In contrast, the first two modes of diversity emphasise 
the difference in the divine initiative rather than in the response of 
the creature. Cobb, therefore, attempts to define "uniqueness" in two 
ways: a result of God's unique aim for Jesus and as a consequence of
Jesus' actualization of that aim. It will also be noted that the 
problem of the transition from the microcosmic world of occasions and 
initial aims to the macrocosmic world of the man Jesus, relevant to 
Pittenger's christology, has not been confronted by Cobb. There is an 
implicit acceptance that God's unique aim for each occasion implies a 
significant uniqueness for Jesus and also that the notion of "response" 
to the initial aim is as appropriate to Jesus as it is to all actual 
occasions. In later chapters I shall note that Cobb's emphasis on the
uniqueness of God's aim for Jesus is only one side of a complex story 
and, furthermore, examine the relationship between the micro- and macro- 
cosmos. For present purposes, however, it is possible to continue our 
examination of Cobb's christology and note hew he applies his general 
ideas to a theory of the human person. While a detailed description of 
that concept is performed in the next chapter, this section deals with 
Cobb's own application for christology.
The central theme states that "God's presence in Jesus played a 
structural role in the actual occasions constituting his personal 
life... "(57). If one considers the two entities A and B, Cobb
(56) ibid. p388.
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describes the two extreme forms of B's prehension of A. First, "B may 
prehend A in such a way that although important aspects of A are 
re-enacted, the source of these eternal objects has no importance."(38). 
It is the content of the prehension which is important to B, not the 
fact that the origin of the content is A. The second form is such that 
"B may prehend A in such a way that the fact that it is A which it is 
prehending is of paramount importance for the subjective form of B 
rather than the particular aspect of A by which A is objectified."(59). 
Here it is the source not the content which is important. Obvious 
analogies present themselves. If I desire to know the time of a train, 
I am more interested in the content of that information rather than its 
source. On the other hand if I hear the words "I love you", I will be 
more interested in knowing the sourceI In practice it may be assumed 
that most prehensions are a ccmbination of the two extremes (60). 
Without, at the moment, questioning Cobb’s understanding of the initial 
aim, and its relevance to "men", one can agree with his observation 
that, for most men, "what is important is the urge to actualization of a 
particular sort, not the source of the urge."(61). But, he then notes, 
"for some men some of the time the sense that they are being urged or 
called or guided by God becomes a very important part of the experience 
of the initial aim."(62). He suggests that the prophets experienced the 
content of the aim and its source as being of equal importance. Thus,
(57) ibid. p390.
(58) ibid. p390. The reference to "eternal objects" can be ignored in this context. The important point is that "the source......has no importance."
(59) ibid. p392.
(60) It is at that point that my two analogies break down, because, of course, in the first example there is an assumption that the source is authoritative and, in the second, my interest in the subject is promoted after the reception of the content.
(61) ibid. p393.
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apart from the aim for the self, the prophets were also made aware of 
their participation in the integrated whole, an awareness which 
inevitably follows from a knowledge of the divine source of the aim. 
Self - fulfilment, therefore, is interpreted as the process of 
actualizing one’s cwn purpose in the lig^t of one’s participation in the 
greater whole. Thus, "the obligation to bear and communicate such 
meanings against his natural feeling and thinking was the ground of 
Jeremiah’s discovery of his selfhood as ’I’."(63). Although he argues 
that the set of individuals who, like Jeremiah, experience the source of 
their aim is numerically small, it is by no means unique. He says of 
Jesus, however, "in his case the prehension of God was one for which
specific content was of secondary importance. God’s aim for Jesus was
that he prehend God in terms of that which constitutes him as God. This 
prehension was not experienced by Jesus as information about God but as 
the presence of God to and in him. Furthermore, and most uniquely, it 
was not experienced by him as one prehension alongside others.... 
rather this prehension constituted in Jesus the center from which 
everything else in his psychic life was integrated... The ’I’ of Jesus 
was constituted by his prehension of God."(64). Cobb’s claim that this 
implies the uniqueness of Jesus requires further examination. There are 
two possible approaches. Either, God determines the uniqueness, by
(62) ibid. p393. Empirical evidence suggests that most people feel a sense of purpose and, indeed, some may, at times, attribute the origin of this purpose to God. Hence, if Cobb hadsubstituted "purpose" for "initial aim", his analysis hasimmediate impact. As it is formulated, however, the problem remains: is it possible to give empirical intelligibility to thenotion of the initial aim?
(63) ibid. p393. It is not clear why Cobb introduces a tension here between Jeremiah’s (the person’s) "natural feeling and thinking" and the requirements of the total environment, implied by his use of the word "against".
(64) ibid. p393. As Griffin says, "the basic notion of this Christological idea was initiated by Schleiermacher insofar as he suggested that the person’s psyche can be structured differently..." (A Process Christology p227).
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forcing Jesus to prehend him as "that which constitutes himself as God", 
or Jesus responds in a unique manner. In terms of Process philosophy 
the first option is difficult to justify because the fundamental process 
of change is non deterministic. Hcwever, once the emphasis is placed on 
Jesus as the responding subject we note that, even if Jesus' response 
was unique, that does not imply a significant "uniqueness" for Jesus. 
Suppose that at some future time a similar response is made. Does that 
imply that Jesus would become "one of two"? Clearly, any "uniqueness" 
attributed to Jesus must not be qualified by the notion of "...so far". 
During the discussion I shall attempt to provide a definition of the 
uniqueness of Jesus which avoids these problems. It is, nevertheless, 
worth quoting James' comment, "Process theology assigns uniqueness to 
every finite particular but special uniqueness to none."(65). We shall 
note that in the second phase of Cobb's christology the quest for 
uniqueness does not play a primary role. At this stage in the 
discussion I shall briefly mention the problem of associating 
"uniqueness" with God's unique aim for all occasions. Cobb states that 
"...the aims provided by God for the successive occasions of Jesus' 
experience were markedly different fr<mi those provided by God for other 
persons."(66). The difficulty here is to give proper significance to 
that statement in the light of the fact that all aims are different (for 
example, Cobb's aims are unique to Cobb) and, furthermore, the fact that 
all aims are essentially identical insofar as all aims are the "best for 
that impasse."(67).
In summary of Cobb's "uniqueness" christology, so characterized
(65) James,R., "Process Cosmology and TheologicalParticularity.", in PPCT p400.
(66) "Finality of Christ in a Whiteheadian Perspective", TheFinality of Christ. Kirkpatrick,D.(Ed). p144.
(67) PR p244.
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because he sets out to give intelligibility to the notion of the 
uniqueness of Jesus, one can make the follcwing points. After 
establishing the necessary presence of God in all occasions, he proposes 
that diversity in this presence exists in three forms, different initial 
aims, other prehensions resulting frcm those initial aims and the 
different responses of the occasions. Jesus' response was, Cobb 
suggests, unique because he, and he alone, prehended with paramount 
importance the source of the aim. Additionally, Cobb postulates 
uniqueness by virtue of the "markedly different" aims which God gave to 
Jesus. Hence, this aspect of his christology is a combination of a 
response based christology and one which emphasises the uniqueness of 
the divine initiative.
The second phase of his christology exhibits a totally different 
approach. He goes beyond the specific historical figure of Jesus in an 
attempt to universalize the meaning of Christ. Whereas he initially 
understood "incarnation" to imply the unique presence of God in Jesus, 
in his later christology it no longer refers solely to the Jesus event.
Kao summarizes the shift in Cobb's christology thus, "Christ is not 
so much a person as a process; he is not just Jesus but any incarnation 
of the Logos in the present or that is to come. While Cobb still argues 
for the unique presence of God in Jesus, the incarnation is no longer 
confined to some event or entity. Whenever there is a new actualization 
of creative transformation, there is incarnation. "(68). The twin 
thrusts of pluralism and secularism mitigate against a view of Christ 
which is the "absolutization of one pattern of life against 
others. "(69). The requirement for the universality of Christ is the 
theme which, in Cobb's later christology, takes precedence over the
(68) Kao op.cit. p128.
(69) Christ in a Pluralistic Age. p21.
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claim for the uniqueness of Jesus.
Universality is achieved through what Cobb terms "Creative 
Transformation." He means, "that process in which our imagination and 
life orientation can be transformed by lucidity of vision and openness 
to what we see."(70). He adds that Christ is the "image" of creative 
transformation. Our first task is to clarify the notion of creative 
transformation and ask hew Christ is its image. Furthermore, it is 
necessary to define how Christ is related to the particular, the 
historical man Jesus, and note how Cobb employs the Logos in this 
respect.
Creative transformation is a concept which, properly speaking, 
defies attempts to give it a strict definition. It is always subject 
dependent and it is not an event which may be objectified or described 
by, or in terms of, other specific events. It incorporates the idea of 
a paradigm shift, yet not all occurrences of creative transformation are 
as dramatic. Similarly, what may function as an event of creative 
transformation in one individual or culture may not be defined as such 
in another. As Cobb emphasises that last point, "relativism in a very 
important sense is simply true."(71). The process of creative 
transformation takes place in all cultures, and has done so throughout 
history. It is not solely associated with a claim of Christianity nor, 
necessarily, even with a wider "religious" claim (72).
In the introduction to his study Cobb states, "'Christ' names what
(70) ibid. p21.
(71) ibid. p19.
(72) For that reason it is important to appreciate that Christ In a Pluralistic Age is not simply a book dedicated to the study of christology. Its primary theme is creative transformation; specifically christological themes are secondary and Jesus is tertiary.
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is experienced as supremely important when this is bound up with 
Jesus."(73). It is equally crucial to note that 'Buddha' must be 
recognized as rightly naming the reality which is, for vast numbers of 
other people, supremely important. Clearly the names are different. 
Equally obvious is the fact that the realities so named are not the 
same, the suggestion that the names 'Christ' and 'Buddha' are merely two 
different names for the same reality merely disguises the issue. The
reality, the claims associated with Christ or. the Buddha, is not
identical. But an approach of absolute tolerance is equally absurd. 
Christians claim that Christ is supremely important and to suggest 
otherwise is to talk about something other than Christianity. One 
solution to this dilemma is to claim that Christ is supremely important 
for the community of Christians who worship him, whilst maintaining that 
for other religious or cultural groups he may be - for all intents and 
purposes - irrelevant (74). But, again, that does not do justice to the 
Christian claim that Jesus is important for all men. Cobb's resolution 
to this problem, which is essentially that of marrying universality to a 
particular claim for supreme importance, is subtly elegant.
He insists that the names "Christ" and "Buddha" are two different 
names, not for one reality, but for the one process itself, the process 
of creative transformation. The "reality" is different for each 
C(xnmunity which invokes a different name because the reality is that
which the process "calls for at any given moment" (75) rather than the
process itself. In this way Christ and the Buddha both name the one 
process although the demands made by the process in those two, very
(73) ibid. p17.
(74) This is reflected by Pittenger's method, the "importance" of Jesus resulting from the appropriation of him as important by individuals and the community.
(75) ibid. p21.
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different, environments vary. Henoe one can state that Christ is the 
image of creative transformation because, for one particular community, 
he represents the reality which is demanded by the process of creative 
transformation. Having established the universal significance of
Christ, and responded to the problem of reconciling that to the claims
made on behalf of other religions, Cobb is then faced by the need to
relate this to the particular. "Christ", if he is to be the image of
creative transformation, must be grounded in certain historical facts, 
because an image necessitates a reference to a particular. What, then, 
is the relationship between Jesus and Christ?
The two terms are not interchangeable. Jesus refers to the person, 
Christ to the image of creative transformation. He is able to justify 
the move from the man Jesus to his intimate association with Christ, the 
image of creative transformation, by developing a Logos christology. 
This enables him to retain a view of the uniqueness of Jesus, despite 
the fact that he is not attributing the "incarnation" solely to him. 
Logos, according to Cobb is the "cosmic principle of order, the ground 
of meaning, and the source of purpose" (76) and, "the Logos in its 
transcendence is timeless and Infinite, but in its incarnation or 
immanence it is always a specific force for just that creative 
transformation which is possible and optimal in each situation. "(77). 
To summarize those definitions, Cobb states that the Logos "is immanent 
in all things as the initial phase of their subjective aim."(78).
The Logos is not the initial aim provided, by God, to each emerging
(76) ibid. p71. What Whitehead calls the "transcendent source of the aim at the new the principle of concretion, the principle of limitation, the organ of the divine Eros, and God in his Primordial nature."(p71).
(77) ibid. p72.
(78) ibid. p76. The "initial phase of the subjective aim" is the initial aim.
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occasion, but it is present in each emerging occasion jajsL the initial 
aim. In order to illustrate how Cobb relates Logos to Christ, I quote a 
paragraph in its entirety.
"’Christ* is therefore a name for the Logos. No statuent can be 
made about Christ that is not true of the Logos. But ’Christ’ does not 
simply designate the Logos as God as the principle of order and novelty. 
It refers to the Logos incarnate; hence jaa the process of creative 
transformation in and of the world. Of course, what is incarnate is the 
transcendent Logos; so it is not false to attribute to Christ the 
transcendent characteristics of deity as well, but Christ as an image 
does not focus on deity in abstraction from the world but as incarnate 
in the world, that is, as creative transformation. But just as ’Christ’ 
does not name the Logos as such but the Logos as incarnate, so also 
creative transformation is named Christ only by those who recognize in 
it the incarnation of the Logos. It is creative transformation the 
incarnation of the Logos."(79). There is a possible source of confusion 
in that passage. 'Christ' names the Logos as incarnate. Yet Cobb 
defines the Logos to be present in each occasion as its initial aim. 
Therefore, and in order to avoid the identification of Christ with the 
initial aim, one must note a distinction between the notions of 
"presence" and "incarnation". This distinction is readily made. 
Incarnation implies the presence and actualization of the Logos as 
initial aim or, "to whatever extent the new aim is successful, to that 
extent there is creative transformation."(80). The process of creative 
transformation only emerges as entities actualize the presence of the 
Logos as the initial aim. Thus, creative transformation is not a 
process which is imposed upon the world, because it relies upon the
(79) ibid. p77.
(80) ibid. p76.
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response of the present occasions to the possibilities for novel 
synthesis. That accords well with Cobb's emphasis on "recognition". 
Those who fail to recognize the incarnation of the Logos are those for 
whom Christ, the image of creative transformation, is redundant. Christ 
only becomes a reality insofar as the power for transformation actually 
exists. But, although this analysis has explained the relation between 
Logos and Christ, it does not relate Jesus to the image of creative 
transformation. And, as Cobb is aware, "unless the power of creative 
transformation discerned in art and theology is also the power that was 
present in (Jesus) and that continues to operate through his word the 
affirmations of Part one cannot stand."(81).
The problem has two aspects. First it is necessary to illustrate 
how, given the terms of Process philosophy, an individual man (Jesus) is 
able to exhibit the qualities of the "Christ". Second, one must show 
that Jesus actually did exhibit those qualities. Cobb's explanation of 
the second point reveals the type of consideration relevant to the 
first. He says, "not only is the Logos itself love but the creative
transformation which is its work in us in human love. That also is not 
immediately apparent; for love as creative transformation is not 
emotion, or sentiment, or moral virtue. It is a way in which the 
process of becoming is formed or structured. But this ontological 
character of love has never been an expendable addition to an already 
formed being. Love is not Christian if it is not constitutive of 
existence... The meaning of love for Christians has been determined by 
Jesus."(82). Jesus is seen as the paradigm of love, the poetry of
(81) ibid, p97. Part One being his analysis of creative transformation, the incarnation of the Logos and the naming of the process "Christ".
(82) ibid. p85. Note the similarity between this definition of love and that of Pittenger. In later chapters I shall examine in more detail what "Christian love" is and how it was exhibited by Jesus.
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creative transformation and the exemplary expression of the incarnate 
Logos. And hence he is the Christ.
Methodologically primary must be the task of the first point, to 
Justify, on philosophical criteria, hew the man Jesus could exhibit the 
exemplary expression of love. The key to Cobb's understanding is the 
notion that the Logos "co-oonstituted" Jesus' "I" (83). He describes 
"ordinary Christian existence" as that in which "the 'I', constituted by 
conformation to its own past, experiences the new possibility provided 
by the Logos as challenging it from without. It is to be taken account 
of. It may be felt to some extent as help, to some extent as demand and 
threat. A person may conform to a considerable degree to the 
possibility provided by the Logos. But the Logos is felt as a force 
other than the self and as acting in relation to the self within the 
total synthesis that is the actual experience. "(84). In this "most 
familiar" structure cf existence the self confronts the Logos as one 
option amongst many. The power for creative transformation is present, 
but only as one element in the myriad of possibilities, one facet in the 
polyhedron of potentiality. But, and this is Cobb's crucial point, this 
is not the only structure of existence. He mentions a very young child 
(the self is constituted by immediate experience) or a primitive tribal 
existence (identity is based on tribal rather than personal experience) 
as examples of other forms. The particular alternative which interests 
Cobb is that in which "the presence of the Logos would share in 
constituting selfhood; that is, it would be identical with the center or 
principle in terms of which other elements in experience are
(83) Chapter three presents an account of a Process theory of the self. I describe it here because it forms an important aspect of Cobb's christology. It is worth noting that he avoids talk of a "common human nature", "there is little common human nature other than the uniquely human capacity to be shaped in history into a wide variety of structures of existence."(p136).
(84) ibid. p139.
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ordered."(85). Again I quote a complete paragraph,
"In that structure the appropriation of one's personal past would 
be just that ideal appropriation made possible by the lure of creative 
novelty that is the immanent Logos. If this occurred, the usual tension 
between the human aim and the ideal possibility of self - actualization 
that is the Logos would not occur. The relation of the person to God 
would not be the confrontation of an 'I* by a 'Thou'. That 
confrontation assumes that the 'I' desires its existence elsewhere than 
from the 'Thou' and is then modified in that relation. That is the case 
when the 'I* is constituted by its reenactment of elements in preceding 
experiences of the person and its anticipation of its own projections 
into the future. Then the Logos may be gratefully received and its 
claim may be recognized as a just and righteous one, but it is felt as 
coming from outside the 'I' and as challenging the natural tendencies of 
the 'I' to seek its cwn narrower interests. But in the structure now 
under consideration, the 'I' in each moment is constituted as much in 
the subjective reception of the lure to self - actualization that is the 
call and presence of the Logos as it is in continuity with the personal 
past. This structure of existence would be the incarnation of the Logos 
in the fullest meaningful sense."(86).
He anticipates what presents itself as the first objection to this 
account of the "I" in his next sentence. He affirms that the self is 
not abolished but perfected by its identification with the Logos. Human 
selfhood, he is claiming is not diminished if the "I" is co-constituted 
by the Logos. To conclude this brief introduction to Cobb's second 
phase in christology, Jesus is related to Christ because Jesus' self, 
being co-constituted by Logos, implies that Jesus ia the process of
(85) ibid. p139.
(86) ibid. p139'40.
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creative transformation which is named Christ. It will be noted that, 
although not primary in his discussion, Cobb retains his argument for 
the uniqueness of Jesus, based upon the manner in which the "I" or 
"self" of Jesus is structured. In that respect, his later christology 
echoes that of "A Whiteheadian Christology". The contrast between the 
two is most apparent when one considers that in his early work he 
explicitly states an intention to "intelligibly affirm the uniqueness of 
Jesus", whereas he shifts his position to concentrate on the 
universality of Christ. Interestingly, he finds that it is necessary to 
affirm the former in order to relate the latter to Jesus. That is, in 
order that his statement about the universality of Christ can be 
relevant to Jesus, he arrives at a position in which the uniqueness of 
Jesus is a necessary corollary.
With reference to Pittenger’s christology I noted that the link 
between the "initial aim" and the human being was not as obvious or 
explicit as he assumed. Cobb, too, makes that assumption. The "I", he 
suggests, can incorporate the Logos in its selfhood, where the Logos is 
present as the initial aim. This notion of the person responding 
Immediately and directly to an initial aim will be considered in the 
next chapter. Although Cobb and Pittenger develop christologles which 
are different, there are also similarities. Perhaps the most striking 
of these is that they both take seriously the person of Jesust 
Pittenger, by stressing the response of the person to God’s initiative, 
Cobb, by highlighting how the Logos is present in the structure of the 
person. The primary difference is one of emphasis. Cobb concentrates 
on a philosophical explication of, firstly the uniqueness of Jesus, 
secontÿ; the universality of Christ whereas Pittenger is more concerned 
with demonstrating how Jesus is important for Christians, employing 
"faith - type" statements as opposed to philosophical ones.
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The christology of Schubert Ogden must be interpreted in the light 
of the following quotation, "there is not the slightest evidence that 
God has acted in Christ in anyway different from the way in which he 
primordially acts in every other event.... and even if it could be 
established that he had, it is clear that such an occurrence would not 
be of the slightest moment to me as an existing self who must win or
lose himself in decision here and now."(87). Griffin is clear about the
dilemma which, he claims, inevitably results, "if God acts the same way 
in relation to the event of Jesus as he acts in relation to every other 
event, and if theology can only make statements about God which apply to 
his relation to every event, it would seem that Ogden has made it doubly 
impossible to assert that Jesus is the decisive act of God."(88). I 
propose here to outline Ogden's christology, note Griffin's response to 
it and then proceed to look at Griffin's alternative. This approach 
implies, as will become evident, that there is a distinct similarity in 
their christology.
If the quotation from Griffin draws our attention to one aspect of 
Ogden's christology it is equally Important to note another. Ogden’s 
theology cannot be extracted from its context of existential relevance. 
That is evident from the second half of the above quotation (89). This 
existentialist concern is perhaps the chief reason why Ogden is in 
agreement with the "crucial insight of the neoclassical theism 
Hartshorne has pioneered in developing" which insists that "God is to be
(87) "Bultmann's Project of Demythologization", Journal ofReligion 37/3 1957 pl69.
(88) Griffin, "Schubert Ogden's Christology and thePossibilities of Process Philosophy." PPCT p349.
(89) See also, for example, the discussion in chapter two of The Point aC Christology. The "question christology answers" is the "existential question" because "it has to do with the ultimate meaning of one's cwn existence as a human being and, therefore, is and must be asked at least implicitly by anyone who exists humanly at all."
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conceived in strict analogy with the human self or person."(90). 
Consequently, "but, if God is thus to be conceived in strict analogy to 
the human self, his action must be understood in strict analogy to the 
action of man."(91). Prior to a description of God's action, therefore, 
it is necessary to clarify the notion of a human act. Ogden identifies 
the primary meaning of "human act" following the tradition of Heidegger 
and Bultmann and, in Process thought, Hartshorne. Behind public acts, 
which are the observable results of human actions, there are the acts 
which constitute the self, primarily the decisions facing the self when 
it defines its own purpose or intention. Such internal acts of the self 
are of two kinds, either "it can open itself to the world and make its
(90) Reality s£. God p175. In Point af Christology he states, "....the whole notion of metaphysical analogy... involves serious logical difficulties.... Consequently, the conclusion to which I have finally come is that one can continue to make Christology dependent on a categorial metaphysical theism only at the risk of its theoretical credibility. As a matter of fact, considering the seriousness of the difficulties that metaphysical analogy involves, I strongly suspect that this kind of a metaphysical theism can hardly be less of a problem in answering the truth of Christology than the mythological theism that I, at least, once Intended to demythologize by it."(p136*9) And yet, "I have left no doubt whatever that the christological formulation that Jesus is the Liberator necessarily implies the strict metaphysical assertion that the ultimate ground of the freedcan that Jesus decisively re-presents is the boundless love ofGod."(pi46). So, although in his later work his confidence in metaphysical analogy has diminished, he remains convinced that strict metaphysical assertions are necessary. He calls this the "transcendental metaphysics" derived from Hartshorne. O'Donnell notes "the consequences of (Ogden's) position are quite significant... Theology cannot justify its assertions merely by appealing to special revelatory experiences or to the Word ofGod. According to Ogden, theology can avoid this cul-de-sac only by vindicating its assertions through a fully developed theistic metaphysics."(O'Donnell p59). Without entering the debate in any depth, it appears to me that Whitehead's dictum God is not an exception but rather the chief exemplification (PR p343)guarantees that a degree of analogy is appropriate. One's interpretation of "chief" in this context is important, but the fact that God is an "exemplification" (no matter hew "different") ensures similarity. Furthermore it is only by assuming that some analogy exists between God and man that one is able to make "God-talk" relevant to the human situation.
(91) Reality ^  God. p176. Deleting "strict" from that quotation leaves its essential meaning intact.
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decisions by sensitively responding to all the influences that bear upon 
it or it may close itself against its world and make its decisions on 
the basis of a much more restricted sensitivity than is actually 
possible for it."(92). Ogden is correct to label the first as the self
who loves, the second jas the self who is estranged from the world.
Alternatively, he could contrast them as authentic and inauthentic 
selfhood respectively. Whatever terminology is used, the point is 
clear, the true meaning of the term "human act" is precisely the inner 
act whereby the self is constituted as a self who loves.
Invoking Wesley's description of God as "pure unbounded love" Ogden 
continues, "I take this to imply that the primary meaning of God’s 
action is the act whereby, in each new present, he constitutes himself 
as God by participating fully and completely in the world of bis
creatures."(93).
In the realm of human actions Ogden is particularly interested by 
those which are "peculiarly ours in a way that others are not.. This is 
particularly true of those distinctively human actions in which, through 
word and deed, we give symbolic expression to our own inner beings and 
understandings."(94). These are significant because as characteristic
(92) ibid. p177.
(93) ibid. p177. There is a point of methodologicalsignificance here. Ogden's affirmation of the "puM unbounded love" of God is prior to any metaphysical statement about, or justification of. Divine actions. In one sense, hcwever, that is precisely the implication of Whitehead's "chief exemplification" notion, God is the perfection of love. Without a metaphysical basis for the statement, Ogden would stand accused of making mythological statements about God, which is exactly what he wishes to avoid. Ogden understands acts of God in the world as analogous to a body - mind relationship (following Hartshorne). He says, "because (God's) love or power of participation in the being of others is literally boundless there are no gradations of intimacy of the creatures to him... The world is, as it were, his sense organ, and his interaction with every creature is unimaginably immediate and direct."(pi78).
(94) ibid. pi81.
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actions they reveal (or "uniquely re-present") the self to others. This 
analysis is the key to understanding hew an act of man can become an act 
of God. If, in our human act we give "symbolic expression" to those 
acts by which God is constituted God, his "creative and redemptive" (95) 
acts, then the human acts actually become God's act in a sense 
"analogous to the sense in which some of our own symbolic actions are 
our acts in a way others are not". It is important to note that Ogden 
retains the use of analogy at this point. Our own acts are not precise 
representations of our inner, constituting acts, they only re-present or 
reveal those acts. Similarly, human acts which re-present God's 
creative and redemptive activity are not exact replicas but symbolic 
expressions. Crucial to Ogden's position is the fact that anv act can 
become an act of God, "insofar as it is received by someone as a symbol 
of God's creative and redemptive action."(96). The reception of the act 
is as important as the objective validity of the act of re-presentation. 
In summary, there are human acts in which "nothing less than the 
transcendent action of God himself is re-presented, they are also acts 
of God, that is, they are acts of God analogously to the way in which 
our outer acts are our acts insofar as they re-present our own 
characteristic decisions as selves or persons."(97).
The christological application of this analysis of acts of God is 
that it enables Ogden to affirm hew Jesus is the decisive act of God. 
He says, "....to say of any historical event that it is the 'decisive' 
act of God can only mean that, in it, in distinction from all other 
historical events, the ultimate truth about our existence before God is 
normatively re-presented or revealed. The decisiveness of the event, in
(95) ibid. pi83. The phrase "creative and redemptive" acts ofGod will be a central part of this thesis.
(96) ibid. pl83.
(97) ibid. pl83.
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other words, lies in its power to decide between all the different and 
conflicting historical claims to reveal the divine logos or meaning 
everywhere discernible to our experience."(98). The notion of
"normative" is not Immediately reconciled with Ogden's claim "that any 
event ever becomes such a decisive act of God is, naturally, also a
function its being received and understood by someone as having
decisive revelatory power. A revelation is not only a revelation of 
something, but also a revelation M  somebodv."(99). I think it is 
important to emphasise that the re-present at ion of the revelation in 
Jesus becomes normative when it is received as such. This, of course, 
echoes Pittenger's views on "importance". To claim that Jesus is the
decisive act of God is to claim that in him, in his acts which are
symbolic of God's creative and redemptive activity, "there is expressed 
that understanding of human existence which is, in fact, the ultimate 
truth about our life before God. "(100). Once we receive the
re-presentation through Jesus we are able to realize authentic existence 
as human beings. Ogden carries the argument one stage further to state 
that, because God's creative and redemptive action is decisively
re-presented in Jesus, "this can only mean that he actually la God's
decisive act."(101).
A possible criticism of Ogden at this point is the extent to which
(98) ibid. pl84, "re-presentation" implies that what is revealed in Jesus is no different than what is presented to man in God's original revelation. See Christ without Myth pi56.
(99) ibid. pl85.
(100) ibid. pi86.
(101) ibid. pi86. Ogden realizes that his argument presupposes a certain interpretation of the Gospels, that is, as a "transparent means of representing a certain possibility forunderstanding human existence  expressing symbolically anunderstanding of our existence coram dec."(pi86). He claims the support of, for example, the scholars noted in Robinson's A New Qu^g.t s£. Historical Jesus. SOM 1959.
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he is employing a circular argument. He defines Jesus as the decisive 
act of God because be re-presents a particular understanding of 
existence. The latter is defined as that understanding of existence
which is a symbolic expression of God's creative and redemptive acts. 
But Ogden seems unable to decide the epistemological primacy of God or 
Jesus. If Jesus is the normative or decisive re-presentation of God's 
act, then God is known through Jesus. Hcwever, for Ogden to make that 
statement about Jesus he had to define God as a God of creative and 
redemptive action who, by virtue of his "pure unbounded love", is
intimately involved with creation. In other words, he has to define the 
"original" revelation which Jesus decisively re-presents. There must be 
a prior knowledge of God, known independently of Jesus, from which it
can be deduced that Jesus is the normative re-presentation of that. For
Ogden, it is possible to claim that the analogy of God's action to human 
action enables humanity to recognise the creative and redemptive action 
of God. Furthermore, although Ogden has shewn how Jesus can act in such 
a way that he re-presents or reveals a divine act - and hence becomes an 
act of God - he has not yet exhibited reason to extrapolate this as a 
decisive act. This revolves around his use of the word normative which, 
as I have noted, incorporates the idea of reception âS decisive. He 
states, "no event can become a decisive act of God unless we receive it 
as determinative of our self - understanding."(102). Griffin's 
criticism of Ogden (which we shall examine shortly) is essentially aimed 
at that point. How, he asks, can Jesus be decisive if this depends upon 
our subjective reception of him?
One of the most important corollaries of Ogden's christology is 
developed in Point ^  Christology. He says, ".. the conditions of 
asserting a christological predicate in no way require that Jesus must
(102) Reality of God pi 85.
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have perfectly actualized the possibility of authentic self - 
understanding. On the contrary, because the function of any 
christological predicate is to assert somehow that Jesus is the decisive 
re-presentation of the meaning of God for us, and hence the meaning of 
ultimate reality for. us, the only condition of truthfully asserting it 
is satisfied if the God whose gift and demand are made fully explicit 
through Jesus is indeed what is ultimately real..."(103). Jesus is the 
decisive act of God because he re-presents God's promise and demand, not 
because he himself actualized that same promise and demand. This frees 
the theologian from the quagmire surrounding the contentious debate of 
Jesus' perfection (104). However, it does leave unanswered the question 
as to whether Jesus of Nazareth actually is the re-presentation of God's 
original creative and redemptive act. As I have noted, Ogden accepts 
that this calls for a particular interpretation of the Gospels. He 
develops this interpretation, describing it as "deideologizing" or a 
"political interpretation. "(105). The key word in this respect is 
"freedom", Ogden develops what is a thorough - going liberation 
christology. He says, "if Jesus who is said to be Christ means love in 
this sense (as authorizing our cwn possibility of authentic faith and 
love) one may evidently say that Jesus also means freedom."(106).
(103) Point Christology p87.
(104) It must be noted that Ogden is not saying that Jesus did not actualize the possibility for authentic self - understanding (see Point Christology p69) but that it is not necessary that he did so in order to validate his central christological assertion.
(105) ibid. p94. (where "political" is equivalent to Niebuhr's notion of the achievement of justice through the equlibria of power.)
(106) ibid.122. Note that he adds "but even if one argues... that any claim about Jesus' own perfect freedom is as theologica]$y unnecessary as it is historically Impossible, one can still join in affirming the the meaning of Jesus for us is precisely the possibility of the existence of freedom."(pi22). I shall say more about the freedom of the individual in chapter three, and the freedom of Jesus in chapters four and five.
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At this point it is possible to make a few comments in summary of 
this aspect of Ogden's christology. First, concerning his use of 
analogy. Although he has subsequently written against the position, he 
makes use of analogy in order to relate God's actions to human actions. 
God, he suggests, is, because his nature is "pure unbounded love", 
intimately involved with creation, in a manner analogous to the body - 
mind relation. Second, he argues that Jesus is the decisive 
re-presentation of the original revelation of God's creative and 
redemptive activity. It is important to note that "decisive" is a 
product of the mode of reception and, in addition, this christological 
affirmation does not depend upon Jesus' perfect actualization of the 
possibilities authorized through the revelation. Several issues are 
raised for further consideration. His account of "human action" must be 
scrutinized in the light of Process philosophy, along with his notions 
of God's creative and redemptive action and "freedom". Furthermore, one 
might question the extent to which "decisiveness" is achieved or, 
indeed, whether his picture of Jesus satisfies the Gospel accounts. 
Chapters three, four and five will respond to these issues.
Griffin's examination of Ogden's christology (107) notes those 
questions and it is to Griffin's response that I now direct attention. 
He agrees that analogy is a necessary mode of thinking, "unless we have 
a way of thinking of God's action as analogous to our own we have no way 
of speaking intelligibly of God's action at all."(108). He also defines 
a "special act" of a person as one which is peculiarly his, but, at 
least to some extent, the difference between his and Ogden's position is 
reducible to their respective understandings of what that means. For
(107) "Schubert Ogden's Christology and the Possibilities of Process Philosophy", PPCT.
(108) Process Christology p206. He expresses agreement with Gilkey on this point.
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Ogden, a special act is one which re-presents or reveals the inner 
person, the true self, of the one who acts if, and only if, that act is 
received by someone as revelatory. Ogden, therefore, equates a special 
act with a revelatory one. Griffin, however, implies a distinction. He 
says, "in my usage the emphasis is on the causal relation between the 
inner being of the person and the nature of the outer act... A 
revelatory act would have both an objective and a subjective aspect; the 
objective aspect of it would be the special act."(109). This differs 
from Ogden's view, in which "the 'specialness' of a special act is 
entirely a function of someone other than the person whose special act 
it is."(110). Griffin's fundamental criticism of that position is that 
it fails to do justice to the objective intention behind the act, "when 
we say that a particular outer action is peculiarly ours we mean that 
the act is such that it in fact is an expression of our inner being, and 
thus we mean to imply something about the intentional ity of the 
act."(111). He wants to add the notion of motive or intention which 
lies behind the act to its subjective appropriation by another person, 
before one can attribute revelatory status to that act. His examples go 
some way to illustrate his point. An act which appears to be unselfish 
might, in fact, have been inspired by very selfish motives. To adapt 
his own example, (112) the motorist who relinquishes the opportunity to 
park in the last remaining space may either have failed to see the empty 
slot, or wanted to avoid the possibility of the traffic warden noticing 
his expired tax disc, or acted out of kindness to his fellow motorists. 
Griffin's point is essentially that the external, observable, act 
remains constant despite the variations in the intention. How,
(109) PPCT p352.
(110) ibid. p353.
(111) ibid. p353.
(112) Process Christology p212.
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therefore, can the mere reception of an act reveal the actor's inner 
self? Thus, "the specialness of a special act is partially a function 
of the jjerson whose special act it is."(113). Similarly, for special 
acts of God, "the specialness of it would have to be partially a 
function of God."(114).
The implication of this is, for an act of God to be a special act, 
God must somehow act differently. Ogden's desire to avoid mythological 
language required that he negates that notion; God does not act 
differently in his "special acts". In contrast, Griffin believes that 
the opposite affirmation is necessary, to stress the role of God's 
initiative behind his special acts.
Prior to a brief description of how Griffin develops his cwn 
christology, we should ask whether his analysis of Ogden is justified. 
Particularly, is Griffin's claim that Ogden's definition of a special 
act entails that it is "entirely a function of someone other than the 
person whose special act it is"(115) correct? One recalls that Ogden 
made an early distinction between different kinds of human act. The 
true meaning of the term is, he claimed, precisely the act by which the 
self is constituted as a self which loves. This definition includes a 
notion of intentionality, the sense in which the intention of the self 
is to constitute itself as an authentic, loving, self. Acts which do 
not enter that category are not human acts in the proper meaning of that 
term. This implies that, although it is the recipient who distinguishes
(113) PPCT p354.
(114) ibid. p354. He explains the word "partially" as follows, "the specialness is also partially a function of the creature, since the creature has a certain freedom in regard to actualizing God's intention for it."(fn.35 p354). This is also analogous to the human case because the outer act is only partially a function of the mind's intention. It depends, in part, upon the body's ability to perform the intention which is given to it.
(115) ibid. p353.
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between a special act (a revelatory one) and an ordinary act, it is, 
nevertheless, possible for Ogden to point to the intentionality which 
permeates the act. If the inner act constitutes the self as lover, the 
outer, visible, act permits its reception as a revelation of that self 
aa lover (116).
Griffin's motorist example illustrates the difficulties in making 
the transition from an observed act to a statement of intention.
However, in a wider context, it fails to convey, in any significant
sense, the point Griffin attempts to express. It is by no means obvious 
how that particular situation would relate to an act whereby a self is 
constituted as a self which loves. Is "love" a notion which has 
relevance to single, isolated acts? In other words, does it make sense 
to speak about solitary acts as being responsible for, or permissive of, 
a revelation of a loving, authentic self? These questions are discussed 
further in the following chapter.
There is an additional difficulty inherent in Griffin's argument 
once he leaves motorists and begins to discuss God. He assumes that, in 
the case of human acts, the intention behind the act can vary, it may be
selfish or it may constitute the self as lover. But, is it possible to
regard God's intention as varying? Surely, faith insists that God's 
intention is constant, the divine vision does not vary and his acts are 
always motivated by his "pure unbounded love". That sense of permanence 
is conveyed in the words, "Abide with me..."(117). It is also the
(116) Griffin might reply that, according to Ogden, it is irrelevant whether, in fact, the self is constituted by acts of love. If the observer thinks it is, that is receives an act as such, then the condition for a revelation of the self as lover is satisfied. My point is, for Ogden, this cannot be a revelation of that self because unifias the self actually is constituted as a self which loves, there is no such self. And it is meaningless to talk about a revelation of a non - existing self.
(117) See Pailin,David, "God as Creator in a Whiteheadian Understanding."
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meaning conveyed by Whitehead's "best for that impasse" formula. 
Whatever the circumstances of the world may be, God always desires the 
"best", the maximization of beauty (118). The crucial implication is, 
if God's acts are always motivated by his self as lover (reiterating 
once again Wesley's words), all his acts are (potentiallys subject to 
their reception) all special, they all reveal him as God. As Griffin 
himself notes, "God's acts in the primary sense are formally all the 
same... he acts by constituting himself in each moment."(119). It is 
not possible to avoid the conclusion to that statement, that, therefore, 
all God's acts are potentially revelatory (120). After considering the 
fact that Ogden's theory incorporates "intention" and having noted the 
difficulties of Griffin's alternatives, it transpires that Ogden's 
analysis of action, human and divine, is not invalidated by Griffin's 
criticism. To conclude this section we should note how Griffin develops 
his christology on the basis of the previous analysis. He employs the 
concept of the initial aim, noting that, "a certain event would be an 
act of God only to the degree that the creature actualized God's will 
for it."(121). One's instant reaction to that should be to note that it 
is a statement which emphasizes the role of response, the part played by 
the recipient, not the intention of the person whose act it is. Second^
(118) Perhaps it is a simplistic interpretation, but it seems to me that the essence of, for example, the parable of the Prodigal Son is to convey the fact that God's love is constant, nothing can sway the Father's love for his son.
(119) A PEas@a& Cbr.ig-tal.ftgy. p2i4.
(120) At least, not without denying the constancy of God'sintention. Additionally one might ask how one could knew God's intention at arqr moment, unless one is able to assume that it is unchanging love. It seems to me that, unless we can treat all acts of God as potentially revealing of himself as God (as lover), we will be unable to consider any acts as beingrevelatory (we can have no criteria to knew which ones).
(121) PPCT p356. This use of the initial aim is subject tothe same comments made in connection with Pittenger and Cobb.That is, is it possible to give credibility to the notion of initial aims for men?
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he observes, quite correctly, that some of our actions have little 
inherent ability to express our inner selves. For example, the act of 
cleaning one's teeth has few possibilities for "personal expression". 
Two points follow. Firstly, the circumstances of the event in question 
are a product of the world's response, not of God's initiative. To be
more accurate one should say that the impasse, which is a given for God,
is a product of the world's response and the divine vision because that 
response is, of course, itself a response to an initiative. To that 
extent, therefore, God's opportunities in the world are limited by what 
the world gives to God. Similarly, it is possible to choreograph a 
dying swan because it has the potential to convey the richness of human 
emotion, but it is unlikely that the act of tying one's shoe laces will
ever be danced on stage with the same effect. Different situations and
different actions have various possibilities to reveal human nature. 
Secondly, despite the fact that God is confronted by a world with only 
limited potential for his self - expression (in acts of creative and 
redemptive love) his intention remains constant, he seeks to maximise 
love, within those predefined boundaries. Although the "whatness" of 
the intention varies, the intention itself is invariant.
Griffin uses his analysis of a special act, and the possibilities 
for a revelatory act, to respond to what he calls the problem of 
christology, "to understand, not how God could be present in Jesus, but 
how God could be present in him in a special way, so that Jesus would be 
especially revelatory of God's nature."(122), Rather than providing a 
comprehensive survey of Griffin's christology it suffices to make a few
(122) Process Christology pi80. He quotes, as general support for a "revelation christology", Whitehead's "the essence of Christianity is the appeal to the life of Christ as a revelation of the nature of God and of his agency in the world. " (Adventures of Ideas pi 67). Sponheim says of Griffin that revelation is the "controlling category" in his christology (Faith and Process pl61).
—  63 —
The Inspiration: Faith.
brief comments about the general issues. Both Ogden and Griffin offer 
"revelation christologies" and points common to both can be made. 
Firstly, it will be necessary to clarify the notion of God acting in 
order to ascertain the possibility for revelation. Then, one must 
discuss the nature of the reception of revelation and, indeed, the 
content of revelation. The discussion must also resolve the debate 
between Ogden and Griffin regarding the subjective and objective aspects 
of a special act. These, and other, issues which have emerged in this 
chapter must be discussed in more detail. Primarily, it is evident that 
the first task must be to examine how God acts in the world (123). This 
must consider the world as understood in terms of "initial aims" and how 
this relates to the notion of man's response to God (124). Particular 
emphasis must be given to the question of what constitutes a human 
person and how, therefore, the response to God is possible (125). Then 
one can understand how the world, and the human Individual is able to 
actualize the potentiality in the relation with God (126) and, finally, 
how it is possible to conceive of God acting in a "special way". One 
might also note that the four authors cited in this chapter have 
employed different terminology in their christologies. Pittenger 
stressed "importance", Cobb "uniqueness / universality", Ogden 
"normative / decisive" and Griffin, the "intention" behind a revelatory 
act. It is not the purpose of this thesis, however, to risk sacrificing 
critical analysis for the sake of mere word-play. The study revolves
(123) This is the basic key to any christology. All four of the authors examined here make it a central point.
(124) This problem has not been considered by any of the Process theologians discussed in this chapter. It has been assumed that the notion of a man responding to his initial aim is intelligible.
(125) This will be based upon Cobb's account of the self, but Ogden's account of "action" will also be relevant.
(126) The essence of a "response" christology.
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around a discussion of the concepts involved in the christological 
adventure, not the linguistic subtleties which pertain to considerations 
of language. Having made that point it is also worth noting that 
lemguage is important. Any term or phrase conveys more than its 
dictionary definition', it might be suited to a philosophical statement 
or it might express an essential religious sentiment. During the course 
of the discussion I shall attempt to restrain the temptation to allow 
emotive words to disguise the real issues and, conversely, not to permit 
philosophical terminology to dominate whatever "sentimentality" or 
emotion might be a necessary adjunct to the study. Both sides of that 
qualification are equally important.
The Process christologies presented in this Chapter have been 
assumed to represent a broad statement of the Christian faith. The 
issues which have been derived from them must now be scrutinised in the 
framework of Whitehead's vision, the categories of Process philosophy.
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The christologlcal adventure Is not, primarily, dedicated to the
individual man, Jesus. Rather, its chief concern must remain with God
or, more accurately, God in his relationship to - and with - the world. 
Hence Sponheim, "while the Christian passion of faith may appropriately 
focus on the figure of Jesus, Christian theology only serves faith well 
if it can speak clearly of God. It is, after all, the lamb God who
takes away the sins of the world" and, similarly, he speaks of the
"logical and theological dependence of Christology on the doctrine of 
God."(1). This relationship forms the subject of the present chapter.
The use of the word "world" might not appear to present any
difficulties. However, it is necessary to define precisely how the term
is being employed in this context. The "world" might mean - and in one
sense it obviously does mean - the world of real things, the Castle
rock, inanimate objects, living cells and human persons. And yet, in
Whitehead’s philosophy, the "world" is thought of as being composed of
actual entities, which are hardly instantly recognisable from the
previous list. Although, of course, these "two" worlds are the same, it
is not a trivial task to relate the metaphysical principles which govern
the latter to the "real" things of the former. The intention of this
chapter is to demonstrate that it is not possible, within Process
thought, to apply the metaphysical principles which are relevant to the
microcosmos directly to the macrocosmic world. The first section of
this chapter deals exclusively with the world as it is composed of
actual entities. This will enable the next section to relate this to
(1) Faith and Process p179. But such a claim is not always self - evident. For example, "death of God" theologians do attempt to speak of Christ without reference to God. See, for example, Paul van Buren's The Secular Meaning jBf Gospel or, particularly noteworthy in this context, Sherburne’s article "Whitehead without God", Process Philosophy a M  Christian .TbQVlKh.t (PPCT) p306. Other theologians argue that all knowledge of God is achieved through Christ. For example, Mackinnon writes, "for Barth there are no problems in theology which are not in the end Christocentric." (Borderlands p65).
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the world of sensory perception and human experience (2).
It is not necessary to invoke subtle distinctions in order to make 
the point that the use of the word "God" is even more problematic! 
Neville provides a dramatic statement of this when he writes, 
"Whitehead's conception of God is largely mistaken and an alternative 
conception is to be preferred."(3). We might not be overly concerned by 
this claim if it were not for one potentially devastating fact; Neville 
arrives at his conclusion after a study of the principles of Process 
philosophy. The impact of his claim is precisely that it is based on 
the same criteria which Whitehead used to formulate his concept of God.
It is a debate internal to Process thought. It is also, therefore, a 
debate which cannot be ignored by any theologically orientated enquiry 
into Process thought. Although space will not permit a full examination 
of his arguments it is nevertheless essential to demonstrate hew they 
may be refuted. It is not necessary to describe in detail Whitehead’s 
concept of God, our concern is how God relates to the world rather than 
with a particular concept. However, two aspects are relevant. Firstly, 
the notion that God is a single actual entity and, secondly, the 
function of God in the creative process.
Whitehead introduced God as a derivative notion, a feature of his 
thought which is portrayed by some as an example of rationalistic 
natural theology. For example, MacQuarrie writes, "Whitehead’s 
philosophy, which, for all its elaboration and difficult terminology,
(2) Blyth uses the terms micro- and macro- in Whitehead’s Theory sL Knowledge (p13). The use of "macro-" is slightly different because, for Blyth, it refers to the transitions between actual entities. However, insofar as a "real" thing is a result of those transitions, its general usage is similar.
(3) Creativity and God p2. See also Leclerc,I., "The Problem of God in Whitehead’s System", lecture (undelivered) Univ. of Manchester. Nov.1984, "Whitehead's conception of God as an 'actual entity’ is unacceptable."(p26).
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presents an argument for the existence of God which is 'primarily the 
traditional one from the order of the universe to a ground of 
order.'"(4): Et hoc dicimus Deum! Cobb, however, is aware that the
situation is more complex than MacQuarrie *s attempt to label Whitehead a 
rationalist allows. He states, "the argument is not a proof... "(5). 
However one wishes to interpret the "argument" it is clear that 
Whitehead did not find room for God merely to satisfy a relic of 
religious feeling, "Whitehead was brought to speak of God by his 
reflection on the relation of events to actuality on one side and 
possibility on the other. "(6).
This "argument" is presented in a convenient and clear fashion by 
Christian (7),
A) The real world is made up of actual entities.
B) Some real things have temporal beginnings.
C) Some actual entities have temporal beginnings.
The conclusion is given by,
P) There is a primordial and everlasting actual entity.
P is contingently true if any of the premises A,B,C, are only
contingently true and necessarily true if all the premises are also î
necessarily true. If one examines premise A, it transpires that P can |
(4) Thinking about God p133. He is quoting Cobb, Christian IHa.t.ur.iaX Ifeeglagy pi69.
(5) Christian Natural Theology p170. His "alternative interpretation" is as follows, "There is a deep human intuition that the order of the world requires for its explanation some principle of order that cannot entirely be attributed to the entities that constitute the world. To many people, this intuition amounts to a virtual certitude."(p170).
(6) Cobb, "Man in Process" p4l. Hocking quotes Whitehead, "I should never have included it, if it had not been strictly required for descriptive purposes." (op.cit. pl6).
(7) "The Concept of God as a Derivative Notion", pi95 Processa M  PlY.lni.ty
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only be contingently true. Christian suggests two reasons why this is 
so. Firstly, "(Whitehead) does not claim to have deduced his system 
from premises which are clear, certain and sufficient.... He does not 
deduce his system; he constructs it"(8), or, in Whitehead's words,
"metaphysical categories are not dogmatic statements of the obvious; 
they are tentative formulations of the ultimate generalities."(9). 
Second, Christian continues, "he does not claim that all possible 
alternatives to his system are absurd". That is, it is possible to 
replace A by, say. A* or A", without necessary absurdity.
Although this analysis mitigates against the necessary truth of 
Whitehead's need for a conception of God (10) two points are relevant. 
In this context the argument proceeds assuming the basic validity of
premise A. Furthermore, it is reasonable to suggest that if the 
corollaries and subsequent Implications of that are shown to be valid 
(11) then this is a sufficient justification for that assumption. 
Christian summarizes his argument, "These provide a strong meaning for 
saying that God as conceived in Whitehead's philosophy is a necessary 
being. But saying the concept of God is the concept of a necessary 
being is not the same as saying the concept of God is a necessary 
concept. It is true that it is systematically necessary; without it 
Whitehead's speculative system would be inconsistent or incomplete or 
both. But it is categoreally contingent, since it is a derivative 
concept. And since its existential truth - claim depends not only on
(8) op.cit. p196.
(9) PR p8.
(10) Perhaps, however, we can agree with Jordan, "it is fair to say that the place of God in Whitehead's philosophy is at least as essential as wheels to a wheelbarrow. " New Shanes of Realitypi 29.
(11) Where valid implies logical, coherent, applicable and adequate.
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the consistency and coherence of Whitehead’s system but also on its 
adequacy, the concept of God in Whitehead's philosophy is existentially 
contingent."(12).
Neville argues that the conclusion P, a "primordial and everlasting 
actual entity", is an inadequate concept of God. In his chapter 
entitled "Process and Eternity" he is concerned with two, intimately 
related, questions; how does God know the world, and hew does the world 
know God? Whitehead suggests that God is a single actual entity, so 
that if God and the world are able to "know" each other then it is 
necessary that there should be prehensions which take place between 
contemporary occasions. But Whitehead's definition of contemporary 
occasions would appear to prevent this, "A and B are mutually 
contemporary when A does not contribute to the datum for B, and B does 
not contribute to the datum for A"(13), and, "actual entities are called 
'contemporary' when neither belongs to the 'given' world defined by the 
other."(14). This definition clearly states that two contemporary 
entities are not available for prehension by each other. This follows 
from Whitehead's insistence that only actual things can be prehended. 
In response to this, various theories have been forthcoming which allow 
prehensions to take place between an entity and an incomplete entity, or 
a phase of an entity (15).
An alternative approach argues that God is a society of actual 
entities. This is best represented by Hartshorne's social conception of 
God (16). The immediate advantage of this concept is that it replies
directly to Neville's criticism of Whitehead's concept. If God is a
(12) op.cit. pi98. As we shall see later it has also beenargued that the concept of God is unnecessary in Whitehead'ssystem.
(13) PR p123.
(14) PR p66.
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society of entities then he can prehend the world, and he is available 
for prehension by the world, in exactly the same manner in which any 
entity can prehend any other, non - contemporary, entity. Neville
accepts that point but raises two further issues about it.
Firstly, "because each divine occasion prehends the absolute and 
necessary nature of divinity in a previous divine occasion, God is
always and everywhere subject to the strictures of necessity.... but 
most theistic religious traditions suggest that God, in at least some 
respects, transcends the limits of necessity and perhaps even creates 
them." Secondly, "if God is limited to the society of divine experience 
- of the world and of divine occasions - the contingent and relative 
occasions must contain the universal principles of necessity 
exhaustively within themselves ; Yet it is difficult to see how a 
universal can be exhausted in even an infinite set of
instantiations."(17).
Neville's first point echoes Ely's "the God that Whitehead derives 
from metaphysical analysis is not the God of religions."(18). But, that 
is not the correct test to apply to a doctrine of God, as, indeed,
Neville has already noted. Although that is an element of his
(15) The argument has been developed by Ford, (see Nevilleop.cit. pl6 n17). He suggests that because an incomplete phase of an actual entity is determinately individual it is available to be prehended as such. However, because there is no possibility of existentially isolating an incomplete phase it is only possible to knew them as abstractions. It is, therefore, only the idea of an incomplete phase which is known. Thompson's Whitehead's Philosophy jq£ Religion surveys these notions. Janzen presents an interesting account of the presence within each other of two contemporary entities, see "Modes of Presence and the Communion of Saints" in Religious Experience ia Process Theology, pi 52.
(16) See, for example Divine Relativity
(17) Creativity and God p33
(18) "The Religious Availability of Whitehead's God; A CriticalAnalysis." p207, EWP.
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objection, the second issue is more Important. Neville is questioning 
the process by which the society which is "God" is capable of ensuring
that the next member of that society is also "God". This is the
question of continuity.
The extent of Neville's examination of Hartshorne's account is 
detailed and comprehensive. To Justify his position on continuity 
Hartshorne has to "deal extensively with the problem of which 
experiences are normative for theories and hew theories give better or 
worse renderings of those experiences. For reasons having to do with 
his theory of a priori metaphysics he does not take up this 
question" ( 19). It is not the purpose of this study to examine this 
general question, but it is possible to summarize Neville's critique. 
If the metaphysical conditions for God are not only possible but 
necessary then "there must be some existing actual entity exhibiting the 
metaphysical conditions... each occasion in the divine life is an 
instance of necessary existence."(20). But, in order to ensure 
continuity, the following must also be true, "any subsequent event would 
prehend the necessity in the antecedent divine event and have to exhibit 
it". Neville states the problem, "but, I argue, if the necessity is 
ccaapletely contained as an abstract part of the antecedent divine event, 
there is no reason for there to be anv subsequent divine event to 
prehend it. Only if the abstract part of the divine nature is normative 
over possible divine events could those possible divine events be
necessitated before they objectify the necessity prehended from their
antecedents."(21). Essentially, Neville is seeking to understand God in
such a way that God exhibits aseity, he is a ÆÊ esse, and does not rely
(19) op.cit. p54. (It must say something about theologiansthat a wiori has become apriori I )
(20) ibid. p64.
(21) ibid. p64.
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on any other entity in order to be himself. This runs contrary to the 
thrust of Process thinking which, to quote a well known saying of 
Whitehead, claims that, "it is as true to say that God creates the 
World, as that the World creates God"(22). Consequently, one can evade 
Neville's criticisms by affirming the truth of Process that, indeed, God 
cannot exhibit "necessity" because of the difficulties he describes. It 
is not the role of philosophy to judge whether that detracts from the 
God of religion (23) but it certainly does not erode the God of Process. 
The question of "continuity" in Process thought is raised in the second 
section of this chapter, but it is interesting to note that Neville 
himself mentions that Whitehead's Category of the Ultimate "guarantees a 
new one out of the many."(24).
Neville restates his objection to Hartshorne, "the claim made 
throughout Creative Synthesis and Philosophical Method that something 
abstract can be contained in something concrete."(25). Although this 
problem is outwith the remit of this study, it is worth observing that 
he proceeds to present his objection in a slightly different light, 
"with respect to how universels are ingredient in the world, this 
presents no problem... but with respect to the formal possibility of 
those universal structures, Hartshorne's theory gives no account."(26). 
A similar objection is raised in the chapter entitled "The category of 
the One and the Many". Focusing on the Category of the Ultimate and the 
Ontological Principle it is possible to state the objection without 
relating the discussion to the complexities of Hartshorne's a priori
(22) PR p348.
(23) But it is the purpose of this study to intimate that itdoes not.
(24) op.cit. p64.
(25) op.cit. p57.
(26) op.cit. p6l.
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metaphysics. According to Neville, the latter accounts for cosmological 
unity whereas the former fails to account for ontological unity.
The Ontological principle states that "any condition in any 
particular instance in the process of becoming is to be accounted for 
either in terms of the decision of some antecedent in its actual world, 
or in the decision of its own concrescence. "(27). Expressed more 
simply, it states that the only reasons or explanations must be in terms
of actual entities (28). Neville considers that it is misnamed, and it
should more accurately be called the cosmological principle (29) because 
it accounts for cosmological unity. As he says, "the kind of question 
the ontological principle interprets is how this or that ingression of 
eternal objects occurred... it does not answer the question why there 
is any decision at all... or why there are actual entities."(30). In 
his view, these latter ontological questions are supposedly dealt with 
by the Category of the Ultimate. One, Many and Creativity are the 
notions making up this category and the relationship between them is
correctly described by Neville, "it is inconceivable that there be a 
many or a one except that one is conceived as a unification of many, and 
many is conceived as a disjunction of such unifications of manys. The 
process of unifying many into one is creativity; the process is creative 
since, when the maz^ is unified into one, there is one more singular 
than when the many is not unified. "(31). Or, "creativity is the
principle that every plurality of actual entities is creatively unified 
into a new actual entity. "(32). Simply, "the many become one and are
(27) op.cit p37.
(28) See PR p19,24
(29) op.cit. p38.
(30) ibid. p38.
(31) ibid. p39.
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increased by one."(33). He now asks in what sense creativity is a 
principle, offering two accounts. First he considers the creative 
principle to be an empirical generalization. Then the principle states 
that, in fact, all pluralities are creatively unified. But, he claims, 
this is an inadequate ontological account because it fails to provide a 
reason as to why any events of creative unification exist. "In effect 
it fails to advance ontologically beyond the ontological principle, 
which, fcflkjpg fsc grapt^d QraatAye unification, accounts for the 
specific form in terms of decisions."(34). The Ontological question 
remains. The second interpretation is that the category of the Ultimate 
is a "normative principle determining that there must be creative 
unifications of manys"(35) but, since Whitehead insisted that creativity 
was indeterminate in abstraction from the actual entities exhibiting it, 
he continues, "it cannot be normative in any sense that would 
necessitate creativity in specific occasions". "Creativity" does not 
exist as an actuality apart from its manifestation in actual entities, 
it cannot therefore be used as a principle to determine that creativity 
will actually take place. This forces us to accept that the Category of 
the Ultimate is an empirical generalization. We then note that this 
accords well with Whitehead's definition of metaphysics.
The ontological question remains unanswered, the "why" persists. 
Of course, at this stage one could quite simply say that there is no 
answer: it is not possible to give a reason why there are creative
actual entities. Perhaps one must say that the Category of the Ultimate 
is simply ultimate (36). Neville, however, continues his search for an
(32) ibid. p40.
(33) PR p21.
(34) op.cit. p41.
(35) ibid. p4l.
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acceptable and unquestionable explanation* The next stage of his 
argument relates the requirement of the ontological principle to the 
Category of the Ultimate. Recall that the former insists that an 
explanation in terms of actual entities must be forthcoming so that, 
"according to the ontological principle there ought to be somewhere a 
creative decision responsible for any unification. "(37). Continuing 
this quotation, "but the decisions of all actual entities, precisely 
because th^ are creative, cannot constitute the ontological unity as
the condition for creativity." Actual entities cannot account for the
Category of the Ultimate because the latter is assumed to account for
the former. Therefore, he concludes, "given ±hs ontological principle, 
with no possibility of an ontological decision, the ontological unity of 
many and one in creativity is impossible I "(38). One possible way of 
avoiding this conclusion would be to exempt the Category of the Ultimate 
frcan the ontological principle but, since this rather begs the question, 
it is not a satisfactory approach. It is also quite correct of Neville 
to note that "the ontological principle does not apply to ontological 
unity in the sense described. There is no decision responsible for the 
basic togetherness of one and many in creativity. Precisely because the 
Category of the Ultimate is the universal of universal s there can be
nothing 'responsible' for it. Creativity must simply be accepted as
something given."(39). To summarize the argument up to this point,
Neville has forced the advocate of a Whiteheadian concept of God to
admit that, ultimately, the construct has no explanation. But that is
not the sum of his objection to the Whiteheadian conceptuality because
(36) ibid. p138. See Pailin,D., "Neville's Critique ofHartshorne", Process Studies 4/3 Fall 74.
(37) op.cit. p43.
(38) ibid. p43.
(39) ibid. p44. He then says, "we rightly boggle at this. Itis a betrayal of rational faith."
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he claims that his own alternative concept is capable of satisfying the 
demand for the ultimate explanation. If that is the case then its 
greater explanatory power will, indeed, do much to commend it. His 
alternative is, "that one and many are both the products of the creative 
act, along with the cosmological creativity that relates them... the 
advance made by appealing to ontological creativity is that it can be 
explained how such a world (ie. a world in process) is possible: it is 
ontologically created, not by decisions within its own process - that 
would be self-referentially absurd - but by a transcendent creator that 
makes itself creator in the act of creating... this gives a reason how
there could be such a world. "(40). That it does do, but the question
is, is it a better reason?(41).
Neville claims that his alternative is superior because, by
attributing the creative act to God, he solves the ontological question 
(42). This, he suggests satisfies the empiricists* sensibilities, that
an "ultimately satisfying explanation consists in locating the decisive
actions from which things take their form."(43). Appreciating that he 
wishes to distance himself from what he terms Whitehead’s rationalistic
(40) ibid. p45.
(41) This has striking similarities to Wilmot's claim aboutAthanasius. He writes, "Athanasius achieves coherence where Whitehead fails because he has learned frcm revelation that God is the creator of everything that is, creation £x ouk onton overcomes the dichotomy which Whitehead is unable to transcend in his system." pi46. Whitehead and God.
(42) The initial response to this is that Neville overlooks the question asked by countless generations of Sunday - school pupils: who created God? That ontological question is, ofcourse, unanswerable in his system. Secondly, he claims supportfrom the fact that his own conception of God is "closer thanWhitehead's to what the Western tradition has regarded the God of religion" (p46). But, as I noted in the first chapter, he is also anxious that "genuine theology" is concerned with the "best"conception of God, not the one which "corresponds to the object of theistic faith and worship"(p75).
(43)ibid. p46.
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approach, this is surely to stretch the limits of empirical sensibility 
too far. Indeed, it seems rather more feasible that Whitehead's system, 
based as it is upon empirical generalization, is more likely to pass the 
empiricist's test. Hence, one must conclude that Neville fails to show
that his system provides a better explanation or answer to the
ontological question.
taThe next step must to show that Whitehead's system is not only 
equal to Neville's, insofar as both leave an unanswered question, but 
actually superior. The Category of the Ultimate may be rephrased to 
state that an inherent aspect of an actual entity is creativity. The 
term "actual entity" implies individual identity or singularity, which 
in turn "presupposes the notion of many singulars in disjunctive 
diversity."(44). This statement therefore includes the three elements 
of the Category. Thus, if there are actual entities, there will be a 
process of creativity. Neville asks why there are any actual entities, 
"of course, neither ones nor many nor creativity could exist except as
together; but the question is why they exist at all."(45). Isn't that 
rather to miss the point? It is empirically obvious that there is 
something as opposed to nothing, and Whitehead's system accounts for the 
form of this. It is both unproductive and, ultimately, somewhat
uninteresting to question why the something exists, "Hang it all I Here 
He are. We don't go behind that; we begin with it."(46). The search 
for the ultimate "why" breaks down once one realises that the fact of 
the question places the enquirer in a privileged position. The
(44) ibid. p36.
(45) ibid. p44.
(46) Whitehead, quoted by Hocking, op.cit. p8. Why the "something" should be thought of in terms of actual entitiesremains a valid question. But that is not Neville's point here. He is assuming that to be the case (recall that this is a debate internal to Process thought) and asking why that something (=actual entities) exists.
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question, and the person asking it, is, itself, the only possible 
answer. That is, one must accept "something" as given. That is not 
irrational nor is it inelegant, it is existence (47).
At this stage one must question Neville's motives for postulating 
an alternative concept of God. It is clear that he has not managed to 
undermine Whitehead's conception by an analysis of the principles of 
Process philosophy, except, perhaps, to the extent that he illustrates 
the difficulties encountered with the single - entity concept of God. 
Lewis Ford provides the probable explanation, by suggesting that 
Neville's interest lies only with applying Process ideas to, and within, 
a created world. He is content to place Process thought in a framework 
dominated by a traditional Creator God model, "this idea is quite 
foreign to Whitehead's own intentions."(48).
Our examination of Neville's criticisms of the Whiteheadian concept 
of God revealed that although the ultimate ontological question is 
unanswered, that is no reason to reject the system. However, he does 
illustrate that the single - entity conception, as represented by P is 
problematic. In order to overcome this obstacle, it is proposed that P' 
becomes,
P' There is an everlasting society of actual entities.
Or, as Cobb expresses it, "an infinite succession of divine occasions of 
experience. "(49). If this is to be justified it is necessary to show
(47) Similarly, Wilmot states that, "(Whitehead's) system provides no interpretation of the 'ultimate metaphysical ground'; it gives no reason, for example, why it is a ' creative advance into novelty' and not a destructive descent into chaos.") op.cit. p66. In response, firstly, Whitehead does not claim that his system does give a reason, secondly, his concept of God, as a derivative notion, does precisely that, ie. explains why it is a creative advance and not a destructive descent.
(48) "Neville's Interpretation of Creativity", EWP p273ff.
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that P’ satisfies the requirement which is met by P, recalling that P 
was necessary "to explain temporal actual entities.". This phrase is 
rather vague and we must ask in more detail what function God has in 
Whitehead's system. Sherburne summarizes the three main roles, (50)
1 • "God preserves the past and in so doing creates significance, 
meaningfulness and also provides the ontological ground for the claim 
that truth is Immortal.
2. God provides the ontological ground for eternal objects.
3. God is the source of subjective aims in temporal occasions, and in 
this role is the principle of limitation productive of order, the source 
of novelty, and the source of the real perspective standpoint within the 
extensive continuum for each occasion."(51).
It is, of course, no coincidence that I have used Sherburne to 
present the function of God in Whitehead's cosmology. He has a specific 
purpose in so doing, a purpose which is relevant to this inquiry. He 
attempts to show that,
1. In at least one of these roles the concept "God" violates the 
fundamental metaphysical principles of the system and thereby introduces 
incoherence into the scheme, and
2. that the system can be so interpreted and modified that each of these 
roles is superfluous (52).
Sherburne believes that it is possible to present a naturalistic
(49) Christian Natural Theology pl88.
(50) PPCT p306. "Whitehead without God"
(51) In the third point Sherburne must be referring, not to the subjective aim itself, but to the initial phase of the subjective aim, the initial aim. The subjective aim is determined by the actual entity itself. See PR p67.
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interpretation of Whitehead, and the adventurer in christology must be 
anxious to discover whether he succeeds. In the article under 
consideration here, Sherburne's argument proceeds from a consideration 
of the metaphysical principles of Process. In the next section of this 
chapter we shall se^ that he also presents the argument based on the 
evidence of experience.
There are three functions of God which Sherburne examines; the 
"past", "eternal objects" and "initial aims". The bulk of his article 
is dedicated primarily to the first of these, which is only tangentially 
relevant to the concern here (53). Before we can tackle the force of 
his arguments against God as the provider of initial aims it is 
necessary to look at Whitehead's theory of actual entities,
incorporating the idea of initial aims.
The actual entity is the basic building block of the universe, or, 
the "final real thing of which the world is made up. "(54). One cannot 
go beyond it to find something more real. Whitehead follows in the 
metaphysical tradition of Aristotle, "endeavoring to conceive of the 
generic properties of a primary existent."(55). For Whitehead, this 
"primary existent" is an event, rather than an Aristotelian enduring 
substance. Each actual entity is what it becomes (56) so in order to
understand the entity itself we must understand this process of
(52) ibid. p306. Ford presents arguments against Sherburne in "Afterword", in EWP p334. See also, "An Appraisal of Whiteheadian Nontheism", Southern Journal of Philosophy 15 1977, p27ff.
(53) The second role, God's function as the ontological ground for eternal objects, will not be considered in this study. For a comprehensive discussion of eternal objects see, for example, "Whitehead's Doctrine of Eternal Objects and its Interpretations", Tulane Studies Philosophy XXIII. Bart F Kennedy.
(54) PR pl8.
(55) Ford, EWP p314.
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becoming. Each entity becomes, or achieves satisfaction, or concresces 
such that "concrescence moves towards its final cause, which is its 
subjective aim."(57). Hence the becoming of an actual entity, what it 
is, is the actualization of its subjective aim. Again Whitehead, "the 
'subjective aim', which controls the becoming of a subject, is that 
subject feeling a proposition with the subjective form of purpose to 
realize it in that process of self - creation."(58). The subjective aim 
of an actual entity is the goal which that entity envisages for itself. 
Or, to quote Christian, "in its self - creation the actual entity is 
guided by its ideal jgf itself as individual satisfaction and as 
transcendent creator. The enjoyment of this ideal is the 'subjective 
aim'."(59).
Christian then raises what is a crucial question, "How does the 
subjective aim originate? Whence comes the original idea which the 
concrescence adopts as its ideal?"(60). He writes, "the subjective aim 
grows out of the initial conceptual aim, which has as its datum a 
possibility not realized in the actual world,"(61). The initial 
conceptual aim is the initial aim (62). Christian thus gives a 
satisfactory reply to his initial question. The subjective aim arises 
from the subject's feeling of the initial aim. But this does not 
entirely satisfy our curiosity I We must ask the same question about the
(56) Category of Explanation no.IX. "That hew an actual entitybecomes constitutes what that actual entity 1&." PR p23.
(57) PR p210.
(58) PR p25.
(59) M  JB.ter.prfefcat.iOP SL Whitehead's MfefcaBhyaigg* p23. Myitalics.
(60) ibid. p157.
(61) ibid. p215.
(62) ibid. p305.
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initial aim, how does it originate? The most significant difference 
between the subjective and initial aims is that, whereas the former 
arises out of the actual entity, the latter is a given. This is
illustrated by Whitehead, who wrote, "each temporal entity  derives
from God its basic conceptual (=initial) aim relevant to its actual 
world, yet with indéterminations awaiting its own decisions."(63). 
Similarly, "the initial stage of its aim is an endowment which the 
subject inherits from the inevitable ordering of things conceptually 
realized in the nature of God. The initial aim is the best for that 
impasse."(64).
We must consider this notion that the self - creation of the actual 
entity begins with the derivation of its initial aim. Whitehead wrote, 
"that aim determines the initial gradations of relevance of eternal 
objects for conceptual feeling; and constitutes the autonomous subject 
in its primary phase of feeling. "(65). The use of the words 
"determines" and "constitutes" (which I have emphasized) clearly 
indicates the Importance Whitehead attached to the initial aim as the 
"initiating principle in the occasion."(66).
This is problematic. As Neville notes, "insofar as God determines 
that value through the subjective aim in the initial data, the 
occasion's cwn choice is depleted. And, if God continues to determine 
modifications of the subjective aim through the process, it is hard to 
see any freedcaa of choice left. Even if there is always a residue of 
self - determined emphasis left to the occasion, the function of God is
(63) PR p224.
(64) PR p244.
(65) PR p244.
(66) PPCT p235 Cobb. The claim that the initial aim is prior to all other data is certainly not, as Sponheim correctly notes, an "unwarranted favour for the religious." op.cit. pl88.
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still to force feed a person's intentions even more powerfully than 
other things do. "(67). Whitehead wants to speak about the freedom of 
the entity in the process of self - causation. And yet, when one
questions the origin of that which is free, the subjective aim, the 
answer involves a determined given, the initial aim. Hence we are 
forced to account for freedom in terms of the given initial aim.
In an earlier quotation we saw that Whitehead noted that the
initial aim has "indéterminations" which await the decision of the 
actual entity. That is to say, the subjective aim is not determined by
the initial aim, because the way the subject feels its initial aim is
dependent upon the subject feeling rather than merely the thing felt.
As Christian says, "the subjective form of the initial aim is not a mere
reproduction of the subjective form of God's conceptual feeling."(68). 
However, he then continues, "the only problem about this application of 
the principle of autonomy of subjective form is: How can the subjective
form of the initial aim be conditioned by the subject when no prior 
unity of the subject exists? How can the subject affect the subjective 
form of that feeling which is itself the basis of the unity of the
subject?" This is a serious difficulty, and is an example of a "chicken
and egg" type of dilemma. Which comes first? The initial aim
"constitutes the autonomous subject" and "determines" which eternal 
objects are relevant for conceptual feelings. It is difficult to see 
how the entity has any "content" with which it can feel its initial aim 
which is not, itself, determined by the initial aim. Christian answers
(67) op.cit. p10. The essential point here is that God, through the initial aim, intends to promote a particular outcome. Neville also argues that Whitehead's doctrine of objective immortality mitigates against freedom, "in the long run there is a metaphysical guarantee that people cannot damn themselves, andthe possibility of self - damnation seems to me a touchstone offreedom".(p9). I discuss this issue again in chapter five.
(68) An Interpretation of Whitehead's Metaphysics p313.
— 84 —
The analysis* Metaphysics.
this by insisting the initial aim "arises with the other feelings in the 
primary phase of concrescence."(69). These other feelings cannot be 
feelings of eternal objects because the initial aim "determines the 
initial gradations of relevance of eternal objects". In the primary 
stages of concrescence there cannot be any feeling of eternal objects 
other than those made possible by the initial aim. Hence, if these 
other feelings are to enable the subject to feel its initial aim with a 
unique subjective form, not determined by the initial aim, they must be 
physical feelings. They are prehensions whose data is actual entities, 
feelings of the past. And, a point of crucial importance here, such 
prehensions of the past must be possible without reference to the 
options generated by the initial aim. This requirement that they are 
independent of the initial aim is necessary if we are to maintain that a 
subject exists with which to feel the initial aim with a unique 
subjective form. Freedom becomes a relevant feature of the actual
entity because the process of concrescence is considered to be an open 
balance between the initial aim and the other prehensions, which, as 
Christian stated, arise together in the primary stage. The basic
principle involved here is that if the emerging entity inherits
"something" from the past, because of its unique location with respect 
to antecedent occasions, then the interaction between the given initial 
aim and the possibilities arising out of the inheritance results in a 
"free" (70) emerging entity.
To relate this to Sherburne’s analysis of initial aims, he writes, 
"Whitehead correctly notes that there cannot be an emerging value 
without there being antecedent standards of value."(71). Whereas 
Whitehead introduces God as this necessary principle of limitation - the 
purpose of the provision of the initial aim - Sherburne suggests that
(69) ibid. p3l4.
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the past is capable of performing this function. He says, "the physical 
prehension of the dominant past actual entity will constitute the 
subjective aim of the emerging entity."(72). Two points follow. First, 
although Sherburne refers to the subjective aim, his comment is 
particularly significant if it applies to the initial aim. If his 
intention really is to attribute the subjective aim to the past then he 
is contradicting Whitehead on a point of fundamental importance. If the 
emerging entity derives its cwn vision of itself from the past then 
there can be no creative advance, the process is entirely retrospective. 
Second, he introduces the idea of the "dominant" past actual entity. 
This is an actual entity in the Immediate past of the concrescing entity 
and is a given, determined by the unique locus of the emerging entity 
(73).
Sherburne’s analysis implies that a series of actual entities is a 
line of inheritance through the generations, each entity inheriting its 
initial aim from the dominant and antecedent actual entity. There is no 
other external ideal which is offered to the emerging entity, a point
(70) "Freedom" in this sense really means non - predictability in terms of either the initial aim or the inheritance from the past. It remains a valid question whether this is an adequate notion of "freedom"; after all, random events are equally non - predictable but one would not wish to ascribe freedom, in any significant sense, to them. Perhaps the concept of "freedom" is so linked to a notion of a conscious being that its use elsewhere (non - predictability or non - determination being more suitable alternatives) is to over stretch its meaning. This is, incidentally, a good example of how Process philosophy uses language in novel ways, inevitably giving rise to problems of interprétât ion.
(71) "Whitehead without God", p328.
(72) ibid. p328. Hence, for Sherburne P becomes P” , "there must be some past entity."
(73) The notion of a past actual entity being "dominant" will be a important aspect of the discussion as it develops. Sherburne is quite specific; the dominant actual entity must be contiguous to the emerging entity. How this relates to the idea of "importance" and other ideas of a particular past being relevant will be considered later.
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which leads into two particular difficulties. Firstly, one notes that 
if the inspirations for emerging entities are derived solely from a 
reiteration of the past, the process is destined to be deterministic. 
Secondly, and not unrelated to this, it is not clear hew the notion of a 
creative advance into harmony is introduced. As Ford says, "creativity 
itself is simply blind activity, supplying the drive but not the focus 
for convergence. "(74). If the initial aim for the new occasion is a 
restatement of the past - the dominant actual entity - the Process lacks 
God's guiding vision which sees the universe beyond the restricted 
horizon implied by the spatio - temporal location of the emergence of 
az^ one actual entity. The process becomes one of reenactment. 
Sherburne provides empirical evidence which, he claims, supports this 
view in the second half of this chapter which will look at the 
macrocosmic world.
These difficulties aside, it is clear that Sherburne has provoked 
some interestizig and illumiziatizig issues: the role of the past with
respect to the emerging entity, the extent to which the present entity 
is determined by dominant antecedent occasions and the sense in which 
there is a thread of iziheritance throughout a series of actual entities. 
Havizig noted these issues it is possible to re-examine the theory of 
initial aims and direct attention explicitly to them. Cobb writes, "the 
initial aim determines the standpoint that the occasion will occupy. 
This, in turn, determines what occasions will be in its past.."(75). 
There is no doubt that this suggests a very strozig determining activity 
of God. However the picture is, as yet, rather one sided. The missing
(74) "Afterword" EWP p332. The claim made by Process thought that there is an advance into harmony is zzot to be equated with "naive optimism" or progress. Because, to admit to a harmozzious advance is not to suggest that everythizig will be all right in our cosmic epoch. This point was stressed by Pittenger durizig conversation 13th. Feb. 1986.
(75) "A Whiteheadian Doctrine of God" PPCT p235.
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facet is, indeed, captured by Whitehead's expression, "the best for that 
impasse. " The initial aim is not only the best, or ideal, or optimum 
possibility but it is that, given Jfehfe circumstances of the emerging 
entity. It is aim towards the most perfect outcome from a particular 
set of initial conditipns. These initial conditions are, of course, the 
past, so that one can rephrase this to say that the initial aim includes 
the idea of inheritance from the past. It includes the past because the 
ideal possibility is framed within the facts of the past. The idea of 
there being a dominant occasion is particularly helpful at this stage. 
It is clear that, for any given emerging entity, there will be some 
feature of its past which is particularly relevant and important for its 
effect on possible initial aims. It makes sense to think of this 
historical factor as being the dominant past, just as Sherburne 
intended. Despite the previous quotation, Cobb is also anxious to make 
that point. He claims that his interpretation of initial aims is such 
that "it denies that the initial phase of the subjective aim need be 
derived exclusively from God"(76) because "I have suggested that we 
consider the initial aim of each occasion as a composite of the aims for 
it of all those entities in the past that have bad specific aims for 
it."(77). So that, "there is the aim at the fulfilment that one's own 
past has aspired toward and there is the aim at that fulfilment which is 
offered the occasion by God."(78). He continues, to make a crucial 
point, "so long as these two aims are in tension with each other, we may 
suppose that in the decision by which the subjective aim is finally 
determined, there will be some compromise between them." We note why 
that is crucial in a moment. Firstly, it is interesting to note how 
this differs from the deterministic overtones expressed in Cobb's
(76) Christian Natural Theology pl83. (Also PPCT p220).
(77) ibid. p248.
(78) ibid. p248.
— 88 —
The analysis: Metaphysics.
earlier quotation. He now writes, "Whitehead's doctrine that the aim at 
the ideal constituted the entire initial aim of the occasion might be 
interpreted as calling for a certain passivity in the becoming occasion 
so that in its decision it would not deviate from the ideal."(79). He 
does not draw that conclusion, arguing that the need for greater 
intensity of experience involving self awareness and consciousness, 
requires an initial aim which inspires "efforts of self - modification", 
not mere passivity (80). The suggestion that the initial aim calls for 
passivity in the emerging entity is Neville's argument restated in 
slightly different terms. The effect in both is that the new entity is 
obliged to align its cwn subjective aim with the initial aim from God. 
Cobb points out that, "with the alternative assumption that the initial 
aim is composite, including God's aim but not exhausted by it, the 
Inappropriateness of passivity is much clearer. There must be some 
resolution of conflicting aims."(81).
The crucial issue in this analysis is revealed by Cobb's use of the 
words "tension, conflicting, compromise" and "resolution". It is clear 
that Cobb sees the ideal toward fulfilment inherited from the past to be
in conflict with the initial aim from God. But one must question the
origin of this conflict. If the initial aim from God includes the past, 
how is it in tension with the past? The answer to that question is 
derived from the principle that there can be no prehension between 
contemporary occasions. Therefore, God's knowledge of the past is 
always "one step behind", he is only aware of what has perished. This 
implies that there is always a discrepancy between how God sees things 
and how things actually are. Hence it follows that there is a similar
(79) ibid. p248.
(80) ibid. p130.
(81) ibid. p248.
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discrepancy between how he wants things to be and the possibilities 
which actually exist for things to be. This Is the source of tension
between the Initial aim and the past. Of course, In a routine universe
of re-enactment this tension would be minimized. It Is only In a
dynamic "exciting" universe that the conflict arises. The conflict Is
the Inevitable "risk" which Is Inherent In the mlcrooosmlc process of 
freedom and novel creativity, balanced by reiteration and continuity.
The purpose of this section was to understand how God Is active In 
the world of actual entitles. In particular his provision of the Initial 
aim. To summarize this theory one can make the following points:
If the Initial aim Is derived solely from God, then the actual
entity Is effectively determined by God.
If the Initial aim Is derived solely from the past, then the actual 
entity Is effectively determined by the past. The universe becomes a 
series of re-enactments with no unifying harmony.
The notion of the Initial aim being a composite between an element
from God and an element Inherited from the past has several advantages.
Firstly, It enables the autonomy of subjective form (Christian) which, 
secondly. Implies that It Is possible to understand the entity as 
"free". Thirdly, the element of the Initial aim derived from God
Introduces the harmonious vision Into the process, which Is complemented 
by the sense of fulfilment of past aims. As complexity Increases, the 
tensions (or Interest) In the Initial aim from God and the Inspiration 
of the dominant antecedent actual entity Increase. This gives rise to 
greater degrees of freedom. The Initial aim Is God's vision towards 
novelty, given the situation of the actual world. These points all 
correspond most acutely with Whitehead's formula that the Initial aim Is 
the "best for that Impasse". The following section attempts to relate
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these principles to the world of real things, the macrocosmlo universe.
- 91 -
The analysis* Metaphysics.
The previous section was concerned with God's presence In the world 
of actual entitles. But as Lango so astutely points out, "the 
fundamental entitles of Whitehead's ontology - the actual entitles - are 
purely hypothetical, postulated by his metaphysics, but not known In any 
other way. We cannot observe an actual entity with our senses; we 
cannot Infer an actual entity with empirical theories; we cannot 
consciously apprehend an actual entity through Introspection."(82). We 
are faced therefore with a choice - retaining Whiteheadian categories as 
a purely abstract exercise with no claimed link with "reality" as we 
perceive It, or we must show Its competence to describe the "real" 
world. The chrlstologlcal adventure, which Is of course at some stage 
concerned with a particular man at a particular time In a very real 
world, demands that we adopt the second of these approaches.
Surprisingly, this Is not an Issue which has featured very
prominently In the works of Process theologians who have, almost without 
exception, been content to relate the principles of the mlcrocosmlc 
world to the macrocosmlo without an explicit justification of the leap. 
The underlying claim that I make here Is that the Intermediate step Is 
not only a necessary one but It Is also a desirable one because only by 
drawing the complete picture Is It possible to achieve a balanced
synthesis between the various components. Hence It Is only after one 
has achieved a description of the human person In terms of the
constituent entitles that It Is possible to begin to discuss the person 
of Jesus - and all the complexities that entails!
Ultimately, It Is the purpose of this section to examine how God Is 
understood to be present In the lives of human beings ; a task which 
takes three distinct stages. First I describe, In general terms, how
the transition from the micro- to the macrocosmlo world Is made.
(82) Lango Whitehead's Ontology p5.
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Second, It Is necessary to Illustrate In more detail how this applies to 
the concept of a human person and, finally, I ask how It Is possible to 
hold an Intelligible view of God's presence In this context. Note that 
the "raw material" for these considerations Is contained In the previous 
section. The present task Is to relate this to a theory of the human
person.
We have already noted that the fundamental unit or building block
In the Process scheme Is the actual entity. The next step on the ladder
which will eventually lead us Into the macrocosmlo world Is that defined 
by the concept of a nexus. Whitehead defines a nexus as "a set of 
actual entitles In the unity of the relatedness constituted by their
prehensions of each other, or - what Is the same thing conversely
expressed - constituted by their objectifications of each other,"(83). 
A formidable definition - but one which Is reducible to a far simpler 
expression. All actual entitles are, at least In principle, related to 
each other. The concept of a nexus Is that principle stated as a fact* 
there are some actual entitles which are related to other actual 
entitles. The notion of a nexus tells us nothing about the actual
togetherness, except that It exists. The concept of a society describes 
the togetherness In more detail.
A society - and the word Is being used In Its technical
Whiteheadian sense - Is a nexus with social order, which is defined by
three points.
1. There Is a common element of form In each of the Included actual 
entitles.
2. This common element of form arises by reason of the conditions 
Imposed upon each entity by Its prehensions of the other entitles.
3. Each entity Includes a positive prehension of the common form.
(83) PR p24.
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(that Is to say that the entity does not reject the common form, thus 
ceasing to be a member of that society.) (84).
It Is Important to note that a society Is self-sustaining, and that 
the class name applies to its members for more than merely accidental 
reasons. As Whitehead expressed It, "the members of the society are 
alike because, by reason of their common character they impose on other 
members of the society the conditions which lead to that likeness."(85). 
The common character Is called the "defining characteristic" and Is 
analogous to the Aristotelian notion of substantial form (86). But - 
reflecting the oft quoted literary dictum - no society Is an Island, It 
Is a society within a wider society and, ultimately, within the totality 
of reality itself. The contributions of this wider society - Its 
environment - must be at least permissive of the self-sustenance of the 
society. To that extent the process, at the level of societies,
exhibits self regulation. Societies which "do not fit" cease to exist 
because the conditions for their survival are not available. This 
condition for survival Is related to the role of the "dominant" actual 
entity for the emerging occasion. If the aim toward fulfilment 
Inherited from that antecedent occasion Is in harmony with the society, 
continued existence Is feasible. If, however, the effect of the 
dominant past Is to push the emerging entity away from the conditions of 
the society, the chances of survival are diminished.
Moving further towards the macrocosmlc level, an example of a 
special form of a society Is an "enduring object" (87). This Is a 
society In which the social order has taken the form of "personal
(84) PR p34.
(85) PR p89.
(86) PR p34.
(87) PR p34.
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order". This rather misleading term Implies that the relatedness of the ^
members of the society orders the members serially. Thus there Is a |
definite vector of Inheritance In the society. If the defining
characteristic Is thought of as the mathematical plus-one function then 4
the series exhibits a form analogous to a society with
personal order - an enduring object (88). J
?
When these Ideas are combined It Is easy to see how It Is possible 
to conceive of the development of "real" things, the elementary i
particles and ever Increasingly complex groups of societies and I
sub-socletles. Equally obvious, however, Is the fact that a world based 4
solely on these societies would be rather tedious and uninteresting. 
Atoms and molecules, for example, exhibit a high degree of continuity 
and It seems reasonable to assume that their capacity for novelty Is 
essentially zero. This follows frcan the way In which societies are 
formed, emphasizing tradition, continuity and repetition. But
experience tells us that the excitement of life, indeed life itself - is 
novelty, so we must concentrate on this aspect. As Whitehead put It, ?
"life Is a bid for freedom"(89). So our explanation of life must go 
beyond the terms of an enduring object which "binds any one of its 
occasions to the line of Its ancestry."
Whitehead himself was not particularly Interested In the 
theoretical concept of the human person. He wrote extensively about
(88) There Is a lot of debate - which need not be directlyrelevant here - as to what actually constitutes an enduring object. See, for example, Sherburne's comments on Cobb In "Whitehead without God" PPCT p314f. The terminology Is misleading because, as Whitehead was aware, an enduring object could be called a "person", (an enduring object "sustains a character" and that Is one meaning of the latln term persona. ). Clearly, however. It Is extremely difficult to forget our preconceptions of what "person" Implies and so Its use In this context should be avoided.
(89) PR p104.
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societies and the order of nature but when It came to "life" the human
did not appear as a distinct category. If one looks at the Index In
Process and Reality one will note that references to the human person 
are about equal In number to those for a "straight line", and this Is 
after Griffin produced the corrected editionI Similarly, although 
Adventures of. Ideas Is concerned with human society. Its main subject Is 
not so much "man" as an "Interpretation of cosmic progress."(90). But
this neglect does not lead us to conclude that Whitehead's conceptuality
Is an Inappropriate device with which to handle "life". It Is on that 
basis that Cobb, In particular, has attempted to develop a more rigorous 
doctrine of man, while claiming loyalty to Whiteheadian categories.
Cobb accepts that most enduring objects trivialize novelty, 
resulting In endless repetition. In order to affirm that truth and to 
establish the possibility of a society In which novelty Is the key 
feature, he draws our attention to the two different types of 
prehension. The first of these Is called a pure prehension, which 
describes an actual entity feeling Its predecessor's physical pole. 
Physical continuity of form Is readily explained by pure prehension. 
The second type, which Interests us here, Is called a hybrid prehension. 
This Is a prehension of the novelty of an actual entity and concerns the 
mental pole. The mental pole Is the originality of the occasion of 
experience which Is not a derivative from the thing experienced but is 
contributed by the experlent. In a hybrid prehension the datum actual 
entity Is objectified by one of Its conceptual feelings. Ordinary 
enduring objects are described In terms of pure prehensions. Hybrid 
feelings, on the other hand, are decisive In a special kind of enduring 
object, which Whitehead calls the soul. The Introduction of the term
(90) Williams,D.D., "Time, Progress and the Kingdom of God." PPCT p445. See Cobb, "Whitehead's Philosophy and a Christian Doctrine of Man", Journal of Bible and Religion 32 1964.
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"soul" requires a few words of warning. It "Is not an underlying 
substance undergoing accidental adventures. It Is nothing but the 
sequence of the experiences that constitute It."(91). Hence Whitehead 
sides with Buddhism (against Hinduism) and with Sartre (against Husserl) 
In their Joint rejection of an ultimate subject underlying human 
experience outside the process (92). In this doctrine of the soul we 
see the possibility for a synthesis between endurance and life. The 
continuity which Is the feature of an enduring object Is married to the 
novelty which is essential when we affirm life. However, having a 
doctrine of the soul Is not In Itself a doctrine of the human person. 
We need to ask how the soul functions In relation to the physical body.
Observations of the higher animals suggests that there Is a degree 
of centralized control. That Is, there are dominant occasions within 
the society of societies which In some sense orders the subordinate 
societies. These dominant occasions constitute the soul. Indeed,
"wherever it Is reasonable to posit a single centre of experience 
playing a decisive role in the functioning of the organism as a whole, 
there it Is reasonable to posit a soul". It follows frcm this that "It 
is not a question of having a soul or of not having a soul. The 
question Is, Hew much. If any?"(93). I shall return to that Issue 
presently.
The Idea of a centralized control within the overall society may 
seem to conflict with the process Insistence on self - determination and 
freedom. However, we have already mentioned the tool by which we avoid
(91) Cobb Christian Natural Theologv p48. Plttenger writes,"the Sartrlan notion of man’s pour-sol or projected self, asdistinguished from his sheer given-ness as en-sol, has a considerable similarity to the general process Idea." Process Thought and Christian Faith p57.
(92) See Cobb, p35 "Man In Process".
(93) Adventures of Ideas p208
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that conclusion. Firstly we recall that the environment must be 
permissive of a society If that society Is to exist. Second, we note
that the dominant occasion Is not oblivious to the needs of the
subordinate societies because It Is prehendlng those occasions. Hence 
we envisage a cooperation, a mutually responsible relationship between 
the dominant occasion and the subordinate occasions. The notion of 
freedom does not preclude the Idea of hierarchy, so long as the latter 
Is always associated with responsibility and non - deterministic power.
If a soul exists In any given society It Is, so to speak, the peak 
of the pyramid. Enduring objects within the society are engaged In the 
process of repetition - the soul Infuses the pyramid with the spark of 
life. Whitehead called the human body a "complex 'amplifier'. The
various actual entitles which compose the body are so coordinated that
the experiences of any part of the body are transmitted to one or more 
central occasions to be Inherited with enhancements accruing upon the 
way, or finally added by reason of the final Integration."(94). An 
Ideal audio amplifier is simply the Integration of the Incoming signal. 
The soul however, adds something novel to the signal, making It come 
alive.
Cobb disagrees with Whitehead as to the location of the soul. 
Whitehead’s view is that the soul resided In the empty spaces of the 
brain where It "wanders from place to place according to the richness of 
the stimuli received at these places."(95). Or, "In the history of a 
living society. Its more vivid manifestations wander to whatever quarter 
Is receiving from the animal body an enormous variety of physical 
experience."(96). Against this view Cobb presents two arguments. First
(94) PR p119.
(95) Cobb Christian Nafeural. Theology p83.
(96) PR p106.
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he argues that, "Hearing, seeing, remembering and calculating seem to 
occur concurrently In one dominant occasion. If these functions are 
most Intimately related with diverse portions of the brain, then It 
seems necessary to suppose that the dominant occasion Is present at the 
same time at all these diverse places."(97). Firstly, however, he falls 
to appreciate that his use of the phrase "seem to occur concurrently" Is 
made from a macrocosmlo position, and can not be considered normative 
for an understanding of the actual entitles themselves. In the world 
these functions may appear to occur simultaneously, but that does not 
Imply their concurrence In the mlcrocosmlc universe. Secondly, there Is 
a more fundamental reason for Cobb’s rejection of the Whiteheadian 
position. Cobb wishes to state that "the region constituting the 
standpoint of one actual occasion can Include the regions constituting 
the standpoints of other actual occasions."(98). Whitehead defines the 
standpoint of an occasion to be "the unique extended locus the occasion 
occupies In the spatiotemporal continuum. "(99). Cobb rejects the word 
unique In this definition. His reasons for doing so are, I believe, 
related to his religious convictions - not out of any philosophical 
conviction nor because of the present question concerning the locus of 
the soul. If one region can include another then he Is able to say that 
God’s standpoint Includes all standpoints. There are several religious 
reasons why this Is advantageous. For example. It permits God to 
prehend contemporary occasions, so He knows our Innermost feelings 
rather than our objective past. This Issue was raised by Neville in the 
previous section (100). I personally rather like Whitehead’s phrase, 
"life lurks In the interstices of each living cell",(101) because It 
flowers with a truly dynamic and living quality. In brief support of
(97) Christian Natural Theology p84.
(98) Ibid. p85.
(99) See Ibid. p82
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the Whiteheadian position we can mention the way In which our attention 
Is constantly shifting Its focus from one aspect of life to another. 
There Is a huge variation In the range and Intensity of our hybrid 
prehensions and I think It would be foolish to suggest that we can feel 
them all at once. "We. sleep; we are half - awake; we are aware of our 
perceptions, but are devoid of generalities In thought; we are vividly 
absorbed In a small region of abstract thought while oblivious to the 
world around; we are attending to our emotions - some torrent of passion 
- to them and to nothing else; we are morbidly discursive In the width 
of our attention; and finally we sink back Into temporary 
obliviousness."(102). That quotation from Whitehead is true to my own 
understanding of self, and It suggests support for the wandering view of 
the soul.
We can give a summary of the preceding section. The human person 
Is an animal body with a dominant occasion, a soul. The soul Is an 
enduring object In which hybrid prehensions are decisive. It therefore 
combines trivial continuity and radical novelty. We must new focus on 
some more specific Issues.
The first of these considers the view that the human person Is a 
psycho - physical unity, composed of both body and soul. Cobb’s 
emphasis on the soul perhaps suggests that he Identifies the person 
solely with the mental aspect, neglecting the physical body. Two points 
follow. First, I do not think that conclusion follows from his, 
undeniable, emphasis on the psychic. He is simply concerned with
(100) The discussion concerning unique standpoints Is outside the scope of this present work. However, Christian (op.clt. p93-104) presents convincing arguments to validate the Whiteheadian view.
(101) PR p105.
(102) PR pl6l.
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showing how novelty Is an Inherent aspect of life, without denying that 
other features are also relevant to the overall concept of the person. 
The accusation may also be levelled against Whitehead, but since he did 
not write extensively on the subject of the person this would be rather 
unjust. The second point is that described by William Gallagher (103). 
He stresses those parts of the body which are neither dominant routes or 
physical objects. There are. In the body various societies which 
contribute to the overall effect, Sponhelm notes that these Include the 
more habitual forms of behaviour. Inattentive speech, blorythms, the 
reticular system, and balance, which appear to exist within the 
body/soul complex without Interference from either the soul or the 
physical body. Hence, If these observations are valid It would seem 
that certain functions of the body are Independent of the dominant 
occasion, the soul. However, before one Is able to make that conclusion 
It would be necessary to show conclusively that those functions are, 
Indeed, as separate as at first suspected. That task Is, of course. 
Impossible as there are an Infinite number of ways In which the 
apparently disconnected functions are. In fact, in some way connected.
The next Issue we must deal with Is to establish the difference 
between man and the animals. As Whitehead said,, "It Is not a mere 
question of having a soul or of not having a soul. The question Is, How 
much, If any?". The answer to this depends upon the degree of 
centralized dominance within the organism, In particular the extent to 
which this dominant occasion has significant serial order. That last 
expression, "significant serial order" Is not simple to expand. One way 
of looking at It Is to consider the significance of distant events as 
opposed to recent events, and the degree to which the future Is a
(103) Quoted by Sponhelm, op.clt. p95,175 from an unpublished doctoral dissertation, "Whitehead’s Theory of the Human Person." 1974.
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relevant consideration. The greater the emphasis on the past and on the 
future, the greater Is the degree of serial order. And so Cobb 
concludes, "It Is my assumption that along these lines one can argue 
with Whitehead's tacit support that soul Is more fully developed In man 
In general than In animals In general."(104). He continues, "presumably 
there would be exceptions If we contrasted a high - grade animal with an 
extremely retarded child". In the Process understanding, It Is 
conceivable that a chimpanzee has more soul than a human baby. Of 
course, once one accepts that the term soul has no religious 
connotation, this Implication loses some of Its Impact, but 
nevertheless, the Issue remains. Plttenger reacts strongly against It 
as he writes, "It Is absurd to think of humans as merely sophisticated 
simians; there Is a genuine difference between us and the higher animal 
level."(105). He would not approve of Beaumarchais' statement, 
"Drinking when we are not thirsty and making love all year round, madam; 
that Is all there Is to distinguish us from other animals."(106). One 
could also mention communication, or language In particular, the strong 
role of the future In our present decisions or our recurring Interest In 
the past as also being factors which differentiate us from the animals. 
However, these are all only differences In degree. They do not separate 
homo sapiens as a species In any absolute sense. Although In some 
quarters that might be Interpreted as conflicting with the Biblical 
account of creation. It Is preferable to stress the advantages of such 
an outlook. Its Implications for ecology and our responsibility to our 
environment are Immense, and It Is no coincidence that several process 
thinkers have written on these Issues. The crux of this fundamental 
similarity Is a corollary of Whitehead's one - substance cosmology. It
(104) Cbrlstlgp WaWzal Theologv p58.
(105) "On Becoming Human" Theology Jan. 1981, p6.
(106) Oxford Dictionary of Quotations.
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Is only after one has accepted the essential sameness of all things that 
one ceases to be worried by the apparently reductionist understanding. 
We should remember, moreover, that "to seek fundamental categories 
exemplified both In conscious human experience and In electrons Is no 
more to reduce man to electrons than to raise electrons to the level of 
man... If viewing man as a part of nature necessarily meant sharing In 
this reductionist drive, then man would have good reason to maintain his 
Independent self - understanding." But as Cobb continues, "kinship and 
continuity do not Imply equality."(107).
However, It Is not sufficient to point to the ultimate unity 
between man and nature as the closing point of the discussion. Consider 
the following quotation from Act 111 of A Midanmmer Night's Dream. "0 
Bottom, thou art changed". One might well ask the question, if Bottom 
has changed how then do we knew that "he" Is still Bottom? This Is the 
question of personal Identity through time. In the Process 
understanding of the person there Is a major difficulty Involved here. 
Self - Identity can only be considered as an attribute of actual 
entitles. Therefore we can state quite categorically that there Is no 
absolute self - Identity through time. Indeed, the concept Itself Is a 
contradiction. Time, In the process view Is an abstraction from the 
extensive relationships of actual entitles. Time cannot exist unless 
there are at least two non - contemporary discreet occasions. As 
Sherburne expressed it, "time Is an abstraction fr<mi the ongoingness 
whereby generation after generation of actual entitles succeed one 
another In the creative ongolngness of the universe."(108). But this Is 
clearly In opposition to our commonsense beliefs about the world. We 
hold to the notion of responsibility. But If the "I" that exists now Is
(107) "Man In Process" p33'4.
(108) "Responsibility, Punishment, and Whitehead's Theory of theSelf", ANWEP, pi81.
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discreet from the "I" that existed yesterday, how can the present "I" be 
responsible for the actions of the historical "I"? Similarly It appears 
that gratitude Is misplaced, because It can never be expressed towards 
the original decision. Again Sherburne, "why execute a murderer or pin 
a medal on a military hero? In each case, given the Whiteheadian
position, the actual entitles whose free decisions were responsible for 
the deeds have perished."(109). This whole question has led substance 
philosophers such as Paul Weiss to question Whitehead's theory on moral 
grounds. It falls, they claim, because It cannot adequately cope with 
the notions of responsibility, reward and punishment (110). In response 
to this It Is necessary to demonstrate how a Whiteheadian can understand 
personal Identity, and then we can show how this enables an
understanding of responsibility.
There are at least three possible solutions to the question of
personal Identity. The first of these Is the simplest, resting personal 
Identity In the continuity of the body. This would thereby ensure a 
steady stream of similar physical experiences for the soul. Invoking a 
similar response at each occasion. This view Is clearly deficient. Our 
bodies change, and no one would wish to suggest that a person becomes a 
totally different person If they lose, say, a limb. We want to say that 
the person Is different but we do not want to say It Is a different 
person.
The second solution suggests that personal continuity Is a result 
of the Inheritance of a common character through the successive 
occasions. This Is very similar to the definition of the defining
(109) Ibid. p182.
(110) Ibid. p179. See his paper, "History and Objective Immortality" In Relevance s£. Whitehead Ledere,I..(Ed.). Similarly, Sponhelm claims that "Process thought may seem to err on the side of undervaluing the self." op.clt. p205.
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characteristic of a society. In fact It Is a special case of that 
definition. Whitehead certainly suggested this approach In, for 
example, his essay entitled "Immortality" (111). However, he also 
recognised that commonness of character cannot be the distinctive mark 
of life. If this was the final Whiteheadian solution the philosophy 
would be in "serious trouble", to use Cobb's phrase. One cannot employ 
the same device to a) stress repetitive continuity and b) personal 
Identity In life. Life consists of freedom and novelty, not just 
reiteration. An additional objection to grounding personal Identity 
solely In the Inheritance of a common character is seen In Cobb's 
example of twins. No matter how alike they may be - and some twins 
exhibit an extraordinary degree of similarity - we do not hesitate to 
give them separate Identities.
We derive the third solution by little more than a shift In 
emphasis. Rather than the common pattern Inherited, Whitehead sometimes 
referred to the special mode of Inheritance. The phrase he used Is 
"peculiar completeness".
"We - as enduring objects with personal order - objectify the 
occasions of our past with peculiar completeness In our Immediate 
present."(112).
"An enduring personality In the temporal world Is a , route of 
occasions In which the successors with some peculiar ccmpleteness sum up 
their predecessors."(113).
Unfortunately, Whitehead did not expand on this phrase, so it Is 
left to other Process thinkers to derive an appropriate Interpretation.
(111) In Schiipp, fhliaggphY a£. Alfred JSscth HMtshead.
(112) PR pl6l.
(113) PR p350.
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The key word for Cobb is memory (114), The present member of the 
series remembers the experiences of the past members of that series. It 
also remembers something about other experiences. Note the difference. 
Experiences Internal to that series are remembered, other, external, 
experiences are remembered only Insofar as the occasion remembers 
something about them (115). Cobb seems to separate this third solution 
from the previous one. However, Cobb's method will only work If we 
presuppose the Inheritance of a common character. Bennett makes that 
point. He refers to the two resources (in fact he claims at least two) 
which support personal Identity, "the Inheritance of a common pattern" 
and "a special mode In which the past Is Inherited"(116). Without the 
defining characteristic there Is no boundary placed on what Is available 
for Immediate prehension. If remembering from within Is defined as an 
unmedlated prehension then one can envisage all kinds of strange and 
wonderful things happening. The general philosophical principle Is that 
every new occasion takes account of every occasion In Its past. There 
Is no limit Implied by this principle, Indeed, every past occasion could 
be physically prehended by every new occasion. However, In our 
universe, or cosmic epoch this does not seem to occur. Pure physical 
feelings are limited to contiguous occasions. These unmedlated 
prehensions then mediate feelings of remote occasions. We can neither 
affirm nor deny - on the basis of the metaphysical principles - whether 
the mental aspect of noncontiguous occasions can be directly prehended. 
Telepathy, which Whitehead was prepared to accept, at least In theory,
(114) Christian Natural Theology p75
(115) For Hartshorne, memory Is "our present experience of our own previous experiences", and, "It Is experiences prehendlng previous experiences In the same personal succession or stream of awareness"(Creativity la American Philosophy p106). Similarly, Bennett, "by mmnory.... Cobb means remembering one's past experiences fVom within rather than from without. " ( "Whitehead and Personal Identity." p513).
(116) Bennett p512.
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Is the Immediate prehension of the mental poles of noncontiguous 
occasions. Such a prehension will also explain racial consciousness or 
an Intense social awareness.
However, unless there Is some kind of Inherited limit It would be 
possible for the present occasion In one series to have unmedlated 
hybrid prehensions of the members of any series whatsoever. I could 
become - In a very real sense - s<mieone else, simply by feeling their 
past rather than my own. The notion of an Inherited common character 
mitigates against this, but we must also note that it does not eliminate 
the possibility. As to why we are not all aware of our telepathic 
ability, Cobb suggests that "Whitehead thinks that the Inevitable mixing 
of these hybrid prehensions of other souls with the mediated prehensions 
of these same souls explains why It Is so difficult for consciousness to 
focus on clear Instances of unmedlated prehensions."(117).
It Is possible to give two senses of responsibility at this point.
A third Interpretation will be Introduced at a later stage. Let us 
accept that there is no absolute sense in which the present occasion Is 
metaphysically responsible for the decisions of the past. But we note j
that this does not Imply that the process understanding of personal 
identity lacks the notion of responsibility. First, the fact of the j
inheritance of common form Implies that there Is a flow between the past ÎÎ
and the present which relates the two. So, rather than suggesting that {
the present occasion Is responsible for the past decision, we can I
suggest that the present entity Is a) responsible to maximise the j
consequences of that past decision and b) Is responsible for similar j
decisions In the present. In a sense this Is to say that the present 
must leam from Its past or continue to build upon the wisdom of Its 
past.
(117) Christian Natural Theology p54.
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The second sense Is particularly appropriate to human persons. It 
suggests that the present occasion not only JLa related in a weak 
metaphysical way, to the past but that It also desires to be related to 
Its past In order to affirm Its own personal Identity. Of course It may 
desire to separate itself from a past event but even here it must first 
affirm that that event belongs to Its past. This has definite 
affinities with modern therapy or social work. The first task must be 
to affirm the Individual as an Individual, In other words to enable the 
person to affirm their own personal Identity. This is achieved by the 
person accepting their past. Only then can one expect a person to be 
able to cope with the complexities of the present (118). Although It Is 
possible to affirm a degree of metaphysical responsibility for the past, 
because of the Inheritance of common form, this Is not the most 
Important aspect. Far more Interesting Is the way In which the self 
affirmation of personal Identity In the present necessitates the 
acceptance of and, moreover, the acceptance of the responsibility of, 
the past. Thus the notion of personal Identity and responsibility are 
Intimately bound together In the process understanding.
The enthusiasm with which Cobb develops a defence of the 
Whiteheadian theory of personal Identity perhaps suggests that Whitehead 
was remiss In not undertaking his own account and that It Is a central 
Issue In the philosophy. To some extent both these points have some 
validity. But we must be rather careful, especially with the second. 
"To establish personal Identity cua personal Identity Is a fruitless 
effort."(119). It Is always a question of personal Identity with 
respect to something. As Whitehead wrote, "The baby In the cradle and
(118) See for example, Process Studies 14/3, 1985. "The Value of the Dialogue Between Process Thought and Pyschotherapy." David E. Roy p158ff.
(119) Bennett p517.
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the grown man In middle age, are In some senses Identical and in other 
senses diverse."(120). Similarly, the choir boy turned rapist Is an 
example In which we Would affirm the continuity of the self In some 
ways, while denying It In others.
This last example raises a further question. We have noted that 
one reason for being able to affirm personal Identity Is found In the 
peculiar completeness with which the present sums up the past. In A
Christian Natural Theology Cobb used the Idea of memory to Interpret
that term. We only have direct memory of occasions belonging to our cwn 
series, therefore we synthesize these experiences in a different way to 
all other experiences. He carries the discussion further In the essay 
"A Whiteheadian Chrlstology" which was quoted previously. He suggests 
that the "I" refers to that centre which tries to organize the whole 
psychic life. Now clearly, this Is related to, and presupposes, the 
Idea of personal Identity through time. "Unless the organizing center 
has continuity with Its predecessors and successors. It cannot usefully 
be designated as "I"."(121). The "I" of which Cobb speaks Is the key by 
which the person unlocks the process of peculiar completeness. In the 
choir boy turned rapist example, there Is obviously a sense In which the 
"I" has changed, the organizing centre has shifted dramatically. An 
alternative method of expressing this point Is to say that the
historical continuity Is broken, and a new line of Inheritance Is
assumed. We note that the organising centre has a strong historical 
aspect and It Is perhaps the Impact of history upon the present self 
which constitutes the essential human - animal distinction. It is worth 
noting that human life does not require the Idea of the self or "I" as 
understood In this context. In existential language the self or the
(120) Modes of Thought nl46.
(121) op.clt. p391.
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affirmation ot the "I" Is authentic human existence whereas a "self" 
which survives without maintaining a route of historical continuity Is 
an Inauthentic existence.
There Is a difficulty here. Although the theory as I have 
described It may be logical and coherent, unless one can propose an 
actual content to what the organizing centre should focus on, one cannot 
claim that this Is authentic existence. If the organizing centre simply 
latches on to something as being Important, then there seems to be 
little rocm to establish an objective standard. Two points follow. 
First, It Is true that In Process thought It Is not possible - nor Is It 
desirable - to define an objective, unchanging content to anything. We 
are dealing with subjects and therefore can only consider value or 
purpose as It relates to the specific subject In question. Whitehead’s 
ethical system Is a complex balancing act between harmony and beauty,
and somewhere in this confusion each Individual, each subject, must find 
its cwn goal or standard. It must be emphasized that there Is more to 
this then merely continuity with the dominant actual entity Introduced 
by Sherburne. That Is a brute fact of the process, here we are dealing
with a conscious decision to appropriate a particular past as an aim for
the present. The second point Is that It Is one of the tasks of the
Chrlstologlcal Adventure to Illustrate In what way, if any. It makes 
sense to propose that Christ can provide and define the optimum data for 
the self. That Is considered In later chapters. Having a theory of the 
self Is, of course, only part of the way to achieving a comprehensive 
understanding of the person. It Is also a requirement that the theory 
is shown to be valid Insofar as it Is adequate to describe observable - 
as opposed to merely theoretical - human beings. I begin this 
evaluation by quoting from Plttenger’s article, "On Becoming Human" 
(122).
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"The various schools of psychology make their contribution here. 
Gestalt stresses the organic character of human activity; dynamic 
psychology tells of the developmental drive towards goals; depth
psychology, however diverse In teaching may be Its exponents, agree that 
the whole Inherited . past Is relevant to the vital striving for
fulfilment. Existential analysis of the human situation emphasises our
belonging and the effort to gain meaning through commitment to some
cause or objective. Cultural psychology or sociology, biology In Its 
several schools, ecology and practically every other contemporary 
discipline show us human becoming and human belonging. In a cosmos which 
is Itself organlsmlc or societal."
Obviously one would not wish to suggest that Plttenger Is a neutral 
observer, but nonetheless I think his comments are valuable. They show
quite dramatically how the Process understanding of the person ties in
with observations from other fields. One way to Illustrate this Is to 
consider the person in the capacity to decide and act. The first
question Is whether the process view Is adequate with respect to self -
determination. Is the human being free to choose? Are we really self 
causative? Cobb has written that "a man may freely modify his own 
goals."(123). That statement Is a direct translation from the 
mlcrocosmlc statement about actual entitles. But one question I find
difficult to answer is whether the world Is really like that. It has
been said that Process philosophy could only have arisen from a
bourgeois, wealthy and optimistic society. My fear Is that the majority 
of the world is not wealthy, nor does It see any reason to be
(122) op.clt. p5.
(123) Christian Natural Theology p96 The theological discussion of human freedom should take place on a more significant levelthan the example discussed by Creel (Divine Impassibility pi85): should a person listen to Mahler while reading Plotinus? That, I would argue. Is not freed cm. It Is luxury.
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optimistic. Can a poor Individual, a member of an oppressed minority 
really decide his own goals, or Is that Individual In effect determined 
by his society? Process thinkers have always tended to stress the ways 
In which men are free, because the metaphysical principles most 
obviously support the Idea of freedom and self - determination. 
However, It Is equally true that these same principles Interpret our 
experience of being oppressed, dominated or determined by society - to 
use the word In Its usual sense. Although the soul and the body are
able to harmonize In order to develop as a free unity, the soul Is
Impotent to change Its wider environment. The structures of human 
society Into which the soul emerges are givens, they cannot be Ignored 
or altered. Indeed, the process model provides a very stark 
interpretation of social Inequality and Injustice, because It recognises 
that beyond a certain limit there Is nothing an individual can do to 
transcend the conditions Imposed by the environment. That Is an aspect 
of process which Is not often heard, perhaps because It Is not the 
aspect which Is Immediately relevant to the majority of process 
thinkers. It Is an Important aspect nevertheless. As Macmurray wrote, 
"Individual Independence Is an Illusion; and the Independent Individual, 
the Isolated self. Is a nonentity."(124). I stress. In order to cope
with oppression and the very real absence of freedom In the world, It
does not prove necessary to alter the basic metaphysical principles of 
freedom and self - determination. The definition of a society, with Its 
concept of the environment being permissive of the conditions required 
by subsocieties. Includes the principles necessary to account for human 
oppression. Given the theory, we expect human life to be a constant 
tension between the conditions Imposed from without and the novelty, our 
bid for freedom from within. The desire to achieve self - fulfilment, 
on one hand, and the requirements of society have to be balanced.
(124) J.Macmurray. Persons In Relation. p211.
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Sponhelm notes of Schroeder that he "seems on target In his attempt to 
develop a Whiteheadian sociological approach to be located somewhere 
between Weber's freely acting Individual and Durkhelm's constraining 
world."(125).
But If It Is possible to account for the dipolar tensions of life 
by making generalized empirical statements, Is It possible to make the 
whole theory empirically intelligible at Its most fundamental level? 
This Is the question Sherburne raises In his paper "Decentering 
Whitehead: Process and Reality fr<m a Post - Modern Perspective"(126),
In the terms of Whitehead's definition of metaphysics - that It should 
be logical, coherent, applicable and adequate - this accords with the 
latter two conditions. We have already seen how Sherburne attempts to 
naturalize Whitehead's philosophy using arguments based upon coherence 
and logical consistency when I examined his proposal that God, as the 
source of Initial alms, was superfluous to the system. The title of his 
paper betrays his central thesis, that It Is possible to expound a 
Whiteheadian philosophy without resorting to "a centered decision, a 
center of meaning, a center of value, a center of redemption and 
salvation, a center of control, a center named God."(127). He asks, 
"what sort of a world would we expect to flow from the centered 
Whiteheadian account, and does our world look anything like that?"(128). 
As befits an Inquiry based upon an empirical or experiential 
justification he produces an example with which to make his point. The 
scenario Is quite straightforward: "a grand piano has just fallen off
(125) op.clt. plOI. See Cognitive Structures a M  ReligiousResearch. Michigan Univ. Press, 1970. W.Wldlck Schroeder.
(126) A revised version of this paper appears In Process Studies15/2 summer 1986.
(127) Ibid. p170
(128) Ibid.
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the top of the Empire State Building"(129). The challenge offered by 
Sherburne Is to explain this unfolding drama using the concepts 
developed In the previous section; In other words to show how, In
experiential terms, the analysis of the microcosmos applies to the
macrocosmlc world of grand pianos.
Sherburne unfolds more of his drama: "so as the piano teeters over
the edge, a young woman taking a stroll on lunch break approaches the 
spot where the piano will strike the pavement. Will she be hit? We 
don't knew yet, nor does God. She Is window shopping. Something she 
doesn't see clearly at first glance In a window catches her eye as she 
passes. Will she decide to stop and step back, or will she decide to go 
on? Will the man right behind her, who has just glanced up and seen the 
piano hurtling down, have the collected presence of mind and the courage 
to grab the woman and shove her out of danger, or will be chose just to
save himself, avoiding some extra risk? And where does God and
subjective aim fit Into all this?"(130). Exciting stuff! As the scene 
Is now described, not only Is there an Inanimate - albeit highly complex 
- society of actual entitles hurtling earthward, but there are also two 
conscious living human beings Involved - with all the Implications for 
novel action and decision which that entails.
One can propose a naturalistic Interpretation of the finale to the 
scene all too easily. The piano falls, the woman Is killed (despite her 
"two small children at home, a doting husband, and aged parents for whom
she lights up the world"(131)). Or perhaps the man behind her does save
her life, perhaps at the expense of his own or perhaps he subsequently
makes his fame and fortune with a novel entitled My Final Moment.
(129) Ibid.
(130) Ibid. p172.
(131) Ibid.
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Although each of these endings Is unpredictable, each Is eminently 
credible and, more Importantly, each Is entirely consistent with what we 
all see/read/hear almost every day. But, In the Whiteheadian "centred* 
universe, God Is an additional feature, he Is, apparently, providing 
each emerging entity with Its Initial aim. Where are these alms?
Consider firstly the piano. Sherburne argues that It Is not 
possible to suggest, from within the Whiteheadian context, that God 
urges the piano occasions to somehcw deviate from their path In order to 
avoid hitting Innocent pedestrians below. It Is difficult not to agree 
with that. Experience teaches us that falling objects do not - unless 
acted upon by forces which have a credible explanation - deviate from 
their line of descent. But It must be stressed that this only 
challenges the Idea of God providing Initial alms If that Idea allows 
for "absurd" possibilities - such as God persuading the piano occasions 
to transmute Into a dove. Clearly, such Ideas are not permitted by the 
theory. This Is because the Initial aim must be relevant to the
historical circumstances of the emerging entity, one might say: once a
falling piano, always a falling piano.
Sherburne himself gives a re-statement of this, "In regard to the 
presentation of subjective alms, God would have to 'speak' to each 
actual occasion In Its cwn 'language', that Is, at Its own level. In a 
manner harmonious with the character of the sort of data which are In 
general operative In the esthetic synthesis which Is the concrescence of 
the actual entity In question."(132). The Issue raised by the scene 
before us Is essentially a moral one: an attempt to justify, or at
least explain, the death of the young woman In a centred universe. But
such language Is obviously far beyond that which Is relevant to the
actual entitles composing the piano: they are simply not capable of any
(132) Ibid. p173.
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self - determination with respect to moral Issues. To suggest otherwise 
Is merely to confuse human categories of values with the Inanimate. If 
attention Is to be focused on the piano, then, the scene must be 
analysed In terms of a complex society reiterating the past conditions 
of that society. And that, one presumes. Is fully compatible with God's 
desire to achieve order In the universe.
The alternative Is to "consider options for understanding how God 
might exert Influence at the other end of the spectrum of actual 
occasions, namely, by proffering subjective alms to those actual 
occasions that constitute moments In the regnant nexus of the human 
beings Involved In the drama."(133). At first consideration this might 
seem to be a more fruitful option. It might well make sense to think of 
God as functioning as an early warning :^stem prior to a disaster If he 
supplies the appropriate Initial aim to a person, utilizing their 
capacity for high - level decision making. But, according to Sherburne, 
clearly not. Primarily, he says, because "If God were viewed as having 
the power to Influence events at this level at all, then we would have 
to conclude that the world ought to be a very different place than In 
fact It Is."(134). Drivers fear fog precisely because they do not know 
what dangers may lie merely a few yards before them, the captain of the 
Titanic did steer his vessel Into an Iceberg: one could continue ad-1lb
cataloguing exactly those events which should not have happened had God 
been providing Information about the world through the Initial alms 
offered to occasions. That Is how Sherburne states his conclusion. 
New, while no-one would doubt that "our world Is filled with the 
absurdity which Sartre and Camus trumpet to the rooftops",(135) Is It
(133) Ibid. p174
(134) Ibid.
(135) Ibid. p178
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possible to Interpret the events of Sherburne's drama In a manner which 
does permit the Idea of a centred universe? There are two additional 
considerations relevant here which shed light on this question. First I 
suggest that It Is canparatlvely straightforward to shew that Sherburne 
concludes too much from his argument and, second, I note that he falls 
to consider those factors which do support the notion of a universe with 
God at - or as - Its centre.
In order to make the first point I accept the basics of his 
argument - I think one would be foolish not to - but arrive at a 
different conclusion. There are. In fact, two valid conclusions which 
one can reach. Firstly, the argument produces evidence that God does 
not provide Information (In the form of the Initial aim to the emerging 
occasion) about the macrocosmlc environment In which the entitles exist. 
That Is essentially a restatement of Sherburne's cwn "appropriate 
language" thesis mentioned earlier. The concept of a "falling - piano - 
about - to - strike - a - young - woman" Is not erne which Is 
Intelligible to any one actual entity, even to the entitles Involved In 
that drama. Entitles concresce according to a synthesis of prehensions 
of other actual entitles, not, directly, of the societies of which those 
entitles are members. The second conclusion states that even If the 
component actual entity. A, "knows" facts pertaining to the macrocosmlc 
world of entitles X,Ï,Z this Is not to say that the complex society of 
which A Is a member Is consciously aware of this relation to the society 
of which X,Y and Z are members. Unless the person Ig. the actual entity 
then the relationship between the person and the entity Is not simple. 
Clearly, to revert back to Sherburne's young woman, at the level of 
conscious experience the relevant data Is delineated by the fact that 
she Is window shopping. It Is nonsense to suggest that a complex 
society Is always conscious of all the prehensions of its component
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entitles (136) As Whitehead said, "... we are vividly absorbed In a 
small region of abstract thought while oblivious to the world around..". 
One can conclude that the observation that the person Is unaware of fact 
X (God's desired outcome) does not, necessarily. Imply that an occasion 
A (In the woman's soul) does not experience a positive prehension of X 
(God). We may not conclude that God Is not Involved In the drama, even 
If we have to be careful about how, precisely, he Is Involved. 
Moreover, In order to surmount Sherburne's objections at this point It 
has been necessary to Introduce the principle which states that a 
society of actual entitles Is not consciously or significantly aware of 
the Initial alms which are relevant to Its component entitles. That has 
profound consequences for chrlstology I
However, whereas these two points reveal that Sherburne draws an 
Invalid conclusion from his argument, the next consideration actually 
supports a centred view of the universe. Consider the following 
conclusion to the drama* a man taking a stroll after luncheon just 
happens to glance towards a bird singing high above him (a disciple of 
Hartshorne perhaps?) and, realizing the urgency of the situation, cries 
out. The woman Instinctively moves... the drama Is over. Supposing 
that the above scenario Is compatible with God's envlsagement of the 
situation. Is It possible to conceive how he Is Involved In the outcome 
without violating the principle already stated? Consider what actually 
takes place here. The act of the man looking upwards at just the right 
time In just the right place Is, of course, purely coincidental. But, 
he shouts a warning. Why?
(136) However, there would be an Interesting exception to this it a person was totally aware of all the aspects of the world as they Impinged upon the self. The possibility of this happening cannot be dismissed although It Is difficult to see how It could be analysed. Perhaps one might point to mysticism or, again, telepathy to provide support for the Idea that It Is possible to be totally In harmony with one's world.
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Sherburne's argument prevents us fr<m ascribing the reason for his
warning directly to God. God did not determine the actions of the man,
nor did he Inspire the call by a direct Initiative through an Initial 
aim. In fact, a sufficient reason Is given by the Idea of 
self-preservation (one day It might happen to him) or, slightly more 
complex, the desire for the preservation of the species. I venture to 
suggest that the macrocosmlc things of a decentred universe could have 
no understanding of, or desire for, a notion of preservation. Only In a
universe which Is ordered and unified Is one able to make sense of
"purpose". Moreover, experiential dramas of the kind portrayed by 
Sherburne reveal that purpose Is an Inherent quality In the lives of 
people who - despite the existentialist's pleadings for absurdity - do 
manifest the symptoms of life In a centred universe (137).
In conjunction with the previous two points this conclusion
provides adequate support for our belief In a God-centred universe.
However, In order to surmount the obstacle of Sherburne's analysis, a
sacrifice was forced upon us, the principle that Initial alms are not
directly relevant for the macrocosmlc Individuals In the universe such
as people. But It Is essential for the chrlstologlcal adventure that we
can speak Intelligibly about God acting with Individual people. In
order to account for mankind's radical perception of purpose and value
It Is necessary, I believe, to be able to express the Divine vision In
(137) Sherburne argues that his thesis maintains a strong religious thrust to It. He talks cf "pockets of order" which arise In the periphery, not the centre. This order ensures, he claims, that there Is a "character of permanent rightness" which permeates nature. See Process Studies 15/2 p84, and Whitehead In Religion the Making. In reply, I suggest that Sherburne's notion of order Is not adequate to conv^ the sheer Imaginative power of the human perception of purpose and aim. One notes a comment made by Wllmot (op.clt. p93), "One of the Interesting features of the present situation Is the extent to which It Is an age of hope, and that In spite of the awareness on the part of all men In our generation that our life could be snuffed out at any moment without warning, we continue to believe In and to plan for the future."
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terms which are available to human persons.
The key to this understanding Is reached through a synthesis of the 
various points In this chapter. The concept of the Initial aim (for 
actual entitles), the soul as the dominant centre of the person, the
Idea of continuity with that Individual's past, and the sense In which 
the whole world Is pervaded by purpose all combine to Illustrate how God 
Is active. Indeed, since this activity Is with, and In, the lives of 
people we can speak of this as God's activity In history. It Is not 
possible to speak clearly about God's action In history without drawing 
the distinction between the three tenses of history, past, present and
future. The reason why It Is necessary to Include all three, 
particularly the last. In our understanding of God's action In history
will become evident once each sense has been described In Isolation.
The simplest sense of God’s action In history Is that of the divine 
presence In the present. This, as has been shown In the previous 
section. Is understood In terms of God's Involvement with actual
entitles through the provision of an Initial aim. At the macrocosmlc 
level this presence Is the Integration of the presence In the 
mlorocosmlc components. We noted that It Is not possible to give 
experiential credibility to the notion of God acting In any direct sense 
with the societies of the "real" world. The character of each Initial 
aim never varies. It Is the "best for that impasse", yet Its actual 
content does. In order for It to be relevant to that particular emerging
entity. It Is, moreover, always an aim which, to different degrees,
appeals to both the past and the future. It must be at once both a lure
towards a future goal and a statement of reiteration of the past. If It
were not then the universe would be, firstly, purposeless and secondly, 
discontinuous. Hence we note that at this most fundamental 
understanding of the divine activity there Is an Inexorable Inter -
- 120 -
The analysis: Metaphysics, 
relatedness between the three tenses.
This relatedness Implies that one must seek to understand God's 
action In the past with reference to the Inclusion of the past as an 
Important element In the present. Firstly, one notes that the way the 
structure of the world Is formed, by societies which reiterate a common 
character, there Is a continuity of physical form without which nothing, 
except perhaps random order or chaos, could possibly exist. This sense 
of essential reiteration Is the condition permissive of life and yet It 
Is also the negation of the central feature of life, namely novelty. 
This aspect becomes relevant because, for an Individual self, continuity
Is achieved by virtue of a novel appropriation of a past which Is seen
to have Importance, or particular relevance, for the existential 
situation of the soul. So, unlike trivial societies, the soul Is, at 
least partly, responsible for the creation of Its cwn past. But every 
past event Is, simply because It was once a present actuality receiving 
Its Initial aim from God, a manifestation of the divine act. The 
combination of these two Ideas Implies that It Is possible to hold to a 
view of God as being active In one's past. This Interprets God's past 
action In a subjective manner. In two ways. Firstly, It Is apparent 
that because one can not label this or that entity to be a more complete 
manifestation of God's action than any other, there Is no objective 
standard for "Incarnation" (138). The response to this emphasizes that 
our perception of the past Is not a relation to actual entitles as such, 
we observe societies of actual entitles which entails a much more 
complex definition of "Incarnation". During the course of this 
discussion It will become apparent that there Is, Indeed, a mode of 
objectivity In this. The second, more Important, point agrees that the
(138) It Is truly an Incarnation of God - In - history, but atthis stage In the discussion the term should be Interpretedwithout an excessive Import of religious bias or significance.
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essence of this process Is subjective. Once again, It must be stressed 
that the Individual Is In a position to determine Its own relevant past. 
However, this element of freedom Is restricted by the environment of the 
person and, therefore. It Is possible to conceive of certain objectified 
standards which exist for that context. Given the environment, one can 
envisage that certain events will. Inevitably, be more important or 
significant than others, these events will become the ^mbols or the 
standards of that society. Hence, although It Is only objective from 
within a closed, finite framework. It Is, nevertheless, objectivity. 
The crux of this point remains that It Is God's action as received by an 
Individual which Is Important, It only makes sense to speak about the 
divine presence In history Insofar as Individuals appropriate that 
history Into their present. This relates to Plttenger's notion of 
"Importance" and Ogden's Insistence that revelation only becomes 
revelatory If It Is received as such.
The third aspect of God's action In history Is the notion of his 
action "In" the future. This provides the key which unlocks the 
understanding of the other two aspects and Introduces a powerful sense 
of objectivity. The whole Idea of discussing action and the future 
appears to present a paradox to Process thought because of Its 
Insistence on the openness of the future: following Aristotle the
future Is potential. How can one speak of action In a realm of mere 
potentiality? However, the paradox Is resolved by noting that God's 
action In the future Is that of a lure towards the realization of 
particular values rather than an action which Is Itself actual. Indeed, 
It Is more correct to speak of God's action for the future as being a 
part of his action In history. This lure towards a realization Is both 
a statement of reiteration and one of novelty. It Is a persuasive force 
for one thing to beocme another thing, promoting change and development
- 122 -
The analysis: Metaphysics.
without divorcing the second state from the first. Crucially, it Is 
obvious that this lure Is available only because It Is present In either 
the past or as anactuality now. It cannot exist, Itself, In the future 
although It Is directed towards, and Is efficacious In - and In that
sense Is an activity In - the future. As a present lure to actual
entitles It Is the Initial aim, and, of particular Interest In this
context, the lure which Is appropriate for societies Is the divine
purpose as It Is manifested In the past. The principle that God acts In
the lives of human beings, not by a direct Implantation of an Initial
aim but through his Incarnation In history, deserves a label. I propose 
to call It the "pyramid effect". This Is the process In which God's aim 
for actual entitles (which "transcend the given but must also reflect 
the given"(139)) becomes Integrated, by actualizations In actual
occasions. Into a macrocosmlc lure relevant to societies. It becomes.
In other words, a statement of purpose which can be apprehended by a 
society. Each level of the pyramid Is dependent upon the lower 
(antecedent) levels, thus confirming Sherburne's emphasis on the causal 
efficacy of the past. If the "trivial" levels, the most elementary 
actual occasions of the cosmos, fall to actualize their aim, the
possibility for synthesized alms for societies Is minimized: chaos
results. Moreover, that fact Illustrates why all actual entitles are
!Important. Without the "cooperation" of the most trivial puffs of j
iexistence, the possibilities for God's activity are limited. Indeed, 
God's Involvement In the world Is essentially zero unless the actual 
entitles of the world cooperate, and actualize God's aim for them. But 
If all actual entitles are thereby rendered Important, the pyramid 
^feot also enables us to understand why gradations of Importance exist.
The complex societies are more significant - Interesting, beautiful and 
generative of greater possibilities of value - because they respond to
(139) Marjorie Hewitt Suchookl, God-Chrlst-Churoh, p9%.
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complex alms, Integrated alms towards, and actualizations of, value In 
less significant societies. The possibilities for novel creativity are 
greater. Whereas an actual entity receives a single aim (which Is 
essentially a novel reiteration arising out of the dominant past actual 
entity), a complex society has a perception of purpose which 
Incorporates a correspondingly complex matrix of alms and values. And, 
whereas an actual entity receives Its aim immediately, the purpose or 
aim for a society (for example a person) Is mediated through the facts 
of history. This emphasises the Importance of the temporal process. A 
"self" cannot be described solely In terms of Its aim and fulfilment In 
the present, but rather In the terms of a becoming process - the lure 
from the past towards the future (140). Hew, In that case, can we 
understand Hartshorne's statement that, "whatever else God controls, he 
controls human minds."?(141).
Hartshorne suggests that God alters the object of our awareness. 
This, he claims, alters our awareness which, In turn, alters us. It Is 
evident that God does not alter our awareness In the manner which was 
criticised by Sherburne. God did not control the mind of our window 
shopper. Her object of awareness did not suddenly change from the 
contents of the window to the grand piano. That would be absurd. It 
follows from this that If God Is to "Influence"(142) a person's mind, 
the process must be desorlbable In terms of the pyramid effect. God's 
purpose must be mediated In history. Clearly, this "takes time". Its
(140) Ford expresses these two aspects when he defines human Integrity In terms of "steadfastness of character" and the values chosen. Lure of God p127.
(141) Tbfe Djyipft Relatlvltg pi39.
(142) Ibid. pl4l. "Influence" Is more appropriate than "control" because "an object always Influences but never cannot dictate."(Ibid.) For an Interesting study around this Idea see Basinger,David "Human Coercion: A Fly In the Process Ointment?", Process Studies 15/3 Fall 1986.
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effects are neither Immediate nor are they predictable. But that Is 
precisely the "risk" Inherent In any non-determlned relationship. The 
notion of "control" Is not available to the Process thelst. Instead, 
the emphasis Is on the continuity of purpose, the divine lure as It Is 
transmitted In history and received In the present. This eliminates a 
dramatic and immediate Injection of aim. It will be noted that this 
corresponds to the continuity of the beccmdng self. Human life Is not 
simply the sum of the constituent acts because the continuity of purpose 
which promotes those acts Is Itself, an element In the person. It Is 
the continuity which ensures self Identity through time. Furthermore, 
continuity of purpose generates, by virtue of the pyramid effect, 
possibilities for the actualization of ever-greater degrees of value. 
Each level of the pyramid Is engaged In a "snowball" effect which 
maximizes Interest and the potential for novelty. To state It In 
slightly different terms, a world which consists of complex societies Is 
more exciting than a world of unassociated actual entitles. I suggest
that It Is Impossible to Ignore Sherburne's arguments and we must,
therefore, conclude that God cannot exercise any direct or Immediate 
control over human minds. He Influences them through his actions In 
history. The person Is able to appropriate that Influence as It Is 
mediated through the events of the past by the pyramid effect. The 
Importance of the "Influence" cannot be stated In stronger terms than 
those used by Williams. He states, "I am In part what I hope for; for 
what I am Is what I am willing to commit myself to, and that depends 
upon what I believe finally counts."(143). The Influence, the "hope",
what "finally counts" or what one Is prepared to "commit" oneself to Is
constitutive of the person.
(143) PPCT p442.
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Despite the quotation from Sponhelm at the end of chapter one, the 
reader may feel that the present chapter has devoted too much attention 
to Issues which are apparently peripheral to chrlstology. In response 
(and although I accept that In classical terms the accusation may have 
substance), I argue that Process chrlstology must explicate the mode of 
God's presence In the world prior to defending or debating the unique 
presence of God In Jesus. The fundamental purpose of this chapter has 
been to establish that, If we are to understand God as active In the 
lives of people, his activity Is mediated tUbugh history. The following 
chapter absorbs that central Idea and, ccanblnlng It with the themes of 
chapter two, begins to enter the true adventure.
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In chapter two the major themes of Process chrlstology were 
presented In a descriptive and uncritical manner. It was noted that 
each of these themes was, by virtue of Its author's Implicit or explicit 
appropriation of Whiteheadian categories, derived from aspects of 
Process metaphysics. Chapter three was a discussion of these 
philosophical foundations, noting particularly relevant points of
divergence amongst Process thinkers, with the Intention of clarifying 
how God acts In the world, and how this relates to a Process
understanding of the human person. In the Idiom of the Introduction, 
two tasks have been completed, the Inspiration and the analysis: faith
and metaphysics. The third task, which Is the purpose of the present 
chapter. Is an attempt at a synthesis. Throughout the chapter, the 
Intention Is to propose a chrlstology which Is thoroughly consistent
with the principles with which we understand the world. Pall In gives us 
a pointed and sardonic warning against adopting any other approach, 
viewing "Incarnation" as an "Irrational Irruption Into this world of a 
'totally other' mode of being" Is equivalent to "presenting the freedom 
of the city to a chimney pot."(1). Our task will take two stages. 
First, the chrlstologles of chapter two will be re-examined and It will 
be asked, critically, If they are valid reflections of Whitehead's 
vision, the principles expounded In chapter three. It Is admitted at 
the outset that this tends towards a more subjective approach than has 
so far been the case. The examination of the chrlstologles Is In the 
light of a particular Interpretation of Process metaphysics (albeit I 
believe It to be the correct one) and, consequently, the "end product" 
will reflect this. Hence, this evaluation of, say, Plttenger's
chrlstology, Is not undertaken with respect to the principles Plttenger
himself would necessarily agree with, rather it subjects his work to an
(1) Pallln,D. "The Incarnation as a Continuing Reality", ICR,RellKiowa Stvdleg p3i4.
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external criterion - the Interpretation of Process metaphysics. In 
chapter two there was a concern to Illustrate the chrlstologles of 
various authors, In the present chapter the concern lies primarily with 
the themes of chrlstology and, to at least some extent, the original 
author Is coincidental» Incidentally, adopting this method has the 
advantage that the study Is not bound by the language limitations 
Imposed by the Chrlstologles of chapter two. It Is Inevitable that 
thinkers - perhaps particularly In the field of religion where 
terminology Is so crucial - generate their own Idiom, yet. In this 
chapter, the Intention Is to break free (to "transcend" would Imply a 
less than modest Intention) from those limits and let the language 
develop without undue predetermination.
The chapter Is divided Into two sections. The first deals with 
that aspect of chrlstology which Is concerned with Jesus Christ as he 
was In and for himself. It replies to the question of who he was when 
he lived as a man In the first century (2). The second section Is an 
attempt to understand hew that man, the Nazarene, can be understood for 
us. what might be termed the present Implications of the previous 
section (3). There Is a sense In which this represents the chrlstology 
- soterlology distinction but, for reasons which will be made evident, 
In the context of a Process chrlstology, the distinction Is somewhat 
artificial. The second stage of the chapter Is to argue that, given the 
various themes. It Is possible to present a coherent "Process 
Chrlstology" which conveys the faith of chapter two In the metaphysical
(2) Moltmann, "the first task of Chrlstology Is the critical verification of the Christian faith In Its origin In Jesus and his history." The Crucified God p84.
(3) "The second task Is the critical verification of the Christian faith In Its consequences for the present and future."(Ibid.) Moltmann shows hew the earliest Christian confessions Incorporated both aspects, "Jesus" - the earthly historical, "Christ" - the eschatologlcal.
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precision of chapter three.
In chapter two It was noted that Process theology has traditionally 
regarded the "problem" of chrlstology not to be how God was present In 
Christ but how he was present In a unique sense (4). The former, It was 
assumed. Is adequately dealt with by a statement of the kind that 
Process theology Is thoroughly Incarnatlonal - God Is Immanent In 
everything and concomitant with the world (5). The notion of God's 
presence In the world was examined In chapter three, In which a 
distinction was drawn between His Involvement In the mlorocosmlc world 
and that In the world of human beings. These are represented by the 
notions of God providing each emerging actual entity with the Initial 
phase of Its subjective aim on one hand and, on the other, through what 
I called the pyramid effect. It was shown that Integral to the notion 
of a fully developed "self", there Is a strand of continuity between the 
past, which Is reiterated, the decisions reached In the present, and the 
orientation towards the future that Is both a product and a cause of the 
previous two. Furthermore, the root of this continuity must be external 
to the developing self. If this condition Is not met then the 
continuity becomes merely self - referential and merely reiteration. 
The sense of widening one's horizons and allowing other Influences to 
lure the self towards a goal Is rendered Impotent unless continuity 
Implies a continuity with something greater than that which Is 
continuous. The extension of this argument Is to claim that an 
Increasingly universal Image and goal, to which the self adheres and 
alms, promotes ever Increasing degrees of harmony and authenticity In
(4) For example, Griffin, (A Process Chrlstology pi80) "the problem for a Chrlstology based on Whitehead's philosophy will be to understand, not how God could be present In Jesus, but how God could be present In him In a special way..."
(5) Whitehead says, "the world lives by Its Incarnation of God In Itself." (Religion In the Making pi40).
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that self. If, therefore, a self develops by virtue of Its 
appropriation of, and adherence to, a divine tradition - Incorporating 
the divine vision relevant to the future - that self achieves Its 
optimum "selfhood". The question to be raised here Is simple: how does
that analysis apply to Jesus?
The reply. It can confidently be stated at the outset. Is devoid of 
such simplicity. There Is no doubt that, on the mlorocosmlc level, God 
was present and active In the life Jesus, Insofar as he provided the 
Initial alms to his component actual entitles. And, as was mentioned In 
chapter two. Process theologians have not always observed the 
micro/macro distinction, thereby enabling, for example, Plttenger's 
statement that Jesus made his own "subjective aim Identical with the 
Initial aim which God provided him" (6). This claim Is a confusion 
between the notion of an actual entity's freedom for self 
determination and the freedom of the totality of the society. Of 
course. If Plttenger merely wishes to say that the actual entitles of 
Jesus adopted their Initial alms as their subjective alms, and achieved 
concrescence according to the divine vision as It was relevant to them, 
then his statement Is credible. But, as a statement of chrlstology It 
Is really to say very little, for one can also say that. In the vast 
majority of Instances, the actual entitles of a grain of sand concresce 
according to their Initial aim. However, his Intention Is to say more 
than that. Indeed, he Is anxious to convey the principle that Jesus, In 
an act of free response to a divine Initiative, fully actualized, or 
accepted as his own aim, whatever this Initiative demanded. His will 
was aligned to the divine vision. The theory of Initial alms Is 
Inadequate to account for this.
(6) Chrlstology Reconsidered p59.
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Interestingly, Plttenger himself hints at the possible solution to 
this difficulty. For, as was quoted In chapter two, he went on to 
employ the language of "purpose", noting that this was conveyed to Jesus 
through the totality of his background. It Is worth stressing the 
difference between the. two claims. Both Involve the notion of God 
Initiating a purpose or aim for Jesus, but, whereas the former Idea 
Involves communicating the aim In the Initial phase of the subjective 
aim, the latter suggests that purpose Is expressed In history. This 
notion will be shown to be eminently suited to the Chrlstologlcal task 
(7). Prior to expanding upon this Idea, It should be noted that Cobb 
uses the Initial aim theory In a not dissimilar manner.
In chapter two It was noted that, for Cobb, there Is a necessary 
presence of God In everything, In the sense that God Is present as 
prehended datum. Obviously, however. It Is essential to show how,
therefore, there Is variation In God's presence, and this he did In 
three ways. On examination It can be shown that these tools are not as 
powerful In the task of Chrlstology as he Implies.
Diversity Is Introduced primarily because of the variation In the
Initial aim Itself. Although Cobb Is correct when he says that each
Initial aim Is unique, that Is only one side of the story. In a more
(7) Plttenger's use of Initial alms at this point Is, perhaps, an example of the "overcoat model" (described with nonchalant perception by Dr. George Hall during afternoon tea In St. Mary's.) This suggests that a theologian. In order to gain the respect of the philosophical community, dresses-up a valid theological Idea In the nearest respectable philosophical notion. If, however, the debate "hots up" the "overcoat" Is discarded and the theology once again stands naked. Note that Plttengerhimself says that if his own faith Is shown to be In mortalconflict with philosophy. It will not be faith which Is rejected. Although this Is, perhaps, a somewhat harsh appraisal. It does provide a warning against using philosophical results as Inappropriate theological devices. The response of my supervisor who noted the comment In an early draft might also be pertinent; a warning not to put faith In a philosophical strait - jacket I The Intention Is, of course, to use philosophical analysis to promote and develop faith.
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fundamental sense all actual alms are Identical - they are all, to use 
Whitehead's words, the best for that Impasse. To rephrase that, all 
Initial alms are lures towards the maximization of harmony - granted the 
circumstances, albeit unique, of the emerging entity. God does not 
favour seme actual entitles more than others. God exhibits a consistent 
and Immutable desire for all occasions, that they maximize the potential 
Inherited frcm their environment. Sherburne's analysis of Initial alms, 
presented In chapter three, shows that the InltlsGl aim from God (If It 
Is to have any experiential credibility) must be severely restricted by 
the Inherited environment. Suppose, however, that God does favour seme 
entitles as opposed to others, and Imparts to some, alms which are 
potentially more rewarding than the usual. It should be immediately 
obvious that we are plunged headlong Into the murky depths of the 
Problem of Evil. The process becomes fatalistic, why should I seek to 
maximize value and harmony In the world unless I believe that God Is 
similarly occupied? The parable of the Lost Sheep Is a Biblical
portrayal of precisely this point, God's love extends to all, equally. 
But If this reduotlo ad absurdum argument Illustrates just how powerful
Whitehead's "best for that Impasse" formula Is, there Is a further
devastating point against any notion of God favouring particular actual 
entitles. This Is as follows. Until an actual entity becomes,
according to Its self - creativity. It Is Impossible for God to know, 
with any degree of certainty, what that actueil entity will be. So, any 
notion of God favouring an actual entity prior to that entity's
concres&nce (at which point It Is, of course, too late for God to Impart 
a special aim for It) provokes Images of God juggling his favours over 
the melting pot of cosmic possibilities, an extreme version of the 
abhorrent dice playing God.
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We have to conclude that any diversity Introduced In the Initial 
aim Is, therefore, a reflection of the different environments and 
Inherited factors which confront each actual entity. Although this can 
be a significant diversity, Its origins do not rest under God's control. 
Thus the Initial aim Is not an adequate explanation of God's Initiative 
for Jesus.
Secondly, Cobb Introduces diversity by suggesting that the Initial 
aim Is not the only way of achieving a prehension of God. For Cobb this 
Is a subset of the first point, because of the emphasis he places on the 
Initial aim as the motivating power behind other prehensions. In his 
attempts to stress God's creating role, he places too much deterministic 
emphasis on the Initial aim and reduces other processes formative of the 
Initial phase of the actual entity to essentially zero. other
prehensions are possible without the controlling reference to the 
initial aim then It Is certainly possible to Introduce greater 
diversity. Bryan hints at this, "Jesus prehended In a unique way the 
Influence of God which was embodied already In the other entitles of his 
distant and Immediate past."(8). One notes that this reference to the 
past of Jesus Is similar to Plttenger's Insistence that his purpose was 
conveyed through his history.
The third way In which Cobb Introduces diversity Is, essentially, 
entirely valid, merely noting that the response of the entity differs 
according to the degree of cooperation with the Initial aim and the 
other Influences. It must be noted, once again, that this can only 
refer to actual entitles, and bears little relation to the freedom of a 
person to respond to macrocosmlc possibilities.
(8) Bryan, "The Understanding of Jesus Christ In the Theology of John B. Cobb." p68.
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In his discussion on the "self", Cobb noted that, for Jesus, It vas 
the source of the urge which was of paramount Importance , rather than 
Its precise content. But, given the analysis presented In chapter three 
and the objections summarized above. It Is clear that If we are to give 
credence to this notion It Is essential to be able to define this "urge" 
(God's aim for Jesus) In a way which Is not limited to the Initial aim 
(9). Unless this can be achieved It Is not possible to advance beyond
the simplistic notion of the macrocosmlc Jesus responding to the
mlorocosmlc actions of God In the world. The "urge" of Cobb Is 
equivalent to the "purpose" of Plttenger, the Intention of both being to
express God's initiative for Jesus.
To allow the discussion to move forwards there are two points which
require surveying; Plttenger's thesis that Jesus was obedient to God's 
purpose for him and a more detailed study of the "self" of Jesus, 
employing Cobb's analysis of the human person. These two points are, 
although It may not be obvious at the moment, Intimately related. 
Briefly, this Is because It Is not possible to understand "purpose" 
without a prior understanding of "self". In the previous chapter It was 
shown that the past, present and future are all Important to an
understanding of "self", we should now attempt to understand the
obedience of Jesus and his "self" In such such a way that It 
Incorporates the three tenses.
The source of Jesus' mission cannot be attributed to an Immediate
awareness cf of a divine message Implanted In his mind as an Initial
aim. We must seek the explanation elsewhere. Not only the fact that
Jesus sensed a divinely Inspired vocation, but also the content of that
vocation. At this point It Is noted that Cobb and Plttenger disagree.
(9) Although It must, of course. Incorporate the notion of theInitial aim because that Is how, at the most fundamental level,God Is active In the world.
- 134 -
The synthesisI Process Chrlstology.
For Plttenger, It Is essential that Jesus was aware of the content - It 
Is not possible to be "obedient" without a referent to which one Is 
obedient - whereas Cobb relegates the content to a secondary Issue. The 
fact that Jesus was aware of the divine origin of his vocation Is the 
significant factor. One notes Immediately that, because It Is proposed 
to express the source (and content) of this vocation (the urge or 
purpose for Jesus) In the terms of the macrocosmlc world. It Is entirely 
feasible to suggest that Jesus (a person, a macrocosmlc society) could 
be aware of It. To express this In Plttenger's preferred terminology. 
It Is the Intention to locate the purpose In such a way that It makes 
sense to speak of an "obedient response".
Consider the person Jesus of Nazareth as he existed at any one
moment of his life, a complex society of actual entitles each one of
which Is occupied In the process of achieving concrescence. One should
Immediately react against a proposition of this nature! The Idea that
one can Isolate a person as a present "thing" Is, In the terms of
Whitehead's vision, quite Inadmissible. The thrust of the process Is,
of course, dynamic, a flow from the past to the present and Into the
potentials of the future. A static photograph extracted from the moving
sequence reveals almost nothing about the person (10). If we are to
discuss the person of Jesus we must Include his past and also his
"future". Both Cobb and Plttenger Incorporate the three tenses.
Plttenger discusses the "four aspects" of the Jesus event; the
"preparation for It In Jewish and other history", and the "existence of
the man himself" representing the past and present while the "results
effected In human history" and "his reception by others" both refer to
(10) This Is the basic reason why there Is no chrlstology-soterlology distinction In the terms of Process chrlstology. The "Chrlstology" itself must reveal the moving picture, the whole dynamic ongoing event, the latter being the traditional preserve of soterlology. See, for example, Griffin A ProcessChristolQgy pl8.
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the future (11). Cobb ’ s theory c£ the human self Is structured around 
the three tenses. The key concept which allows for self - Identity 
through time (continuity with one's own past) Is memory, and the 
quotation from Bryan showed the Importance of data In the past. The 
present Is the acting self and the future Is that power of anticipation 
which affects present decisions. He summarized these In his apparently 
strange notion of continuity with one's successors. The present tense 
Is accounted for by the Idea of an obedient self and. If It Is possible 
to establish a unique relationship between Jesus and God, It must be 
done through the notion of this obedient self Interacting with an
Initiative relevant to the past and future. These two asymetrlcal 
"opposites" - one Is actual and real, the other Is pure potential - are 
always balanced by the response In the "present". It Is In the present 
that the self has to make the decision which Integrates continuity and 
anticipation. It will be observed that to consider the "future" aspect 
In any detail Is to Invoke the "soterlologlcal" considerations which are 
relevant to the next section, Illustrating once again how the two 
aspects cf chrlstology are related.
There are two basic ways In which Jesus' obedience was a
manifestation of his relationship to God. The first of these Is to 
claim that he was especially attuned to those events In his past which 
Illustrated God's Involvement with the world. The pyramid effect 
ensures that It Is possible for God's activity In the mlorocosmlc world 
to be Integrated and amplified so that It becomes a feature of the 
macrocosmlc world. Ultimately, God's aim for the fundamental building 
blocks Is converted - to a degree dependent upon the response matrix of 
the relevant events - Into a purpose able to be cultivated Into fruition
by a conscious mind. In chapter three I noted that, although In the
(11) Theology no.88 1985 p450.
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universe as we know It there Is no perfect transmission system, the 
principles of Process philosophy certainly allcw this possibility to be 
realized. In this context It Is necessary to be more particular and ask 
whether, In fact, Jesus did respond to his past In this way and, 
consequently, may be considered as the flowering of a divine purpose. 
Our question seeks a reply based on the world and In that sense Is at 
least an empirical quest. However, It Is clear that any debate 
concerned with the historical Jesus Is destined for a compromised 
solution lying at some point between the extremity of a "no-knowledge" 
approach and the absurdity of a "Gospel as Fact" position (12). If we 
are to establish that Jesus responded to certain facts In his past In a 
specific manner then we must be able to provide evidence that the 
argument Is sound. Without wishing to enter the debate In any depth It 
seems - and this Is purely a subjective evaluation - that It Is 
Impossible for us to know either the precise nature of the Influences 
that Jesus considered relevant or the precise nature of his response to 
these Influences. What can be said with certainty Is that the Biblical 
picture of Jesus Illustrates a man for whom the past was of paramount 
Importance In his life (13). Whereas for Plttenger It Is Important that 
Jesus responded to the content of the past, for Cobb the condition Is 
satisfied If Jesus recognised that, through the past, God was the source 
of whatever he felt his aim to be.
Suppose for a moment that It Is valid to suggest that Jesus made 
the perfect response, one of total obedience, to an urge or purpose 
which he was made aware of because of his own understanding of history. 
Does that render Jesus "unique"? And, even If It does Imply uniqueness
(12) See for example Kelsey,D.H., Uses s£i Scripture JLa
R999Rt IhÊûlfiÉBL-
(13) For example, Jesus* preaching and reading from the Scriptures, Luke 4:16.
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In fact (that Is, after an appraisal of the data), does It Imply 
uniqueness definition? Note that for the latter condition to be 
true, one Is suggesting that It Is Impossible for any other person to 
make the same, perfect, response. Significantly, neither Cobb nor 
Plttenger dwell on that question. Plttenger Is more concerned to show 
the congrulty of the God - Jesus relationship to that of the God - World 
relationship, which, as a corollary, renders "uniqueness" secondary. He 
considers the question of uniqueness In connection with the decisiveness 
of Jesus. This, he argued. Is a result of our decision to make him 
decisive (properly belonging to the second section) rather than
decisiveness defined In terms Internal to Jesus. For Cobb, the 
uniqueness of Jesus Is a direct result of his awareness of the source of 
the urge, rather than the purpose. In the second phase of his
chrlstology hcwever even this Is tertiary to his concern for
universality. Any chrlstology which Is based upon the claim that Jesus
was uniquely In tune with God-ln-hlstory, and therefore made a unique 
response In perfect obedience, faces two Issues. Firstly, the lack of 
available historical verification and, second, the limited sense of 
"uniqueness".
These problems prompt a further development which, although not 
ccmipletely detached from the previous analysis, approaches the topic 
from a different angle with the Intention of surmounting those 
obstacles. Rather than considering the past as a sequence of "facts" It 
Is helpful to think of history as the spawning ground for possibilities 
which confront the becoming present. This raises the explicit Idea that 
the past produces Indeterminate possibilities for the present, rather 
than mere statements of what was the case. This Implies dynamism as 
opposed to factual presentation, and allows one to steer away from a 
static notion of obedience - as the acceptance (or rejection) of, say,
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facts A,A' and A** - to a view in which the present self is confronted 
by possibilities. These take the form of conflicts, opportunities and 
"questions" which arise as a result of those facts. This is the pyramid 
effect. The questions are not the actual facts of history - the A,A’ 
and A'*, perished actual entities of antecedent generations - but are 
generated as a result of the self - determining activity of those 
entities. If the present being is to achieve a significant "selfhood" 
one must propose that there exists a continuity in how these 
possibilities are confronted. If history gives the present a series of 
questions, there must be a common feature motivating a response. 
Without this underlying commonality there can be no self. I shall call 
this the principle of interpretation, because it is the key with which 
the past can be interpreted, not randomly but with continuity. The 
becoming self, if it is true to a principle of interpretation, will 
negotiate the risks of possibility with a uniformity of purpose. Of 
course, a person is quite entitled to assume a position vis-a-vis his 
past which is quite arbitrary, in which case one assumes that the self 
is never fully realized. However, in this context, the proposal is that 
for Jesus, obedience meant the adherence to one particular principle of 
interpretation. This notion accords well with Cobb's idea that there is 
an "organizing centre" in the self. Indeed, one might suggest that it 
is the macrocosmic equivalent of the organizing centre, it functions in 
a similar way in that it gives the person a theme around which life is 
orientated. Given the present analysis it is possible to understand how 
Jesus could be aware of the divine source of his urge. If Jesus' 
appreciation of history was such that he interpreted past events in the 
light of the divine activity then the "source" which provided the 
motivating force central to his own life, was recognised as God's 
involvement with the world. Furthermore, if Jesus reached his cwn 
decisions founded upon his belief that he was answering the questions of
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his past by employing a "divine" interpretative principle, then his own
self - understanding was that he was engaged in the work of God. The
phrase "divine principle of interpretation", despite its rather grand
and formidable sound, is nothing other than Jesus' belief that God had
worked in his past and his commitment to build upon that by using it to
rationalize his own life. But what was this belief? Or, how did Jesus
understand God's involvement in the past in such a way that it gave rise
to a general theme around which he was able to interpret the world? The
answer to this question will follow from a consideration of revelation,
later in this section. At this point one notes that it is still
necessary to provide some degree of evidence that Jesus actually did
interpret the world in the way suggested. However, this has been
reduced to a matter of showing that there was a general principle of
interpretation operating throughout his life - which does not require
evidence about individual details. Ford dismisses obedience chrlstology
as inadequate because it "does not distinguish Jesus from the saints
without making impossible dogmatic claims for Jesus' sinlessness." He
continues, "the evidence is simply not available... one is forced to
make claims that we have no way of supporting (14). While accepting
that Ford's comments are pertinent, I would nevertheless suggest that
the evidence required by the present analysis Jjg. available because,
rather than seeking facts erne is looking for an overall impression. As
Pittenger says, "it is not essential to Christianity that this or that
particular incident or saying should be certainly accurate; it JLa
necessary that we shall be able to say of the whole picture, that this
or something like this did in fact occur", and, "it is important to
insist over and over again that the significant point for a
(14) Ford,L. "The Power of the Christ" Religious Experience and Process Theology p86. In Lure sL God, Ford notes that because the term "optimal realization" (the response of Jesus) is relative rather than absolute it is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the Christ event (p52).
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Christological study is the total impression, the full impact, which the 
records as a whole give us."(15).
If the present analysis is to be verified by historical evidence, 
then, it is necessary to show that the Gospel's portrayal of Jesus does, 
indeed, depict him as using his belief in God-in-history as the 
foundation to his own life. Chapter five will attempt this. The 
"problem" of uniqueness remains. I have used the word "problem" rather 
than "issue" because, although I do not regard it as a particular 
difficulty, I have not yet answered McIntyre's charge that, "Dr. 
Pittenger fails to see that Christology has always assumed as a first
premise that God is not in Christ in the same way as he is in ordinary 
men or even in saints. "(16). Once again, chapter five deals with this 
issue. Here it suffices to note that McIntyre's stance is the polar 
opposite to Pittenger's concern for congruity. Indeed, there is no 
difficulty showing that this analysis of the man Jesus maintains, 
precisely, the strong sense of congruity required by Pittenger. Ford 
refers to this as the "continuity" of God's presence in Jesus with his 
action in the world. This mitigates against absolute uniqueness, which 
is discontinuity (17). Once this is accepted one can see that by 
shifting "obedience" away frcm a notion of a response to an initial aim 
to an appropriation of a motivating (purpose inspiring) force, derived 
from God-in-history, Jesus' humanity is emphasised. More precisely, to 
avoid using the term which implies a universal quality, it places utmost 
importance on Jesus' selfhood, and, furthermore, it emphasises the 
process by which he achieved that selfhood. This follows from the fact
(15) Word Incarnate p51*3. He is expressing his agreement withTillich's position here. (He cites Tillich Systematic Theologyvol II), the "biblical picture of Christ" acts as an analogy to the facts which renders faith in Jesus at least possible.
(16) a^aES. s£. Chrlgt.9l<?fy pi4o.
(17) op.cit. p79.
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that all human beings are confronted by the same issue - how to act in 
the present, for the future, from the past, the integration of 
continuity and anticipation.
To summarize the "christology of response" which has been 
formulated in this analysis, three points can be made. Firstly, by 
using the concept of the pyramid effect, it is possible to understand 
how a person can become aware of God-in-history. If this awareness 
forms the interpretative principle with which one confronts the 
possibilities of life, and the claim is that for Jesus it did, then the 
self is primarily motivated by the divine vision, as it is relevant to 
the situation of that self. Secondly, one can conceive that the 
Biblical data will furnish evidence for this because a general, overall 
picture is all that is required. Thirdly, on the question of 
uniqueness, it is clear that a response - type christology will 
inevitably value congruity higher than uniqueness. If, however, one 
considers the quality of Jesus* obedience, one can suggest that it makes 
him unique in fact, although not by definition.
The desire to invert the emphasis and stress the Importance of 
uniqueness leads on to the second type of christology. Rather than 
regarding the crucial aspect to be the response of Jesus, it is possible 
to look at the initiative of God, in respect to which the response is 
made. Once again, we note the central role played by the 
macro/microcosmic distinction because we want to avoid thinking of God's 
initiative solely in terms of the initial aim. If God's actions were so 
limited then any initiative He had with respect to Jesus alone is
inevitably arbitrary, as Mellert writes, "(if) every moment of his life
was an acceptance and a reaffirmation of God's special initiative on his
behalf...." then, "it is the positing of an arbitrary initiative that
applied solely to the person of Jesus."(18). The task must be to
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formulate, in the terms of the macrocosmic world, an understanding of 
God's initiative which permits Jesus to be the receiving subject of a 
particular purpose, but without having to posit a special - and 
therefore arbitrary - initiative by God with respect to him. To express 
that slightly differently, one must formulate an understanding of a 
divine initiative which is relevant to a particular, the man Jesus, but 
which is not arbitrarily particular. The root of the solution to this 
apparent paradox is, as expected, the pyramid effect. An analogy might 
convey the intended meaning. When an author is writing a novel, he 
possesses, in himself, ideas of how he understands the characters and 
their actions. In the act of writing, however, he cannot express those 
ideas, all he can do is to use the printer's ink to convey the basic raw
material and hope that the reader formulates the same evaluation. The
reader may or may not do so, but as the character develops throughout 
the book each additional "fact" adds to the impact of the whole. 
Similarly, an artist can communicate only through the fact of each brush 
stroke, although she may have a clear message to convey. She must then 
hope that the viewer assembles and synthesises those facts in such a way 
that the original purpose is grasped. No-one looking at a painting 
"sees" X number of brush strokes, th^ see a dead tree.... (or perhaps 
a lonely sentinel standing guard over distant lands, or a symbol of
man's misuse of nature or perhaps even evidence of God's wonderous
creativity ....). The mediated message is never guaranteed success 
because, despite the accuracy of the initial facts (the print on the 
page or the paint on the canvas) the final effect depends on its 
transmission and final reception. This is Important for christology 
because it opens the door to an understanding of how God's initiative 
for Jesus is genuinely unique.
(18) Mellert, op.cit. p8l
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If we propose that, throughout the history of the Old Testament 
world, God's vision of the forthcoming Christ was operating at all 
levels on the pyramid of activity, we can envisage that at the time of 
Jesus' birth the world theatre presented precisely the optimum stage on 
which Jesus could perform the divine play. Not, it must be noted, in a 
performance isolated frcm the past but, on the contrary, as a 
culmination of centuries of antecedent preparatory activity. Hence 
Griffin attributes the fact that Jesus was in a position from which he 
was aware of the divine source of his purpose "partly to the person 
himself and partly to the history of decisions constituting the 
particular context in which he finds himself."(19). This is not to 
suggest that God moulded the world so that it unfolded along a divinely 
predetermined path - that would not advance us beyond deterministic 
omnipotence - but that, initially as a result of the divine lure 
available to all actual entities and their response, the divine purpose 
was integrated into the macrocosmic history of Israel. The "facts" were 
the initial aims presented to each occasions. God could only hope that 
his message - his vision of, and purpose for, the Christ - was the 
experienced product. The role of response and the self - determining 
activity of creatures remains a crucial part of this process, although 
the emphasis - and it is only an emphasis - lies with God's initiative. 
To plagiarize a phrase of William Temple, this represents the 
coincidence of divine initiative with human discernment. Two questions 
follow. First, to what extent has this compromised God's love for all 
creatures by understanding his initiative vis-a-vis Jesus as elevating 
one individual above all others? Second, does it satisfy a requirement 
for uniqueness?
(19) Griffin, A Process Chrlstology p230,
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It is comparatively straightforward to acquit the argument of the 
first charge, that it represents arbitrary "favouritism". God's 
initiative is not directed at the man Jesus but at the world. It is the 
world, by the quality of its response throughout history which makes the 
initiative appropriate to the man Jesus. Even if one stresses that it 
was a special initiative by God, seeking to express his vision and 
purpose in a human person, that it is relevant to Jesus is dependant 
upon the world. There are three further points which follow on from 
this. Jesus, it is clear, is, in a very real sense, the pinnacle of 
God's involvement in the world, in addition to being the ideal response. 
Hence, one can conceive of him as the representative of God in the 
world, an idea which forms the basis of the following part of this 
section. Furthermore, Jesus is equally a product of the world as he may 
be a product of God's initiative. Should that provoke a negative 
response I recall Whitehead's comment that God, himself, is created by 
world. Essentially, the inter - relatedness of all actual entities 
ensures the validity of this. Such a statement serves to emphasise that 
Jesus cannot be divorced frcm his past. If the history of Israel had 
been different prior to Jesus, there would be no reason to suggest that 
îfery and Joseph would not have given issue to the man Jesus but, equally 
certainly, this man would not have been the Jesus who is the subject of 
this thesis. Thirdly, one notes that the idea of a divine initiative, 
which incorporates the vision of a man fulfilling God's purpose, 
existing throughout history prior to the existence of the man for whom 
it is particularly relevant, lends itself to a notion of 
"pre-existence". That is, God's anticipation of the Christ, the ideal 
human response to his initiative, was present and active in the world 
prior to its actualization by Jesus. To avoid confusion it must be 
stressed that it is the anticipation which is pre-existent, not the 
actualization which is Jesus.
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The second question raised, once again, the issue of uniqueness. 
This centres on the two notions of Jesus as the fulfilment of the divine 
initiative and the perfect human response to that initiative. If one 
posits that the divine initiative required only one fulfilment (that is 
an arbitrary judgement on behalf of man) then clearly Jesus, considered 
as that fulfilment, is unique. One has to note that he is not 
necessarily so, because it was the world which generated the unique 
possibility for him. In fact, it is perhaps rather more meaningful to 
talk about the dialogue between the world's response and God's action 
which created a situation uniquely capable of becoming the "Christ - 
event". Of course, all cosmic situations are unique, but only that one 
particular state, of which Jesus was a part, was enabling of the "Christ 
- event". Lewis Ford has replied to the question, "why is it that 
Socrates could not have been the Christ?" One agrees with him that 
"Socrates was as sensitive to the divine call as Jesus" and that he 
"allowed himself to be directed by what he calls his daimon, his Inner 
spirit," which can be thought of in terms of God's call. "But", he 
correctly continues, "Socrates cannot be the Christ simply because he is 
not of the house of Israel and does not participate in that whole 
context of meanings which makes it possible for Jesus to fulfil a 
different role than is otherwise possible."(20). Note that Ford's reply 
to his question does not doubt the ability or sincerity of Socrates, nor
does he suggest that God did not wish to bestow such elevated status
upon him. Rather, he notes that the history of Socrates was not the
history which was enabling of the Christ. The term "Christ - event" 
requires further explanation. At this point it is helpful to survey the 
christology of Ogden and Griffin, which was introduced in chapter two. 
The "Christ - event", it will be argued, is an event which is a
revelation of God.
(20) Ford, "The Power of the Christ" p85.
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Revelation must be one of the most complex of all theological 
concepts. Partly, this is due to the fact that it is, by definition, a 
category of "knowledge" removed from the more readily accepted methods 
of argument and verification. It also inherits difficulties because of 
the complexity of its subject and diversity of usage. Rather than 
indulge in a necessarily lengthy exposition of how revelation can be 
understood, I shall examine the "revelation" christologles of Ogden and 
Griffin with the intention of illustrating how the category can be made 
to serve christology.
Ogden’s christology began with a statement that analogy as a 
metaphysical tool enables us to view God’s actions as being similar to 
human acts. Inevitably, his analysis of human actions is the crux of 
his argument. He discussed the idea of "self - constituting acts" which 
are either inclusive or exclusive. An inclusive act incorporates all 
the relevant influences and a decision is based upon a "sensitive 
response" to these factors, while an exclusive act, as the name 
suggests, excludes influences and the resulting decision is necessarily 
deficient. The conclusions reached in chapter three, which examined the 
concept of the human person, support Ogden’s ideas. There it was shown 
that the self, in order to become a true self, must be responsible to 
its cwn past (taking account of all the influences which are relevant to 
it: continuity) and make decisions which synthesise the past and flow
into the future (the "sensitive response": novelty). Human freedom was
defined to be the option, which is always present, not to act in that 
way by rejecting the essential past or ignoring the future. The misuse 
of freedom results in, respectively, discontinuity or reiteration devoid 
of future direction. On the other hand, the self which acts, in the 
full response to its freedom, in an optimum sense with respect to its 
past and future, is the self which constitutes itself as a self which
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loves. An act which thus constitutes the self as lover is a 
re-presentation of the inner characteristic of that self. The 
condition, according to Ogden, which ensures the validity of this is 
that it is received by another self as such.
That requirement, when applied to christology, implies that for 
Christ to be a revelation of God - an expression which will be clarified 
later - he must be appropriated as such by the receiving subject. 
Hence, this topic belongs to the second section of this chapter which
concentrates on the response of the subject to Christ. However, that is
not to limit the christological implications of Ogden's analysis to our 
reception of Jesus as the revelation of God because one can employ the 
concept to complement the "response" or "obedience" type christology 
discussed previously.
There it was proposed that Jesus, by virtue of his free human 
response, was obedient to a particular principle of interpretation, 
derived from his belief that he was building upon God's activity which 
permeated history. He replied to the questions which confronted his own 
becoming self in the light of his understanding of God's involvement 
with the people of Israel. One of the crucial questions raised in that 
discussion was how Jesus was able to interpret history in that way. 
Ogden's category of revelation provides the clue. It enables one to 
claim that Jesus recognised, in his cwn past, revelations of God's 
"creative and redemptive" activity, revelations which became for Jesus 
(by virtue of his appropriation of the relevant past) the key to the 
development of his own self. By receiving - frcm history - an insight
into the love of God - the pure unbounded love of God - Jesus himself
was enabled to respond in obedience to that urge to love. The love of 
God was, by itself, impotent to generate activity but once it had been 
appropriated by Jesus it became the source of tremendous creative power.
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It was realized as love-in-action. One can conclude that Jesus' self 
was formed as a self which loved because of its obedience, or response, 
to a revelation of God's love. Two points must be made which follow 
frcm this. Firstly, the point is being made that "revelation" is as 
important a category in our understanding of Jesus' own relation to God, 
as it is to our own relation to God through Jesus. We shall note later 
how it is still possible to suggest that all revelation is 
christocentric, so that Christ is the sole revealer of God but this 
necessitates making a distinction between Jesus and "Christ". At this 
stage I am discussing the man Jesus. This point is essential, the fact 
that God is active in all history or, as Griffin expresses it, we have a
"Christianized ontology, in which God is conceived as active in all
events. "(21). This is essentially a reaffirmation of the claim that 
there is no special link between God and Jesus, except that which exists 
- as it does for all men - through history. In other words, the
revelation of God which was appropriated by Jesus was necessary for him. 
The second point is to note that Ogden does not align himself with an 
obedience - type chrlstology. Indeed, as was noted In chapter two, his 
own christology in no way requires that Jesus made a specific response. 
It certainly does not call for a perfect actualization of the
possibility of revelation, although he does, in fact, suggest that Jesus 
"perfectly actualized the possibility of authentic self 
understanding. "(22). However, I have employed his category to show how 
the response - based christology can provide an explanation for 
obedience. It is Jesus' response to a revelation of God's love which he 
appropriated frcm his past. Although what has been said of Jesus' 
response to revelation is important, particularly with reference to an 
obedience christology, the purpose of the category of revelation as used
(21) A Process Christology p143.
(22) Point st Christology p69.
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by Ogden and Griffin demands more. It is, of course, to demonstrate how 
Jesus himself is a revelation of God. As indicated previously, 
revelation for Ogden is largely a function of the mode of reception. 
Griffin, on the other hand is anxious to ascribe to a revelatory event 
an objective quality and the debate between the two positions was 
examined in chapter two (23).
It is interesting to consider how the notion of an "objective" 
revelation fits the model of Jesus responding to a revelation he 
received from his past. To satisfy Griffin's requirement for an 
objective component it must be possible to claim that God intended to 
reveal himself, and that what was revealed is, in fact, what he intended 
to reveal. But it will be noted that the conditions necessary to 
satisfy this requirement are implicit in previous argument. God's 
activity in the world is to lure creation towards harmony by the 
provision of aims and the urge towards creative novelty. The 
manifestation in the macrocosmos of this activity is, by virtue of the 
pyramid effect, a revelation of God's creative and redemptive activity. 
Furthermore, because God's nature jL& creative and redemptive, a 
revelation of his creative and redemptive activity is a revelation of 
his nature. In summary, it may be stated that when God acts. He reveals 
himself and, since God is always active. He is always revealing his 
nature (24). To contradict this is to deny the very thrust of the 
Process. It must, however, be stressed once again that this notion of
revelation does not consist of magical messages to window shoppers in it
N^W York. The revelation is inherent in the process itself, and it is j
(23) As was noted in chapter two, it is not valid to suggest - |as Griffin does - that Ogden's analysis of revelation is devoid of an objective component. It is the self which loves (an |objective criterion, stated without reference to the receiving |subject) which reveals the self as a lover. Nevertheless, the idifference in emphasis does exist and it is convenient to imaintain the distinction. I
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the unfolding of the process - how the various actors play their parts - 
which illuminates or disguises the revelation. The conclusion to this 
states that God's intention - always to act - is always to reveal. 
Therefore, the objective aspect of revelation which is required by 
Griffin is ensured. Thus, in the terms of an obedience chrlstology one 
can maintain the freedom of Jesus' response and the objective intention 
of God to reveal. The link between these two aspects will be stated 
explicity at the end of this chapter.
If one concentrates on the notion that Jesus himself is a
revelation of God the issues are rather different. Clearly, the fact
that all God's actions are revelations of his nature can be extended to
state that God's intention was to reveal himself through Jesus. If God
reveeils himself in history, then he reveals himself in Jesus too. But
the question considered here is to what extent must Jesus himself have
been aware of his cwn intention to be God's revelation? There are two
extreme possibilities. The first suggests that Jesus was conscious of
his divine vocation and consequently understood himself to be the
mediator of the divine revelation. This necessitates some kind of
response - based christology, as described previously. The second
possibility suggests that Jesus became a victim of circumstances and
conveyed the revelation essentially unknowingly. This is not as absurd
as it may, initially, appear for two basic reasons. Primarily, the
objective aspect of revelation is present regardless of how
(24) This assumes that the act is received as revelation. Theterms "creative" and "redemptive" will be clarified as the discussion progresses. It should be clear frcm chapter three that God's nature is creative, but the sense in which it is redemptive will require further consideration. Note that Thomas Morris, although accepting that Process theology has providedInsights into relationship, denies that God's nature requires himto create (suggesting that a notion of the Trinity conveys the necessary aspect of God relating without dependence upon a "creation").(Logic of God Incarnate d212). Despite this, in the context of this interpretation of Process Theism, creativity is an essential aspect of God's self.
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"objectively" Jesus saw his life vis-a-vis God. Additionally, our 
subjective appropriation of Jesus as revelation is not dependent upon 
Jesus* cwn subjective awareness of what he was doing. For example, 
Ogden's analysis of revelation does not require a specific response from 
Jesus. In fact, Griffin's argument requires that Jesus did respond in a 
positive way to the possibility of revelation. This follows from 
Griffin's agreement with Baillie that, "the specialness of an act of God 
also depends upon the free response of the person in whom God is 
acting"(25). However, when he introduces Tillich's language that Jesus 
is "transparent" to God, one must question the extent to which this 
response is active or passive. What are the implications for the 
"self", if that self is "transparent" to another? Griffin aims to 
establish that the "objective existence of God in (Jesus) constituted 
his selfhood" (26) thereby betraying a position which demands more than a 
free response by Jesus. Because if X constitutes the selfhood of A it 
is nonsense to speak of A's response to X, A X. There is a way to 
avoid this dilemma, which I consider in the final part of this chapter, 
although it must be noted that the sense of the "objective presence" of 
God decreases proportionally as the degree of "constitution" decreases. 
If we are to avoid the sacrifice of the self then it must be concluded 
that Jesus freely appropriated God (in the form of the divine activity 
in his past) to be a causal Influence in his own becoming self, but 
noting the qualification that the past event cannot constitute anything. 
In an attempt to establish the objective presence of God in Jesus, 
Griffin made the claim that God acted in a special (different to all his 
other relations ) way with respect to Jesus, who can then be called a 
special act of God. Of course, he never denies the need for Jesus' 
"free decision to proclaim God's will"(27), but he concentrates on the
(25) Process Chrlstology pi44.
(26) ibid. pl45.
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specialness of the divine side of the relationship.
He considers these points within the framework of the initial aim, 
suggesting that the particular aim for Jesus was an expression of the 
general aim God envisages for the entire creation. Assuming that the
thesis central to this study is valid (that initial aims are relevant
only to the microcosmos, and the aims for macrocosmic entities are 
mediated through the response of the world), is it possible to maintain 
his argument? He employs a distinction between the formal and the
material with respect to God's action. Formally, God acts in precisely
the same way in all events, while materially, the content of his action
varies. In a similar way, Cobb noted that the initial aims for all
entities are unique, because all are different. In terms of revelation, 
the definition of God's formal activity is that all his actions are 
(potentially - to be actually so requires the reception by a subject as 
such) revelatory. Any notion of "special action" must be formulated in 
the terms of revelation. In a (trivial) sense, because the past for all 
things is different, the reception of revelation will be different, but 
this material difference is hardly enough to allow one to postulate a 
special activity for Jesus. It must be stressed that the "specialness" 
cannot be attributed to the fact that God's purpose for Christ is 
"revelatory", because all God's acts in the world are able to be 
received as such. It is not possible for God to act in a manner untrue 
to his nature as creative and redemptive (God must be true to himself)
so there can be nothing special about an act through Jesus which reveals
his nature. For Ogden this is obvious, but Griffin faces a two-fold 
problem. Firstly, how to understand the divine intention changing so 
that some, and only some, acts reveal his creative and redemptive nature 
while others do not. Note that it is not possible to reply to this by
(27) ibid. p2l8.
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appealing to the quality of the subjective reception of the act as 
revelation because, for Griffin it is the intention behind the act which 
must account for the difference. S<»condly, he must produce a method by 
which we - the receiving subjects - are able to distinguish between 
those acts which are revelatory and those which are not. Given the view 
I am taking this second problem is avoided. If all acts of God are 
potentially revelatory, because God is he who loves, then one can 
evaluate a claim for revelation by an examination of its reception as 
revelation. Pailin has proposed a verification test (which I discuss 
and employ later) which verifies the revelatory status of a proposition. 
Griffin has to have a test capable of distinguishing between God's true 
intention and otherwise. There is nothing in his analysis which enables 
a satisfactory reply to either of these problems. It must be concluded 
that Griffin fails to give an account of revelation which permits him to 
ascribe the degree of "specialness" to Jesus necessary to justify the 
"objective presence" of God in him. Revelation must be expounded in 
Ogden's terms, the reception of an act of God by receiving subjects who, 
because of their participation in the process, are immersed in the 
omnipresent divine activity. That point having been established, it 
follows that "uniqueness" or "decisiveness", as Ogden states it, is 
partly (in addition to that already implied by a response christology) a 
function of a subject's appropriation of him as being decisive. This 
leads on to the second aspect of christology, namely, Christ for us.
Prior to that, I summarize the main points of this section which
considered the person of Jesus.
An obedience or response based christology must, a) define that to 
which Jesus is obedient and b) ensure that the response is a human
response. Jesus' obedience was stated in terms of obedience to a
principle of interpretation, derived frcm history, and which he used to
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develop his own self. This is the same process of beocming which 
confronts all human beings, which ensures the congruity required by the 
second point. Generally, the principle of interpretation is the method 
by which the self resolves the questions and possibilities generated by 
the past. Furthermore, the principle of interpretation can be 
understood as a revelation of God's creative and redemptive nature, 
through his cumulative activity in history. I am suggesting that this 
was appropriated by Jesus as the theme central to his cwn life. A 
degree of uniqueness was introduced by noting that the situation 
consisting of Jesus' past and present, and his cwn response (to which 
will be added the future effects) are uniquely enabling of the Christ : 
event. The Christ event is the name given to this totality which 
confronts the becoming self, now, in the present. This necessitates the î 
second section. We, too, are becoming "selfs", facing the same problem I 
of synthesizing our past and directing our lives into the future, as 
Jesus. In order to become as authentically as the existential reality 
of our situation permits, we must incorporate all relevant influences 
into the development of the self. To express this in one of the 
questions of the introduction, is it possible to achieve authentic 
existence without an appeal to Christ? Alternatively, is the Christ 
event crucial to a self in the process of becoming in the twentieth 
century?
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The two strands of the previous section, Jesus as the obedient 
human and Jesus as revelation (28), will be retained, although as the 
discussion progresses the boundary between them will tend to wander. At 
the end of the chapter I shew how the two themes can be integrated.
Pittenger, it will be recalled, suggests that Jesus actualized a 
relationship with God which is potential for all men. This gives rise
to the question whether this relationship can, in fact, be actualized,
without its prior actualization by Jesus. Does the relationship which, 
according to Pittenger, is potential for all men exist because of the 
actualization of that potentiality by Jesus? There are two aspects to 
this question, indeed, to the whole notion of our response to Jesus. 
These are the individual response and the response which takes place 
within a community. Considering the individual aspect, the first 
concern is to illustrate how men and women living in today's present are 
able to incorporate Jesus into their cwn lives. This follows from 
chapter three, in which it was stated that the self must exhibit 
continuity with the past, in order that it might grow into the future as 
an unbroken thread of selfhood. The selection of this past is partly a 
result of inheritance, and, within the confines of that given, a choice 
of the individual. If, for example, "I" decide to reiterate the "I" of 
yesterday, then the requirement for continuity is satisfied. But, the 
"I" develops within very limited parameters and it lacks the openness of
an authentic self. If, in contrast, the self is open to the divine
vision it is able to become in the most complete, all - encompassing 
manner possible for it. The latter, it was suggested, can function as a 
description of Jesus' self. But as it stands the "divineVision" is 
available to us only as a concept or general principle. In order that a
(28) Accepting that, as yet, I have not shown precisely how Jesus can be considered as revelation, that being dependent upon this present section which deals with our response.
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present self can, in fact, relate to the divine vision it must be 
available in history, the universal must be manifest as a particular 
reality. Whereas for Jesus the reality of the divine^vision existed as 
the history of the people of Israel, the idea promoted by Pittenger is 
that, for us, Jesus, is the focal point of all the divine activity and 
is, therefore, the particular to which we turn in order to relate to 
God. Because (as related in the previous section) Jesus is the peak of 
the pyramid, he is available to us as the representative of the totality 
of the pyramid. There are two further requirements which must be 
satisfied, in addition to the actual existence of this particular 
historical reality. The event which is being appropriated must be 
capable of promoting action in the present; it must be significant. 
This point can be expressed in Niebuhr's idiomatic twin sense of 
history. External history is simply à sequence of events which any 
uninterested spectator can view from the outside. Internal history is 
"history as it is lived and apprehended from within."(29). In order 
that Jesus is a valid peak of the pyramid it is essential that, at least 
as far as the apprehending subject is concerned, the history which is 
the Christ event is history in the internal sense. Secondly, the event 
which is in the past must contain a dimension which speaks to the 
future. The divine vision is a lure, and any event which is claimed to 
represent that vision must communicate that futuristic element. Without 
the essential future aspect the development of the apprehending self is 
introverted, a replication of a mere fact which is devoid of the 
creative novelty of the process. The first of these, the call for 
action, represents "creativity"; the second, the lure towards harmony, 
is "redemptive". Hence one can begin to see how Jesus is a revelation 
of God because, when one appropriates an event which is creative and 
redemptive, that event is a reflection of God who is creative and
(29) Quoted by Griffin, Process Christology p51.
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redemptive. We shall note later how this relates to Pallin's 
verification test for revelation.
The very nature of an individual's response to Jesus implies that 
the topic presently under consideration is subjective. This is not to
deny the objective requirements mentioned above, but one notes that the
response is how one self appropriates the historical events. If this 
were the end of the story then "Christian faith" could not exist. It 
would be lost amidst the plethora of different subjective responses to 
Jesus, each (assuming the elements of past and future) equally valid 
because each is relevant to one particular receiving individual. But, 
the response to Jesus is not limited to the response of the individual. 
One must also take account of the community response. The community, 
the Church, is, in erne sense, a class name for all those individuals who 
adhere to it and believe in its own importance. Yet the Church is also 
more than a mere name. It is also a society - in the technical
Whiteheadian sense - in which "all members prehend that importance from
past members of the society and incorporate that importance into
themselves."(30). I shall consider the Church in more detail in the 
next chapter but in this context one notes that objectivity is 
introduced by the defining characteristic of the Church as society. The 
Church Is the community response to Jesus and (regardless of whether one 
believes that to be true or false) that is an objective criterion. Once 
again, this community response must be subject to the same two
requirements mentioned above, that the response is initiative of novel 
action, and is based upon a historical thread of continuity.
In order that we are able to appropriate Jesus it is necessary to
be able to show how he is able to affect the future. There are two
basic ways in which this is possible. Perhaps the simplest of these is
(30) Mellert, op.cit. p94.
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to suggest that Jesus provides an example of authentic existence, the 
ideal human - divine relationship. This approach is not, of course, 
unique to Process thought. For example, Norris writes of Strauss’ 
Christology, "the figure of Christ, then, is for Strauss a kind of ideal
representative of humanity,...... in the light of which people become
aware of who they are or, perhaps, what they are becoming."(31). In 
this sense, Jesus represents a perfection of humanity - which is open to 
two interpretations. On one hand, Mellert, for example, writes, "Jesus 
is most divine when he is most ideally human. "(32). Insofar as the 
ideal state of being human would permit a maximization of prehensions 
and awareness of the whole, then this does indeed tend towards divinity 
- God being the self who is aware of everything. However, and to mark 
the contrast, Pailin notes that this view is deficient if it reduces 
Jesus to "man’s ideal for man"(33) which, as he points out, tends 
towards a Feuerbachian position. Since the Process view of Jesus 
clearly does establish him as an example these, apparently 
irreconcilable, positions must be harmonized. They are, of course, both 
correct because they look at the issue from two different angles.
Mellert’s intention is to make the point, in line with Pittenger's
position, that there is congruity between our human response and the 
human response of Jesus, while maintaining an emphasis upon the
"uniqueness" of Jesus’ response. One must also note that Ogden’s
analogy theory Implies that the line between a human act and a divine 
act is not precise; the boundary can be blurred. The importance of this 
is that it enables one to "divinize" Jesus’ actions - the quality of his 
response to God-in-history - without crossing over the boundary between 
the human and the divine. Obviously, however, this has an element of
(31) Norris,R.A. Studia Patrlstica P147.
(32) Mellert op.cit. p87.
(33) Pailin, ICR p306.
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mere semantics about it and, given Mellert*s religious position he 
inevitably tends towards the maximization of "divine" language about 
Jesus. Pailin, on the other hand, is anxious to stress one of the 
possible dangers of an obedience type Christology. If Jesus' importance 
is solely a function of his human response then he becomes an ideal, 
worthy of our attention, without reference to God. It is then only a 
minor step to a Feuerbachian position. It must be added that an 
obedience - or response based - Christology does not, in fact, argue 
that Jesus is man's ideal for man. Indeed, because it is claimed that 
Jesus was obedient to a divine call, it can be stated that he is God's 
ideal for man. That statement must be qualified - as it stands it 
implies a universal quality "man", whereas, of course, Jesus was, and 
could only be, God's ideal for that particular man. Pittenger warns 
that Process thought cannot permit talk of "Godhead" in union with 
"humanity". It is always God with that man. (34). Any generalized claim 
about "humanity" is always an extrapolation made with convenience, and, 
classically, a different metaphysical framework, rather than precision 
in mind. Pailin's warning is valuable insofar as it draws attention to 
the requirement that a response christology must be formulated with 
God's initiative occupying the central role. It is not a human response 
to a human initiative, but a human response to God's initiative.
The second understanding of Jesus as efficacious in the present 
concerns the generation of new possibilities. The response of Jesus to 
the challenge of his own life and death has opened novel possibilities 
for people alive today. To some extent this is true cf all events, some 
to an increased extent than others. For example, when Rutherford 
succeeded in splitting the atom he had - albeit unknowingly - enabled 
both Hiroshima and complex radiation treatment techniques. These things
(34) Christology Reconsidered p12.
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could not have existed unless that Initial possibility had been realised 
as an actual event. In a trivial sense, unless I boil the kettle I will 
not have the possibility of making a cup of instant coffee. The 
principle that one event enables certain possibilities in the future is 
consistent, although , the significance can vary dramatically. The 
application of this to christology is important. One can suggest that 
the life of Jesus enables present actions to be realized by creating the 
conditions necessary for that actualization to occur. But aiy hope that 
this is a simple exercise in christology is misplaced. One must 
question whether the potential for action which exists in the present 
could ever have existed without the possibilities generated by Jesus' 
response in his life. As an analogy, for example, the atomic bomb 
would, in fact, probably have existed even if Rutherford's experiments 
had failed - the initial actualization would have been achieved by one 
of his colleagues or the next generation of experimental physicists. 
Similarly, it is not the fact that X switched the kettle on, but rather 
the content of that, the fact that the kettle was switched on. The 
causal relationship is one of event enabling a future event, regardless 
of the subjective quality of the initial event. To illustrate this 
further one notes an essential difference between my two examples. 
Because, whereas I certainly intended to make my coffee, it is doubtful 
in the extreme that Rutherford had any intention to create a weapon of 
vast destructive potential. Consequently, if it is argued that Jesus 
generated novel possibilities for the present, two issues arise. 
Firstly, do these possibilities rely for their existence upon Jesus 
himself - are they subject dependent - or is the person Jesus of 
Nazareth coincidental to the causal relationship which exists between 
the events? Secondly, and assuming an answer to the first , did Jesus- 
intend to generate those possibilities which are attributed to him? 
Note that the notion of intention being discussed here is not the same
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as that required by Griffin* In the present context our concern is with 
Jesus' intention, not God's.
Initially, however, one should ask these questions not about Jesus, 
but, rather, God. Invoking the conclusions expressed in the third 
chapter, one notes that although God is always active in the world, it 
is the pyramid effect which enables the plethora of macrocosmic choice 
and possibility. This synthesis of urges and possibilities created at 
the level of initial aims and actual entities generates interesting 
potentials for societies and living individuals. The implication of 
this is that any given situation or potential state cannot be attributed 
solely to God. It is cosmic history as a whole which is causal in 
determining what present possibilities are available, a history in which 
God plays one role amongst many. Relating this to Jesus one realizes 
that it is not possible to maintain a precise causal relationship 
between his acts and the potential states which exist now. The options 
which are available to a becoming individual in the present are a 
product of that individual's total history, not of any one part of that 
history. The inter - relatedness of all events is the principle which 
explains why that is so. However, in an Important sense the argument so 
far has missed the crucial point. Because it is not the individual acts 
which happened to be performed by Jesus which enable present 
possibilities but rather the totality of the whole "Jesus-event".
Within this integrated corpus Jesus is an ever present reality and 
inspiration (or, as Pittenger, the "focus") but it is, nevertheless, the 
overall effect which is significant in determining what choices face the 
present. Chapter five shows how the Church fulfils this role. The
point which emerges from this is that "soteriology" is not simply a 
question of what Jesus did, but rather the whole drama of events
associated with him. The phrase "Jesus - event" has assumed the status
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of a theological cliche which is rather unfortunate in many ways because 
it really does capture the sense in which it is the totality of "Jesus", 
the man and his effects, which are important.
The question remains, to what extent is this subject dependent upon 
the man Jesus? The answer to this has, essentially, been expressed, 
albeit implicitly, in the previous section of this chapter. That is,
the individual human being Jesus of Nazareth was not, and cannot have 
been, pre-determined by God, because we noted that he was a product of 
the world's response, his own response and the divine initiative. God 
urged the conditions for Jesus insofar as his creative and redemptive
activity in the world promoted a Jesus - type response. The principle 
was there, awaiting the free response. I used the notion of 
"pre-existence" to convey that point. In the final part of this chapter 
I shall introduce the idea that this principle can be thought of as the 
"Christ". In the terms of the present question, one must conclude that 
the individual Jesus is formally coincident to the divine vision which 
urges new possibilities for the present. He remains, however, the
efficient cause because, in practice - that is, as an actuality existing 
in history - Jesus the response which realised the divine urge. In 
that sense Jesus is the incarnation of the Divine vision.
The second question asks whether Jesus actually intended to prcanote 
the possibilities which are attributed to him. One's initial response 
is to note that the source of this generative urge is truly attributed 
to God - for it is he who urges the world towards a telos. Furthermore 
one should be aware of the danger that this type of issue trivializes an 
important aspect of soteriology. The language of generating
possibilities implies a somewhat materialistic choice between, say, 
event X and event X*. But of course, Jesus had no way of knowing what 
events would be possible or absurd for twentieth century man; one notes
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that God himself Is not able to predict the actual future with 
precision. So, to ask whether Jesus Intended to generate possibility X 
or X' Is an absurd question. These present possibilities are generated 
by the totality of the past, particularly the recent antecedent 
actualizations, an emphasis which follows from Sherburne's analysis. 
This Is precisely the pyramid effect. In the consideration of the
Church this will be of considerable significance, because It will enable 
us to understand how Jesus does effect real choices for aa todav  ^
without resorting to some sort of magical transmission of possibility 
through the centuries. Furthermore, It Is stressed that Jesus'
contribution to the process retains Its significance not because of his
Intention or desire that It should do so, but because he aligned his own 
volition with the divine vision as he received It through his past. He 
acted in accordance with how he understood God's purpose for himself, 
within the overall context of God's purpose for creation. That loyalty 
- an active free decision rather than a passive lettlng-go - Is the
sacrifice which forms the essence of any Process soterlology, because 
through that act God's purpose for the world Is allowed to flourish.
Assuming that the above analysis Is valid one Is still faced by the 
problem of Jesus' necessity. Is Jesus necessary? On one level It Is 
obvious that the answer Is In the negative. It must be accepted that 
for the majority of the world's population Jesus Is absolutely 
Irrelevant - and yet those same people still lead lives which are, at 
least apparently, as authentic as any Christian life. Towards the end 
of this chapter, by Invoking the "christ" principle mentioned earlier, 
the force of that statement, seemingly so devastating to the Christian 
position, will be diminished. It Is worthwhile repeating here the 
positive aspect of the claim that Jesus becomes Important when he Is 
appropriated as such, a point to which Plttenger drew our attention. If
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the claim for Importance (decisiveness or necessity) Is made by virtue 
of a subjective appropriation, an existential rather than metaphysical 
claim, one achieves the required result without arrogance.
Inevitably there will be problems In establishing the necessity of 
Jesus In a world where he Is all too obviously unnecessary, but a 
similar problem also arises within the theological sphere of Process 
thought. This Is an Issue Inherent In Process christology and Is, 
therefore, of much greater significance to this discussion. Process 
theism Insists that God Is always and everywhere In relation to the 
world, and vice-versa. Hence It Is necessary to explain why, and In 
what sense, Jesus can be a necessary link between God and the world. If 
It Is Impossible to escape the relationship with God, why Is the 
Christian emphasis on Jesus so vital to faith? This would be a 
substantial problem for Process christology were It not for the analysis 
performed in chapter three which highlighted the difference between the 
micro- and macrocosmlc worlds. The statement which relates God to the 
world In a direct and immediate fashion applies to the microcosmos, and 
at that scale It Is true to say that Jesus Is an unnecessary aspect of 
that process. In other words, It Is possible to understand Process 
metaphysics without an appeal to Christ. But, assuming one also desires 
to understand the world of sense experience, there are additional 
factors to be considered. The precision of actual entity - Initial aim
g- subjective aim - concresence Is lost In the plethora of opportunities 
and possibilities generated by the pyramid effect. Decisions and 
potentialities which confront societies of actual entitles are mediated 
through the world (as a result of the decisions and responses of other 
societies) and, similarly, the divine vision, as It has relevance for 
societies, must also be mediated through the activity of other 
societies. Whereas an actual entity prehends the Divine vision
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appropriate to It In Its Initial aim, a conscious person Is able to 
respond to the Will of God, his purpose, only by appropriating his 
vision for the self as It Is manifested In history. The Will of God Is 
mediated In history. For Jesus, It will be recalled, this took place In 
the history of Israel, while for the present It Is the totality of the 
Jesus - event which conveys the revelation. The Jesus event Is, Itself, 
the totality of Jewish history, the actual life of Jesus and subsequent 
effects, notably the Church. Unless this mediation took place. In and 
through history. It Is not possible for a society existing In the 
present to be fully Immersed In the divine vision. The mediation Is 
necessary. It Is Interesting to note how Pallln argues towards 
"necessity", albeit of a weak and pragmatic form (35). He writes, "we 
must recognize that while God Is Involved In all events, he Is not the 
only agent Involved. If, then. In some events his Influence Is more 
decisive than In others, there Is good reason to concentrate our 
attention on those events as offering clearer Indications of his 
nature." We note that Pallln bases his argument around a claim that God 
is more evident In some events than In others. However, whereas he 
restricts the discussion of this variation to the level of "events" (to 
Imply an actual occaslon(36)) I suggest that the variation In the 
Incarnation of the divine vision (Its actualization) Is simply a result 
of the pyramid effect. Some threads of societal Inheritance are 
"clearer Indications" of creative and redemptive activity than others.
The discussion up to this point has Illustrated how It Is possible 
for the present to respond to Jesus as Important, by appropriating him
(35) ICR p317. One should note that while accepting the difference between "good reason" (i^y emphasis) and "necessity" the basis of his claim remains relevant to the present discussion.
(36) This Is similar to Cobb's analysis of the variation In the divine Initiative which was considered at the outset of this chapter.
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as such, and the two ways In which Jesus has affected the future. Both 
these Issues arise from an obedience - type christology. The next 
consideration Is to analyse how the present can respond to the Jesus of 
a revelatlonal christology. In the previous section It was stated that 
for Ogden the key to an event being revelatory lies In Its being
received as revelation. It follows that, In order to describe Jesus as 
a revelation of God, It Is simply necessary to state that for me he Is a 
revelation of God. Furthermore, It was shown that all God's
relationships with the world must be, at least potentially, revelatory 
because his nature Implies acts which reveal himself as creative and 
redemptive. An act which Is not creative or redemptive Is not a 
revelation of God's creative and redemptive nature. But this gives one 
a criterion by which to verify the claims made for revelatory
propositions under the "for me" principle. This requirement can be
Incorporated Into the verification test for revelation which David
Pallln has proposed (37). He suggests that, "to be accepted as at least 
possibly true, propositions expressing the nature of God's active 
actuality revealed by an Incarnation" must satisfy the following six 
points. One should note that the test Is not claimed to be (although 
arguably It Is) a test for revelation In a general sense, but it Is 
applicable to revealed propositions about God's activity, related to 
christology - the "Incarnation". This ensures that It Is Ideally suited 
to the present task. The six points are*
1. Internal coherence. "The assertion of *p' and 'not-p* of the same
(37) ICR p322. He makes the point that his approach may be"criticised on the grounds that I am here Illegitimately layingdown â priori rules for Christian theology whereas the proper procedure Is to Inspect Christian theology as Is Instantiated and to discover a posteriori the rules that It actuallyobeys."(p304). In the context of the present discussion such a criticism Is not made. Indeed, It was the stated purpose of chapter three that we should discover precisely those & priori rules which theology must obey. An Interest solely in aposteriori rules Is retrospectively descriptive and has little place In the construction of a dynamic and living theology.
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aspect at the same time cannot be true of any entity, not even of God." 
This condition Is obvious enough, although it Is Interesting to note the 
qualification which Is, Incidentally, the one necessary to Whitehead's 
famous theses - antitheses statements about God (38).
2. "Consistency with ultimate rational, evaluative and Independently 
known principles." There Is no guarantee that the "rational and 
evaluative principles" which we assume to know are. Indeed, the 
"ultimate" ones. Hence In order that this Is a working, pragmatic 
definition It Is necessary to overlook the qualification of "ultlmacy" 
and look Instead to consistency with rational and evaluative principles 
which we assume are valid.
3. Universality, so that the revealed propositions provide a "coherent 
perspective on all reality". They must be consistent In all possible 
situations.
4. Adequacy, that Is, what Is revealed about God must not be trivial 
but be "appropriate to the character of the ground of all reality viewed 
on a cosmic scale".
5. A revelation of God "may well be expected to have some kind of 
Intuitive appeal to men". I expand upon this notion later but her*' I 
note that It broadens the Idea of an "Independent knowledge" of God to 
Include Intuitive knowledge.
6. The revealed propositions must be relevant. Although this might, 
Initially, appear to contradict the requirement for universality, the 
stress here Is being placed on the relevance of the revelation to an 
actual existential state.
The first test requires that the revelation Is Internally coherent. 
Observing that "creation" and "redemption" are so closely Intertwined In 
the Process account (39), It follows that If a revealed proposition Is
(38) PR p348.
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"creative and redemptive" there Is no possibility of Incoherence. Of 
course, the same requirement also applies to the act of receiving the 
revelation, because It Is through that act that the revelation Is Indeed 
received as revelation. This Implies that the very act of reception 
must. Itself, be coherent with the revelation, It must be creative and 
redemptive. The full Implications of this will be clarified as the 
discussion develops.
The second aspect of the test raises a crucial Issue. Pallln 
requires that the revelation exhibits consistency with an Independent 
knowledge. But he notes that "such a 'revelatory* view of Incarnation 
may seem to be open to the objection that an Incarnation must be 
redundant since It provides us with a knowledge of God that must already 
be presupposed In our decision that here we have a revelation of 
God"(40), Indeed, this study Illustrates his point because. In chapter 
three, I discussed the nature of God without an appeal to revelation. 
It was possible, for example, to give credibility to the notion that 
God's nature Is creative and redemptive without resorting to revealed 
evidence to justify the claim. Similarly, Hartshorne (41) argues to a 
theory about the nature of God again without an appeal to revelation. 
The resolution to this dilemma, Pallln states thus, "though Hartshorne 
argues convincingly that God must be conceived as loving and not as 
hating or apathetic,.., since hatred or apathy would contradict his 
existence as the ground of being or principle of concretion, this Is a 
hlg^y abstract notion erf love and Is not able to Indicate with any
(39) Indeed, the notion of creativity Implies a lure towards harmony, which Is redemption, and, similarly, a redemptive act Is precisely that, a creative act which actualizes that lure.
(40) ICR p307. A generalized objection Is true of all "Incarnatlonal" theories -I.e. they presuppose an Incarnatlonal type God.
(41) In, for example, Tfee Divine ÂelativitY and A Natural Iheplogy. tsæ. am lim*
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clearness what God's love Is actually like and how It really does 
act. "(42). In essence, this Is a restatement of the theme which 
permeates this study. The non- Incarnat lonal knowledge which Is 
achieved via metaphysical speculation refers only to the abstract 
existence of God, It concerns the mlcrocosmlc ontological reality. 
Knowledge of the existential God - the God of the Bible to which human 
beings may relate - must be mediated through the world. This Is a 
denial of the claim that the New Testament adds nothing to what
philosophy already says. It does, because it adds tangibility to
otherwise abstract notions. Similarly, It reaffirms Whitehead's Idea 
that theology Is an attempt to synthesise the life of Jesus (the
revelation) with Plato's Insight (Sophist and Timaeus) that Divine 
persuasion (a term which equates with the creative and redemptive nature 
of God) Is the foundation of the cosmos (43). My Interpretation of 
Pallln's condition Is two-fold. Firstly, It requires that the latter 
corresponds to the former, thereby bestowing eplstemologlcal primacy on 
the metaphysical or non-lncarnatlonal knowledge. Secondly, there Is the 
point that If the "rational and evaluative" principles change, by virtue 
of a paradigm shift In our understanding of the cosmos. It Is reasonable 
to expect a different view of what constitutes a revelation of God's 
nature. For example, prior to a scientific world view, a revealed 
picture of a magical God - a God who Is able to stop the sun In the sky 
(Joshua 10*12-13) Is quite consistent with Independent knowledge 
accepted at that time. Given our current knowledge however. It Is quite 
legitimate (and not destructive to faith) to question whether such 
"revelations" are valid. It Is, for example, rather difficult to see 
hew the act of halting the apparent orbit of the sun around the earth 
(even If It were possible to give this meaning In our scientific
(42) ICR p309.
(43) Adventures of Ideas p172.
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framework) Is relevant to and consistent with a creative and redemptive 
act of God. This principle relatlvlzes revelation because It provides a 
mechanism to understand how a revelation In one context will fall the 
test In another.
Initially, Pallln*s third condition appears to contradict this.
The requirement for universality and a "coherent perspective on all 
reality" might seem to deny the relativism permitted by the second 
condition. However, the crux of this "universality" must be taken In 
regard to Its reference to "reality". In Process thought the "real" Is 
the Inherited standpoint, those perished actual entitles which are 
available to constitute the past for the emerging entity. It is clear 
that how reality Is actually defined Is dependent upon the position of 
the emerging actual entity In the spatlo - temporal continuum. In one 
sense this Is obvious. From my position now, the events of tomorrow do 
not constitute part of my reality (no matter how "real" my hopes and 
fears for tomorrow may be). But, In two days time those events will 
belong to the set of what Is real - reality has altered. By 
extrapolating this principle to any two different locations In the
volume defined by space and time. It Is clear that "reality" depends |
f
upon the position of the observer. This too promotes relativism. The jttImportant point to note Is that, given this "reality", the revealed |
iproposition must be universal Insofar as It gives a coherent perspective |
on all that reality. As a corollary of this, one notes that It also I
Implies responsibility. The person Is responsible to ensure that they j
consider all of what, for them, Is real. This corresponds to the j
responsibility of the self to become In response to all the Influences 
which are relevant to It. I shall also note how the requirement for j
universality Is Incorporated In the final part of Pallln*s test. I
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The fourth point, concerning adequacy, requires that what Is 
revealed Is not trivial. There Is an Implicit assumption here about 
God, that he Is the ground of all reality and, therefore, not trivial - 
a point which relates to the requirement for consistency with an 
Independent knowledge. In order to be adequate It must be adequate with 
respect to something, and this "something" Is given by philosophical 
speculation. Again, one notes that this condition Is flexible to the 
extent of permitting relativity. The term "adequate" Is not absolute 
and varies according to how the "something", with reference to which 
adequacy Is assessed, differs In a variety of contexts. The Issue of 
Independent knowledge Is also relevant to the next point. In which 
Pallln suggests that the revelation should have "Intuitive appeal". 
Does this Imply that man can reach - on the basis of his Intuition - 
authentic existence, thus rendering revelation unnecessary? It Is, of 
course, always open to that Interpretation but there Is a more subtle 
Intention, If I understand Pallln correctly. It Is quite possible for a 
person to "know" something without ever really being aware of It. True 
awareness - at which point the possession of that knowledge acquires 
existential significance - Is achieved when a catalyst provokes the 
required reaction. Or, to us^ Ramsey's phrase, when the "penny drops". 
Analogies are not always helpful, but personal experience teaches that 
It Is quite possible to be vaguely aware of something without really 
appreciating It, and yet - sometimes dramatically, sometimes over a 
prolonged period - the vagueness Is dissipated and the awareness Is 
vivid. Pallln Is, It seems to me, suggesting that revelation can 
function as this catalyst, to provoke full consciousness of an otherwise 
dormant knowledge. This analysis certainly fits rather neatly Into the 
micro/macro Idlan of this study. From the mlcrocosmlc viewpoint the 
process exhibits the creative and redemptive nature of God and so. In 
that sense, we - as societies composed of myriads of actual entitles -
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are Immersed In the pre-consclous awareness of creative and redemptive 
activity* And yet we are not consciously aware of that. A revelation 
In the macrocosmlc world of experience can light the spark which 
Illuminates that reality. Thus, revelation, as conceived In this 
analysis, can act as a bridge which relates the microcosmos to the 
macrocosmlc world.
Pallln suggests three possible ways In which revelation may have 
Intuitive appeal to men. Firstly, the Idea that It leads to "human 
flourishing", secondly, that It promotes "creative growth and 
understanding" and thirdly, (perhaps) that the revealed propositions are 
self - evident. The third point, adequately accounted for by the 
discussion above. Is the Idea that the revealed material completes the 
jigsaw and fits one's preconceived understanding of reality. The Idea 
of revelation promoting human development - to summarize Pallln's notion 
of flourishing, creative growth and understanding - Is, perhaps, the
most significant aspect of the test. For this Is an explicit statement
that revelation Is not merely the communication of Information about the 
nature of God but Is, Itself, a motive for action. Indeed, not only is 
It a motive for, but It also demands action. It Is not revelatory 
unless accompanied by action. Furthermore, It must be noted that the 
action It requires must be a reflection of the content of revelation. 
This point was made In connection with the first condition of the test. 
As Thornton wrote, "revelation. Interpreted In terms of activity. Is the 
corollary of creation. It Is the creative activity of God drawing man
to his true end. In a sinful world revelation passes Into the form of
redemptive activity."(44). The reception of God's creative and 
redemptive nature only occurs If the act of receiving Is also an act 
which brings forth creative growth and human flourishing. This gives a
(44) Thornton,L. The Incarnate Lord, Synopsis of Contents,ch. VI, pXXI.
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two edged sword to the test for authentic revelation. Firstly, the 
actual content of revelation, what Is claimed to be revealed, must 
satisfy the six points of the test and, secondly, the effects erf the 
revelation must be to Induce positive results In the receiver. If 
either of these aspects Is missing from a revelatory claim then It falls 
Pallln*s test.
The final point Is a demand that what Is revealed Is relevant. In 
the context of "revelation" which becomes revelatory because It Is 
received as such this Is obvious. If the Jesus event Is a revelation 
because I receive It as such, then, for me. It Is relevant to my current 
existential state. It Is worth observing however, that the actual 
condition requires rather more than that. The point Is, not that the 
revelation Is relevant for me just because It "suits a mood", but that 
It Is relevant to the totality (hence universality) of what Is my 
reality. To rephrase that, relevance Is judged against what Is relevant 
for a responsible becoming self. Inclusive of all Influences, not just a 
tiny portion of life. Once again, this condition permits the
relatlvlzlng of revelation.
It Is now possible to apply Pallln's test to Ogden's analysis of 
revelation. Ogden opines that all God's actions are potentially 
revelatory and actually so If they are received as revelation. In 
response to the crucial point It Is clear that Ogden Is well placed to 
stress that revelation does promote action. The self. In the process of 
becoming, apprehends what It considers to be Important and then, almost 
by definition, acts upon that decision. Indeed, the decision Itself Is
active. Pallln says, "as Whitehead suggests with his concept of
'Importance', certain events are far more valuable than others In 
leading us to perceive 'how things go'."(45). Such events become
(45) ICR p317.
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revelatory If our perception of "how things go", which Is derived from 
them, leads on to action and response. Although previously we saw that 
Pallln requires that a revealed proposition Is, at least to some extent, 
"self - evident", the consequences of receiving the revelation, and 
acting In accordance with it, can Induce radical novelty. R'^ velatlon Is 
capable. If It Is received as a transforming power, to restructure one's 
understanding of "how things go". It Is not necessarily a reiteration 
or reaffirmation of a known state as It can also function as the 
Inspiration for change. The decisions of the self are, ultimately, 
formative of the self and If the self becomes according to Its reception 
of revelation the self exhibits the qualities of the revelation. 
Otherwise the revelation falls as revelation because It has achieved 
nothing, and revelation Is an act of God. Hence, since revelation Is 
always a revelation of the creative and redemptive nature of God - which 
Is love - the self who receives, and consequently acts upon, revelation
Is a self who loves.
This line of argument can be developed further. A self who loves 
Is a self who Is open to all the Influences which are relevant to It. 
God, as the supreme lover, Is affected by the totality of history 
(everything which has ever happened Is part of God's reality) whereas
even the most authentic human Is defined within a limited boundary.
However, within this limit, the responsible self must be open to all 
Influences relevant to that limit, and consider all the facets of Its 
own reality. It must, therefore, come to terms with the one Inevitable 
Influence In life, namely death. But this Involves a paradox. Death 
mitigates against a loving self. It takes away life, and threatens to 
render meaningless value and love. The problem Is how to reconcile the 
apprehension of a revelation of love with the fact of death. Pallln's 
verification test requires that revelation Is relevant and adequate with
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respect to the existential state of the receiving subject. This
necessarily Includes the presence of the possibility of Imminent death. 
At least, to be more precise. It should Include that awareness If the 
self Is to be open to all relevant Influences. It follows from this 
that a proposition. If It Is a revelation of the creative and redemptive 
nature <rf God, must convey the solution to that paradox. A revelation 
which Is threatened by the fear of death can not be a revelation of the 
One who Is pure unbounded love. Otherwise, revelation falls Pallln*s 
test because It Is not adequate or relevant to the fact of death. This 
has a profoundly Interesting Implication for christology, particularly 
for the sense In which Jesus can be considered to be the decisive 
revelation of God.
It Is clear that there are two alternative views. Either Jesus
merely conveys the revelation or Jesus Is himself a part of the
revelation. The proposal I wish to follow here Is that If the
revelation Is to be adequate with respect to death then It must be 
founded In the existential reality of human flnltude. If Jesus Is only 
the conveyor of the revelation this Is not possible. The content thus 
conveyed may express ontological truths about flnltude, but It cannot 
convey the existential human reality unless It Is grounded In that 
reality. But, supposing that Jesus Is himself an Integral part of the 
revelation, we are confronted by the Intriguing possibility that the 
crucifixion - considered as the victory of love and value over death - 
Is an essential part of a revelation of God (46). This Is, of course, a
statement which "faith" might have made on the opening page of this
thesis (47), but the Interesting point here Is that we have arrived at
i
(46) Note also, for example, Whitehead's "the essence ofChristianity Is an appeal to the life of Christ as a revelation of (God)". (Adventures of Ideas pi69*) One notes that the appeal Is to the life of Christ - Jesus himself - not to a revelation merely conveyed by him.
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this conclusion via a different route: a philosophical analysis.
Precisely hew the crucifixion fulfils this role will be considered In 
more detail In the next chapter. In Ogden's terminology, this Implies 
that the act of re-presen tat Ion requires participation, to the extent 
that without participation the mediation of the message falls. This, In 
turn, allows one to assign a significant degree of "uniqueness" to 
Jesus. Firstly, one must accept that revelation of God occurs 
throughout all creation, simply by virtue of the fact that creation
exhibits the process of novel creativity which Is God's nature (48). 
But It Is only In the totality of the event which culminated In the 
crucifixion that the revelation assumed the authority to speak to the 
total, existentially aware human person. Mackey's rhetoric dramatises 
this. The crucifixion Is the "element of tragedy necessary for any true 
portrayal of the human condition. "(49). Furthermore, It Is at this 
point that one can propose a departure from a humanist or, so-called, 
existentialist position. Because, even accepting that "life" Is 
possible without an appeal to Jesus, these positions lack the potency to 
reconcile the apparent and utter devastation of death to the love and 
value of life. That will not persuade a humanist to change his mind, 
Sartrlan absurdity will not dissolve In the face of the crucifixion or 
resurrection. But even If the hope which Is the message of the Cross Is 
received by one person as an affirmation of love, despite death, then
(47) "Christ died for our sins In accordance with th^ Scriptures and was burled, and he was raised on the third day...."1.Cor.15:3b-4. See Moltmann Crucified God pi81 and elsewhere.
(48) It might also be argued that It exhibits purpose, (forexample In the Tlmaeus or In the various forms of theteleologlcal argument) thereby hinting at God's redemptive nature, but this controversial claim Is not necessary to the argument. Of course, for Whlteheadlans It Is true that the universe has a purpose (the Divine vision for It), but thecontroversy centres around the claim that It exhibits purpose.For, In any one cosmic epoch It Is quite conceivable that theunderlying purpose Is hidden by localised forces.
(49) Modern Theology. p88
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revelation has occurred.
It Is especially Interesting that a Process analysis of revelation 
should be able to reply to the "unanswerable" problem which confronts 
the existentialists. It remains to be shown whether the crucifixion Is 
an adequate account erf the preservatlem of value , the triumph of love 
over the loss of death, (this Is considered In the following chapter)
but what has been established Is that Jesus as the revelation of God Is
relevant to the total human being. This, in addition to the fact that 
the act of receiving Jesus as the revelation of God Is both an act and a 
motive for further acts of the self, ensures that our account of 
revelation satisfies the conditions of Pallln's test.
Throughout the present chapter I have, on occasions, noted a 
distinction between the terms "Jesus" and "Christ". It should also be 
added that I have not observed any distinction with slavish accuracy. 
The purpose of this final part of the chapter Is to examine these two 
terms and to comment upon their Implications for Process christology. 
The essence of this Is the notion of creative transformation which was 
Introduced In the section on Cobb In chapter two.
The Idea of creative transformation Is composed of four primary
aspects, Logos, "Incarnation", "Christ" as the Incarnation of Logos 
which Is the Image of creative transformation, and, finally, how this 
relates to the particular, the man Jesus. Logos, according to Cobb Is 
present to all actual entitles as the "Initial phase of their subjective 
aim"(50), which Is their Initial aim. The Divine Vision, the eternal 
urge of desire. Is the Logos, which Is Imparted to each emerging actual 
entity as a specific urge relevant to the circumstances of that 
particular genesis. This presents no difficulties from a Whiteheadian
(50) Christ in a Pluralistic Age p76.
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viewpoint. It Is merely taking one aspect of deity, the Divine Eros,
and labelling It "Logos". The name Is as equally valid as any other
appellation. One possible problem arises from within the sphere of
faith and In the following chapter I shall consider whether this
definition of Logos Is adequate In that respect. One notes that Logos 
defines a process relevant to the abstract mlcrocosmlc world, a point 
which Is crucial as the discussion unfolds. There Is also a sense In 
which Logos exists outwlth time because, being the eternal urge for 
desire. It Is, essentially, a hope for and a striving towards a future - 
and therefore not yet actual - state. It Is timeless because, for
Process thought, time Is a product of two non-contemporary occasions and 
an urge for the future Is not bound by, or descrlbable In terms of, 
actual events. One can claim that the urge for, say, event A exists 
prior to event A actually occurring. Logos Is pre-existent with respect 
to any event to which It Is relevant.
If Logos represents a timeless urge then one of two possibilities 
may be true. Either, the urge must change according to hew the events 
which exist In, and create, time actually concresce, or, alternatively, 
the urge Is constant. Human beings. It can be noted, often tend to 
exhibit one or other of these traits. Either they allow the self to be 
so Influenced by variable and local forces that they lack an overall 
continuity of desire, life constantly changing direction according to 
the latest Influence, or they close the self to novel Influences and 
merely reiterate the same (Internal and selfish) desire. Logos, It must 
be suggested Is neither one nor the other but the optimal combination of 
both. Firstly, the urge Is Infinitely variable because It Is adapted to 
the unique spatlo - temporal location of each emerging occasion. 
Second, It Is constant because It Is always an urge towards the 
maximization of harmony. This, of course. Is nothing other than a
— 179 —
The synthesis: Process Christology.
reiteration of Whitehead's "best for that Impasse" formula. The next 
aspect of creative transformation Is the notion of "Incarnation". This 
term Is employed In order to distinguish between the presence of Logos 
In each actual entity as the Initial aim, and the actualization of the 
Logos which occurs when the occasion adopts the Initial aim as Its own 
subjective aim and achieves concrescence according to the divine vision 
appropriate to It. The Logos Incarnate Is, like the Logos present, 
confined to actual entitles. However, whereas the Logos present Is 
(unless actualized. In which case It becomes Logos Incarnate) transient 
and fades Into oblivion the moment the entity perishes, the Logos 
Incarnate becomes an actual reality, a fact which exists for prehension 
by other, non-contemporary, actual entitles. Thus the Logos Incarnate 
Is available, by virtue of Its being a part of what Is real, to be 
Incorporated by the pyramid effect. It becomes an Inherent aspect of
the macrocosmlc world. The difference between "presence" and
"Incarnation" Is, then, more than a mere variation In vocabulary. The 
notion of "Incarnation" enables one to understand how God's activity 
permeates the world of real things, based upon and founded In, his 
activity as Logos In actual entitles.
This actualization of the Logos Is, for Cobb, the process of 
creative transformation. There Is a sense in which the reader of Cobb's 
work Is given the Impression that creative transformation Is a process 
additional to the process of creativity as described by Whitehead. 
This, If Indeed such an Impression Is conveyed. Is false. Creative 
transformation Is nothing other than the process of novel creativity 
when that coincides with the Divine vision. It might, therefore, be 
termed creativity In Its Ideal state, each actual entity aligning Itself
with the eternal aim towards harmony. Creative transformation Is,
therrfore, essentially redemptive because Insofar as creative
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transformation Is taking place, the actual entitles are tending towards 
the goal of redemption, harmony. This analysis of creative 
transformation must be reconciled with a statement of Cobb's quoted 
previously. In which he defines creative transformation as "that process 
In which our Imagination and life orientation can be transformed by 
lucidity erf vision and openness to what we see."(51). Cobb Intends that 
creative transformation can have Immediate effects on human beings and, 
consequently. It Is necessary to provide macrocosmlc Justification of 
this. This Is readily forthcoming because, as noted above, when 
creative transformation Is occurring It Is efficacious In promoting a 
movement towards a harmonious, redemptive, state at all levels of
activity. Actual entitles which exhibit the Logos Incarnate are the
roots which enable the flowering of creative transformation In ever 
Increasingly complex societies. And, as the process Is amplified by 
each new event of creativity, new horizons are Incorporated, casting 
asunder the boundaries to vision and encouraging openness to a wider 
spectrum of Influence. Furthermore, It Is precisely for the same reason 
that creative transformation Is relative, Implying that what functions 
as creative transformation for one group may not do so for another. 
For, even If creative transformation Is functioning at the level of 
actual entitles or simple societies, unless complex societies - Indeed, 
consciously aware societies - also Integrate Into the process It will
remain Invisible and Irrelevant to them. This replies to a question 
raised In chapter two concerning the possibility of recognizing creative 
transformation. In response, one notes that participation Is 
recognition and, without participation, recognition Is Impossible. This 
reflects what Is an accepted principle In the scientific community, 
namely, that the act of performing an experiment (the participation) Is 
an aspect of the observed result (the recognition). Similarly, Knox
(51) Ibid. p21.
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notes that although an event may be undeniably public (for example, a 
death In the family). It will only possess "transforming power" for 
those who are Intimately Involved with It (52). It remains possible for 
a group of people to recognise that creative transformation Is a feature
of the cosmos without making the associated claim that It Is the Logos
Incarnate. Any position which recognizes a purpose to the cosmos, and
enables present actions to be grounded In anticipation or hope of a
future state Is recognizing the process of creative transformation, no 
matter how Implicit this recognition may be. But, of particular 
Interest In this context, Cobb suggests that when creative 
transformation Is recognized as the Incarnation of Logos, the process 
can be named the Christ. In Cobb's analysis he faces, but does not 
confront, the problem that any actual entity which Is recognized as an 
Incarnation of the Logos (and thus Is an Instance of creative 
transformation) can, correctly, be termed the Christ. This would 
suggest that the past Is, at least conceivably, littered with "Christs", 
many singular Instances of creative transformation which are recognized 
as Logos Incarnate. This deficiency Is overcome. In the Idiom of this 
thesis, by the Insistence that creative transformation culminates, by 
virtue of the pyramid effect, Into a force active In the world which Is 
directly available to human beings, that Is, In the history of the 
macrocosmlc universe. If this peak exists as an aspect of the process 
which is relevant to a consciously aware human society, It must, Itself,
(52) The Church and the Realltv ^  Christ p83. Note that, despite Its superficial similarity, this statement rests detached from the fldelstlc views which have been adopted by some (for example, Barthlan) theologians. These positions avoid or Ignore criticism by arguing that unless a person Is Illuminated by, and accepts, the "doctrine" they will have no hope of understanding It, thus rendering objections from outwlth the Inner sanctum of experience Irrelevant and Impotent. Although Cobb does argue that one group may claim to be Immersed In creative transformation, which Is possibly not acknowledged by another group, this never amounts to a true/false division. The question of "truth" Is raised shortly.
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exist as a similarly consciously aware human person. For, if the
process of creative transformation has only progressed as far as simple 
Inanimate objects It Is, to all Intents and purposes, not (yet) a
significant feature In the process of becoming for more complex 
organisms. This follows from the fact that participation Is an Integral 
aspect of recognition. If we (as consciously aware human beings) are to 
recognize creative transformation we must participate In It, and we are 
unable to be fully participant In the process of becoming relevant to, 
say, a grain of sand. We can state that. If the process of creative 
transformation Is available for recognition by men. It must exist In the 
life of a man. In whom we can participate - the man who Is then named 
the Christ. This Is perhaps the closest Process christology comes to 
establishing the necessity of Jesus, the fact that creative
transformation must (If It Is to be available for recognition by us)
exist In a man (53).
It must be emphasized that the naming of creative transformation Is 
relevant only to that particular group who participate In the process of 
creative transformation so named. It Is the Christian reality which 
validates the naming of the process Christ, other realities validate 
other names (54).
The argument up to this point has Insisted that. In order for human
beings to participate In creative transformation, the "Christ", so
named, must be available as a particular In which It Is possible to
participate. It Is Cobb’s purpose, speaking as he Is from within a
Christian participatory framework, to show how Jesus Is the man who Is
(53) One can appreciate the feminist position at this point. For, If participation Is the key to the recognition of creative transformation, one can ask whether a female Is able to fullyparticipate In the life of a male. This thesis Is not concernedwith feminist theology as such, but It must recognise that achristology of participation has to respond to those type ofIssues.
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the Christ. Two questions were raised In chapter two. Does the
historical man Jesus exhibit the necessary attributes which validate the
naming of him the Christ? The next chapter deals with this In detail,
the sense In which Jesus Is portrayed by the Gospels as a man of
creative and redemptive activity. And, equally Important, It shows how
Christ Is present In the Church which Is the community of Jesus. The
second question concerned the possibility of a man being able to exhibit
creative transformation In Its most complete sense. Cobb's analysis of
this followed the notion of Jesus actualizing the presence of Logos, In
order that the Incarnation of Logos co-const It uted his self. It Is
relatively straightforward to transpose this, mlcrocosmlc understanding.
Into a macrocosmlc framework. The self Is a synthesis of the past,
according to the present decisions of that self. But the past contains
the Logos Incarnate, Initially at the level of actual entitles, which
(54) It will be recalled that In the Introduction I raised the question, "why Christ"? The notion of creative transformation ensures that the Buddha, for example, ia ss Important to thisdiscussion as the Christ. But, and this Is the crucialcondition, that Is not the name which Is relevant to, orvalidated by, the reality In which the thesis Is being written. Cobb defined reality as that called forth by creative transformation at any given moment. This differs from thedefinition I gave previously which defined reality In terms of the context, or history, of the location of the subject. Cobb's definition ensures that "reality" Is defined without reference to any decision made by the subject, but It Is preferable to adopt a definition of "reality" which Incorporates the sense of an active subject. Given any set of circumstances a person can create their cwn reality, consider, for example. Hare's paranoid college student who Is convinced that his professors are Intent upon murdering him. Apart from Its overtly pragmatic Inevitability a definition of reality which acknowledges the capacity for self - creation by the subject must reply to the accusation that It Is too subjective. This can be achieved through a definition of "truth". Rorty employs a phrase of James' when he states that truth Is "that which It Is better for us to believe"(Phllosonhv and the Mirror gf Nature plO). That definition Is, I argue, close to Cobb's definition of reality, because It conveys astrong sense of an Ideal being imposed from without the subject.Truth Is that which Is dictated by the process, or In Cobb's words, what Is called forth. In this context, "better" Implies correspondence to creative and redemptive actions which promote harmony. Implying that truth Is coincident with creative transformation. For societies participating In the process named Christ It Is correct to label Christ as the Truth.
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actualize the Logos present, and, by virtue of the pyramid effect, 
eventually, creative transformation Is manifested by societies. The 
corollary to this, which Is crucial to the present argument, states that 
If the present self appropriates the past which Is the Logos Incarnate,
then that self Is constituted by the Logos Incarnate. If, moreover, the
self consciously seeks to appropriate the past which Is Logos Incarnate 
this active decision can be emphasised by employing the term 
"co-constItutes". The self Is consciously aware that It forms Itself by 
Incorporating the Logos Incarnate as the primary feature of Its cwn
composition. Similarly, the man who lives "for his children" allows his
self to be co-constltuted by their needs and desires. Whereas Cobb 
suggests that Jesus actualized the Logos as It was Immediately present 
as the Initial aim. It makes more sense to argue that Jesus’ self was 
formed by synthesizing Logos Incarnate with all the other Influences 
present to him. To express this using Kaiser's words, "though Jesus was 
free to follow his own personal alms, he accepted the call of God as the 
very centre of his being, his very self."(55). It might be argued that 
the notion of co-constltutlon Is tantamount to the sacrifice of the self 
to an external agency. In Cobb's analysis, which permits the direct and 
Immediate effect of the Logos Incarnate this accusation has substance. 
It Is certainly a problem for Griffin's claim that Jesus was 
"transparent" to God. If, however. It Is Insisted that the Logos 
Incarnate Is derived from history, the autonomy of Jesus' self Is 
emphasised, for It Is the decision of his self to Incorporate the Logos 
which enables co-constltutlon to take place. Barnhart speaks of "a 
unity between God and Jesus which Is more than a commonality of purposes 
and Ideals"(56), calling this an empathie union. This, he goes on to
(55) Scottish Journal of Theology vol.28. 1975 p75. Review ofGriffin's Process Christology.
(56) Religious Studies p227f. "Incarnation and ProcessPhilosophy"
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suggest, amounts to an identification which, although not an ontological 
Identification, has ontological Implications. He presents an analogy of 
a social worker Involved with a child In the slums. If that person 
begins to "Identify" (one notes that this Is a frequently used term) 
with the child they might well be confronted a choice: to abandon
their academic Interest or to beccmie personally Involved. This, It 
seems to me. Is precisely what Is Involved by stating that Jesus' self 
was co-constltuted by the Logos. Jesus, In his response to his 
perception of God's activity In history, became Identified with the 
corresponding promise and demand. Ford raises an Important objection to 
the notion of co-constltutlon. How, he asks, do we know the Inner
psychic experience of a person, In order that we can state how that self 
Is constituted? (57). This eplstemologlcal problem Is surmounted In 
the next chapter by Insisting that It Is through the New Testament 
accounts of Jesus' life, and the Church, that we see his selfhood 
revealed.
The language used throughout this present section has differed from 
that used elsewhere In this chapter. Despite this, a theory of creative 
transformation, based upon Cobb's analysis. Is the key to relate and
synthesize the previous Ideas. A christology based upon creative
transformation Is, In fact, a combination of a response - type
christology and a revelatlonal christology. To express this In Its 
simplest form, the response consists In Jesus' free decision to 
appropriate the past which was Logos Incarnate, and Logos Incarnate must 
be recognised to be a revelation of God. The obedience of Jesus was 
defined to be his loyalty to the particular principle of Interpretation 
which he employed to reach decisions In his present. The decision he 
faced was two-fold: how to understand and rationalize his past, and what
(57) Lure of God, p67.
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direction his future life should take. Based upon his understanding of 
God's activity In his past, his dealings with the people of Israel, 
Jesus Incorporated this revelation Into his self, and became personally 
Involved with the call for action Implied by the Divine vision. But 
this Is saying that Jesus allowed his self to be co-constltuted by the 
Logos because the Logos Incarnate Is the divine activity In history. 
Consequently we can understand how his life was, Insofar as the Logos 
Incarnate co-constltuted his self, an Incarnation of the Divine Vision. 
All that remains, the subject of the next chapter. Is to examine the 
Gospel record of Jesus and shew that this Is, Indeed, a fair account of 
his life. Similarly, It was shown that God's activity In history Is a 
revelation of his creative and redemptive nature, because all his 
actions In history are creative and redemptive. But, since God's 
activity In history Is the Logos Incarnate, we conclude that the Logos 
Incarnate, which co-constItutes Jesus' self, Is a revelation of God. 
Jesus, who Is named Christ, which Is creative transformation recognised 
as Logos Incarnate, Is, therefore, revelation. Again the subject of the 
next chapter. It must be shown hew this revelation Is adequate with 
respect to the totality of the human existential situation. In order 
that It satisfies Pallin's verification test.
To summarize this chapter I quote Daniel Day Williams, "through 
what Christ has accomplished In the events which came to their climax In 
the life of Jesus our human existence has been given a new structure. 
Creative and redemptive power has been released In It which was not 
wholly released before. There Is a new community In history. Members 
of that community begin to live on the basis of what has taken hold of 
them through the life of Jesus. "(58). He captures the three Important 
points. The Idea of God's activity reaching Its climax In Jesus
(58) op.clt. p460. PPCT.
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highlights the fact that Jesus Is the focus of an activity which 
permeates all history. We observe that It Is In the life of Jesus - 
that Is, the dynamic process of his becoming self - that this explicit 
revelation of what Is "wholly released" occurs (59). Finally, we note 
that this Implies a new structure of existence for the self. This Is 
achieved when the self Is co-constltuted by the Logos. The division 
between a response christology and a revelation christology Is 
artificial. Jesus' response to God iâ a revelation and revelation 
Implies response. The response and the revelation take place In the 
becoming self, the structure of existence. William's quotation 
continues, to Introduce the notion of community. This new community Is 
the Church. Plttenger's christology Is explicitly and essentially 
communal In nature. His emphasis on the faith of the community, the 
tradition of the Church as the data for christology, and Its continuing 
response to Jesus ensures that Jesus Is never considered In Isolation 
from those who receive him. It Is not Immediately obvious that Cobb's 
creative transformation Implies community to the same extent. That 
process Is relevant to Individuals, and Is named the Christ by those who 
recognise In It the Incarnation of the Logos. However, and as Thornton 
notes In another context, "...activities of the spirit which In this way 
pass Into highly Individualised forms do not necessarily become 
Individualistic."(60). Although creative transformation Is
Individualized, It becomes so by virtue of Its reception within a 
particular context or environment. This community, which may be a 
Church, a society, ethnic group or. Indeed, any collection of 
Individuals, ensures the social aspect of Cobb's christology. It Is 
perhaps worth noting that, for Cobb, the community Is understood In a 
far broader sense than the "Church" which, for Plttenger, mediates and
(59) See, for example, Hebrews 1:1-3.
(60) op.clt. p135.
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maintains the Christian tradition. The first task of the next chapter 
Is to explicate the notion of the Church In greater detail.
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The christology I presented In the previous chapter is, it is 
claimed, an adequate account of Jesus Christ with respect to the 
principles of Whitehead's vision described In chapter three. But, If 
that claim is valid It Is a rather limited achievement. At best It can 
hope to appeal to theologians already committed, or at least 
sympathetic, to the Process position. Of greater Importance (1) Is the 
question whether the Process christology of chapter four Is adequate 
with respect to the Christian faith; does It satisfy the religious 
demand? An Initial reaction Is to note that I have already Integrated 
"faith" Into the discussion because chapter two, the "Inspiration", 
described statements of faith. However, these statements were deeply 
rooted In the Process tradition. They were expressions of faith within 
a Whiteheadian framework and for that reason the resulting christology 
does not, necessarily, reflect what traditional Christianity has taught. 
It remains necessary to suppose, therefore, that In order to give an 
account of Its adequacy with respect to "faith", the Process christology 
I have discussed In this study must be subjected to a comparison with 
the doctrines of traditional christology and the New Testament account 
of Jesus (2), It must be stated at the outset what the precise purpose 
of this evaluation actually Is. It Is not my Intention nor, I believe, 
should It be, to adjust the christology I have presented so that It fits 
whatever the requirements of "faith" or traditional religion might 
warrant. It is, rather, to show that a Process christology as I have 
Interpreted It provides an account of Jesus Christ which does respond 
significantly and adequately to the demands of faith. That Is a
(1) I use the word "greater" not to Imply that I am sacrificing my adherence to the principles of Process metaphysics but rather to convey the essential point that to be a "valid" account It must appeal to a wider audience.
(2) Note the Implicit assumption here that the New Testament accounts are not, necessarily, adequately reflected by later christology!
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positive Intention. I wish to highlight compatibility, but I will not 
shy away from noting areas which possibly generate problems for "faith". 
Furthermore, I believe It Is necessary to provide rather more of an
explanation than Mellert who states of Process christology, "It seems to 
me to conform quite adequately to what was proclaimed at Ephesus and 
Chalcedon."(3). It Is not possible to make a simple Identification 
between the two because, as Moltmann expresses It, "whereas In the 
ancient Church the dispute about the relationship of the two natures In 
the person of Christ was always a dispute about physical redemption as 
well and the Idea of the real Incarnation of God was always associated 
with the deification of man (theosls) which It made possible, the 
dispute at the present time about the true humanity of Jesus, his 
awareness of God, his 'Inner life', and his freedom finds Its basis In 
the demand for true humanity, authentic life. Inner identity and
liberation."(4).
In the previous chapter I noted that an analysis of Jesus is not 
sufficient to respond to a total christology; the "Christ - event" must 
Include the notion of the response to Jesus, which Is the Church. This 
Idea Is not new, as Plttenger brings to our attention. He draws upon 
the Epistle to the Ephesians In which the stress Is placed not on Christ 
as Jesus only but on "Christ as Jesus and those who are his. It
portrays Christ In terms of 'Christ and his Church' or 'Christ in his
Church'."(5). Therefore, before one can evaluate Process christology 
with respect to the six themes of Biblical and traditional views. It Is 
necessary to expand upon the Process understanding of the Church.
The preliminary task Is to define how I am using the term "Church".
(3) Mellert, op.clt. p84.
(4) Crucified God p93.
(5) Christology Reconsidered. p94.
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It Is not Intended to Imply any one particular Institution and yet, In 
order that It remains relevant. It must apply to the "Church" to which 
(real) people actually belong and In which they worship. It Is not an 
abstract. Idealized "City of God" but neither Is It the mass of wood and 
stone which shelters, the members from the chill of winter for a few 
short Sunday hours. The Church Is the people, and It Is all those 
people who confess to worship one Lord Jesus Christ. Knox, while 
accepting that It Is futile to try to give a precise location to the 
Church makes the point that the question "what Church?" remains, and Is 
a valid one to raise (6). Furthermore, he notes that the definition 
must Involve "oneness, community" and "reconciliation" but adds that 
this does not Imply that It must be perfect (7). I think he provides
exactly the right balance between the sense of "perfection" (Church as
the Body of Christ) and "fallibility" (Church as the participation of 
fallible individual members) when he states, "the garment may have been 
tom out of shape or even rent apart, but the fabric with its
characteristic texture is still the same"(8).
The basis of a Process understanding of the Church Is to make the 
distinction between the "Church" as a name which applies to a group of 
Individuals and the notion that the Church Is a society. I quoted
Mellert in the previous chapter, in which he drew our attention to 
precisely that point. There are two aspects to Church as society. The 
present members prehend ("Inherit" Is a word which avoids a conflict 
between the macro and micro aspects) the Importance from the past and 
then, crucially. Incorporate that Importance Into their cwn present. 
That, of course. Is the definition of a society and one can see how
(6) Knox,J. The Church and the Reality of Christ. p22 n8.
(7) Ibid. p129.
(8) Ibid. p59.
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continuity (the Inheritance from the past) and self - perpetuation (the 
Incorporation of Importance) are Inherent In the definition. But If 
continuity Is to be understood In macrocosmlc terms, that Is, relevant 
to human beings who are members of the society which Is the Church, we 
must be clear about what "past" Is being referred to. The proposal to 
be made Is that, because the Church was originally a community response 
to Jesus It contains within It an embodiment of what It means to respond 
to Jesus. In that sense, a response In the Church Is a response to 
Jesus. There are three Issues which arise from that general principle. 
These are: In what sense Is the Church a response to Jesus, hew Is that 
response "present" and how can one understand the notion of a response 
In the Church as being a response to Jesus? I have noted that the New 
Testament records of Jesus are accurate renditions of how people 
responded to him, either directly or mediated via the appropriate 
network of communication. Hence, for example, there Is no reason to 
suppose that the journeys of Paul cannot be regarded as factual accounts 
of what he did In his response to the message he had heard about Jesus. 
Indeed, even the drama of his conversion may be considered to be a true 
and valid account of his response to the stimuli he received. 
Furthermore, one can reasonably assume that Paul's subsequent actions 
reflect his previous experiences. Indeed are made as a direct result of 
those experiences. That is how an action Is defined, as a manifestation 
of a decision made in response to received stimuli. But this enables 
one to conclude that If we are able to observe an action we are In some 
significant sense witnessing the decision and even the experience 
Itself. Not directly of course but mediated through our Interpretation 
and reception of the action. The relevance of this Is that, since we 
can observe the actions of Paul (we read the accounts of his journeys 
and the letters he wrote) we can witness his experience. And, Insofar 
as an experience Is an experience "of - something" we gain an Insight
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Into that "something"(9). If we consider the earliest community of 
Christians, the object of their response was the living person of Jesus,
As generation succeeded generation the active role of Jesus as the
Initiator of the response faded but. Insofar as Jesus was Incarnated In
the response of preylous generations, he Initiated response through 
those generations. That Is, the Church Itself, Insofar as It Is an 
Incarnation of the response to Jesus, la Jesus active In the present. 
Jesus Is truly present In the Church because the Church Is the
realization of his Initiatory activity (10). Although I think this 
notion of presence Is stated with clarity by the process analysis. It Is 
necessary to probe beyond a basic Idea of "response" to discuss the
nature of a particular response to the present Jesus. There Is a sense
In which this requirement has already been met because, if the Church Is 
to be a society, It must exhibit continuity and growth. Hence one
immediately recognizes the Importance of tradition on one hand and a 
future - orientated tradition on the other. But even that condition Is 
too general; It applies to any society, and if one is to establish the 
presence of Jesus In the Church It must be shown that the Church is the 
valid response to him. The Church claims that Jesus is the revelation
of God and this is the key to deduce what the response must be. In the
(9) This principle has been widely used by New Testament scholars to justify the historicity of Jesus. The fact that theChristian community received Jesus (the experience) Is ademonstration of a degree of historicity which It is claimed for him (the experience of something). See, for example, Knox,J. Criticism and Faith ch.II,III. It Is also worth noting that by emphasising the response people made to Jesus rather than theprecise demands he made upon them, one avoids the problematic question of whether Jesus Intended to Institute a "church". The reaction of the community of faith suggests that their own self 1understanding was of a community founded upon Jesus. Knox Isaccurate when he writes, "the whole Issue Is largely Irrelevant. jThe important thing is not what Jesus Intended or expected but Iwhat God did. And it Is clear that God actually created the |Church around and through the career of Jesus. The fact of Jesus Ïbelongs to the process of the Church's becoming, not to some iprior event or development." The Church and the Realltv of |Christ. p35. I
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previous chapter Pallln's verification test for revelation highlighted 
the requirement that the reception of revelation promotes action, has 
relevance to Its situation and Is consistent with the content of 
revelation, the creative and redemptive activity and nature of God. If 
we are to show that the Church Is the temple of God, the body of Christ
and the community of people who confess their faith In the One Living
Lord, we must show how the Church meets those requirements (11). We 
must demonstrate that the Church Is continuous with the creative and 
redemptive activity of God, that the Church Itself exhibits creative and
(10) Interestingly, given Cobb's analysis of the self presented In chapter three, Knox chooses to convey the sense of Jesus'presence In the Church In terms of "memory" or, morespecifically, a "corporate memory", a notion derived from Niebuhr's "Internal history", (Ibid. ch. 2 "The Church and Its Memory"). Hence he writes, "It Is only as (Jesus) is remembered that he has meaning for either Christian theology or Christian devotion"(p50). In addition to providing an explanation of "presence", the notion of memory serves to balance the lack of factual records from the New Testament. Within the remembering community, the "facts" are supplemented and complemented by the "memory", and it is to the Integrated product of these two factors that the Church responds. The notion of corporate memory Is similar to "imagination", see Mackey Modern Theology who cites Warnock's Imagination. p25. The Idea of a past thing becoming present is essentially the notion of causal efficacy and Lee, for example, bases his argument for the presence of Jesus on that fact, see The Becoming of the Church. Janzen, however, also suggests that "presentational Immediacy" permits a divine "presence - to" the Church, In such a way that the past Is somehow available to be known "there - now", (op.clt. p154). Sponhelm responds, "it is not clear to me that process categories bring us quite as far as Janzen has come" (op.clt. p206). The sense of "there - now" required by Janzen conflicts with the temporality of the process and Is not implied by "presentational Immediacy" which yields "only the Inferred knowledge of that other through correct recognition of pattern and extensive location" (Sponhelm Ibid. p206). Mackey, (op.clt. p74f), suggests that the Incarnation Is a present reality because Jesus Is present In the Eucharist. This appears to localize the presence of the Living Lord to the sacraments, whereas I prefer to speak of the Church, In Its entirety, as the Body of Christ. The sacraments, and other forms of worship, are the focus points and symbols of that presence.
(11) Note that In order to define the Church as a society It Is only necessary to show that it obeys the conditions for a society. But, if one defines the Church to be the particular society which Is the response to Jesus, It Is necessary to show that It satisfies the quality of the conditions for establishing revelation.
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redemptive activity and, furthermore, that It Is capable of calling 
forth creative and redemptive activity from Its adherents. At this 
point I shy away from a direct confrontation with the precise Issues 
relevant to this task. These Issues are extremely complex - for example 
It Is by no means obvious what a "creative and redemptive" response to,
say, the crisis In Nicaragua, Is, quite apart from the question of 
whether the Church, In straightforward practical terms, actually Is 
being creative and redemptive. I think this difficulty Is a direct 
result of the (unavoidable) Institutionalization of the Church so that. 
In addition to being the community response to Jesus, it Is also an 
Instrument of human mechanisations Inspired by a wide variety of 
motives. Hence I shall simply define the Church according to the 
quality of continuity and novelty as expressed and demanded by the 
creative and redemptive aspects of revelation. These conditions cover 
all aspects of discussion about the Church, from the response of one 
Individual to the Church, to the notion of the Church's "defining 
characteristic". Why the latter Is Important In a practical sense is 
seen in a statement by Mellert. The function of identifying the
defining characteristic Is not "In the fact that It is conceptualized
for purposes of an abstract definition, but in the fact that it is 
successively Incorporated in an immanent way Into the actual occasions 
which constitute the society"(12). Several further comments must be 
made.
Firstly, It will be noted that because the Church Is continuous 
with a tradition which embodies the community response to Jesus It Is, 
in that respect, representative of an objective response. As I stated 
in the previous chapter, there Is a definite sense In which the Church 
Is the valid Christian response to Jesus, thereby mitigating against
(12) op.clt. p95* The defining characteristic ja what theChurch becomes.
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some of the more absurd and radically Individualistic claims. But the 
other side of that coin must also be avoided, the objectified response 
of the community must not prevent the novel richness Inherent In 
Individual expressions of faith. The balance Is achieved when one 
appreciates that the Church Is composed of both aspects: Individuals In
community. Both facets of this dilemma are revealed by the various
Institutional churches, some tending towards more authoritative 
definitions which are Imposed by the community on to Its members while 
others allow almost total freedom of Individual expression. Neither 
position Is to be denigrated. Insofar as both options are freely 
available and reply to the different needs experienced by different 
people. My only objection would arise when one position claims 
precedence or authority over the other.
The condition that the Church, if it is to be creative and 
redemptive, must be relevant implies that it must speak to the problems 
and issues which confront people in the present. This gives rise to the 
whole subject of practical theology, making the Churches effective 
Institutions and, more important in this context, enables us to
understand further how Jesus generates novel possibilities for 
individuals becoming In the present. In the previous chapter it was
shown that to speak of Jesus himself as somehow creating possibilities 
in the present is absurd, but if (me thinks in terms of the Church 
generating the novel opportunities then the Idea Is sensible. The 
Church Is the community response to Jesus and. Insofar as the Church
promotes possibilities for creative and redemptive activity, It does so
by virtue of Its relation to Jesus. A response to Jesus must be a
response of creative and redemptive activity which. In turn, and by
definition, must also promote creative and redemptive activity. In that 
way, Jesus, the Inspirational force behind the response which Is the
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Church, Is the source of the activity which In practice Is generated by 
the Church, To rephrase this point, the Church Is essentially 
continuous with the activity of Jesus and, since the latter Is 
revelatory of God's creative and redemptive nature, the work of the 
Church Is creative and redemptive. Furthermore, because Jesus Is the 
human response to God's creative and redemptive activity In the world, 
the work of Jesus in and through the Church Is precisely the work of 
God, Insofar as the response of the Church - the participation of Its 
members - Is, Itself, creative and redemptive. The Idea of 
"participation" follows from, and Is emphasised by, the Idea of memory. 
For It Is only within the community that an Individual comes to share 
that community's corporate memory and experience. Similarly, as a 
mother only exists (as a mother) for her children, "Our Lord Jesus 
Christ" has no reality outside the Christian community (13). These 
points serve to highlight the fact that an adequate christology must
incorporate Jesus and the Church, because it is in and through the
Church that God is active (In and through Jesus) In the present. To 
divorce Jesus from the Church Is as Inadmissible as divorcing him from 
the context of his past. Without attempting to become embroiled in 
practical Issues, we note that the nature of the possibilities for
creative and redemptive action generated by the Church has two aspects. 
Firstly, the response of the Church to Jesus authenticates the
possibilities for Individual responses through the Church. The Church 
becomes the vehicle which enables the person to act upon the faith 
decision. Second, and In many ways as a consequence of the first, the 
Individual who responds to Jesus In and through the Church strengthens
(13) Knox, op.clt. p94. He also draws attention to the fact that by placing the locus of the Incarnation In the Church (c.f. Plttenger) one relieves the Gospels cf an Impossible burden. It Is no longer necessary to prove that Jesus Is the Incarnation. Furthermore It avoids placing the humanity of Jesus under extreme stress.
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the defining characteristic of the society. By participating in the 
response of faith, creative and redemptive activity, the Individual 
contributes to the future of the community response, the Church, because
any Instance of creative and redemptive action Is an Incarnation of the
work of God, as revealed by Jesus. To express this In terminology which 
Incorporates an explicit religious sentiment, the Individual who 
responds. In faith, to Jesus through the Church Is participating In the 
Living Lord (14). Indeed, one might go further, to say that the person 
who, by virtue of their faith, participates In the Living Lord Is also a 
revelation of the Living Lord because It Is by his or her own Individual 
response - albeit through the Church - that Jesus becomes a "living" 
reality.
I have mentioned the possible conflict between the Individual and
the community aspects of the Church and any discussion of christology
must respond to this Issue. On one hand I have Implied the notion of a
community response to Jesus while, on the other, I have spoken of the
role of faith or individual participation. The question of authority -
does the community have the right to exercise control over its members?
- Illustrates this most adequately. At one extreme of the debate is
Joseph Hallman who argues that "those most akin to the divine ought to
function as persuasive agents for the religious self - realization of
believers."(15). Of course, there Is one sense in which this claim
(14) In this context "faith" and "participation" are synonymous. An Individual who "has faith" Is so Immersed In the participation that the self Is "co-const Ituted" by the quality of thatactivity. Hence, faith Is not a thing which one possesses but Itis lived, it is participation in "Christology", Christ and theChurch. It is lived even to the extent that It become "life", because the self Is Inexorably "co-constltuted" by the faith. This understanding of faith emphasises Its dynamic and activequalities, the fides qua creditur rather than the fldes quaeoreditur. Faith Is a living and feeling process, not a mere"knowing", as Knox writes, "Faith must knew Its object In a waywe cannot know a historical fact."(op.clt. pl6). Or, as Mackeyexpresses It, "all human faith Is qulntessentlallypraxis."(op.clt. p71).
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ought to be true, Insofar as an Individual may at any one moment of life 
reach a peak In the awareness of being Immersed In the creative and 
redemptive activity of God - a moment of finest Insight. The response 
to that awareness should be a faith decision to act according to 
creative and redemptlv(S principles. Therefore the response of that 
Individual has didactic qualities. It Is an action considered as 
virtuous, an example of human fulfilment worthy to be followed. It Is 
valid, therefore, to describe such people at those times as "persuasive 
agents". But, to establish that Is not the Interpretation Intended by 
Hallman, for he suggests that there exists a distinct set of Individuals 
- the priesthood or the hierarchy of the Church - who, all of the tine 
are "most akin to the divine". There is nothing In a Process 
understanding of the Church which permits that degree of privilege. 
Indeed, one should recall the difficulty of ascribing such a blanket 
"perfection" to Jesus. Hallman continues, stating that "the aim of the 
Church Is the construction of significant or Important Christian 
experience". This conveys the Impression of an asymetrlcal relationship 
between the community and the individual members of that community. The 
community Is said to "construct" an experience which the members are 
able to experience. This notion Is flawed on two points. Firstly, the 
notion of a passive "experience" Is not supported by Whitehead's 
epistemology. One does not confront an "experience" (a thing) which one 
then "experiences", because the very act of experiencing is Intimately 
bound up with the "experience - experienced". In any significant sense 
It Is only true that an experiencing Individual "constructs" (by. 
Indeed, the very act of experiencing) any "experience". Second^,the 
notion that a society can act without any reference to Its members Is 
meaningless. Knox Illustrated how vital It is to avoid any Idea of "the
(15) "Towards a Process Theology of the Church", in ReligiousExperience and Process Thought. pl43.
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Church" as being a thing which exists apart fr<xn the Individuals who 
adhere to, and promote, the defining characteristic. Of course, by 
virtue of the cumulative actions of the members, one can speak about the 
Church's action, but that Is a linguistic convenience appropriate to a 
society and must not be understood In Isolation from the faith of the 
Individuals. Hence, to say that the Church "constructs" experience only 
has meaning If It Is taken to refer to the group name appropriate to the 
experiences enjoyed by all the members. The corollary to that Is to 
deny to the "Church" the kind of authority claimed by Hallman. I think 
the final word on "authority" can be left to Cobb, who says, "the 
prophets, Jesus, Paul, John and many others have great authority for us 
today. But there Is no one locus of absolute authority. Our concern Is 
faithfulness to God's call today, and we can be guided In that 
faithfulness by many authorities. Finally w ê must decide."(16).
However, as Mellert noted, the Church Is more than the group name 
which applies to Its members and there Is a sense In which the "Churoh" 
has an existence of its own. This existence, which is nevertheless 
relative to and dependent upon the members. Is to be thought of not in 
terms of authority over Its adherents, but as the vehicle for creative 
reciprocity. By virtue of its being a community of people responding in 
faith It possesses an ability to promote further and deeper 
participation In Its members and, of course. In Its missionary zeal. 
The fact that the Church Is ultimately dependent upon the faith input of 
the members is also, therefore, the reason why the Church is self - 
nourishing and perpetuating. Furthermore, by stressing the reciprocity 
between the Church as community and the Individuals who define It, one 
achieves uniformity In the models appropriate to this Process 
christology. The relationships between God and Jesus, the Church and
(16) Process Theology as Political Theology p48.
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Jesus and the Church and Its members have all been expounded In terms of 
Initiative and response, a free faith - decision made In response to 
creative and redemptive activity. The "price" for this elegant 
simplicity has been the sacrifice of dogmatic certainty. At any link In 
the "chrlstologloal chain" the Invitation may be rejected.
It Is through the Church that Jesus may be seen as the focal point 
of all christology. In his own life he synthesized the strands of God's 
Involvement In history with his environment and succeeded In provoking a 
reaction which established a community to continue God's creative and 
redemptive work. The sense of the Divine activity In the past, present 
and future are all made explicit In the Church's appeal to Jesus. 
Individuals make a faith response In the present, which promotes 
creative and redemptive action In the future, based upon the Church's 
memory and experience of the revelation of God's creative and redemptive 
nature In the past. The crucial point to note Is that the relation 
between the three tenses is more than coincidental. The future is
inherent in the present faith decision and the call for a faith decision 
is inherent to the revelation of God's nature in the past. Jesus is the 
bond which relates the three, the focus at which the various aspects can 
be understood as a coherent whole.
It will be noted that I have limited my discussion of the Church to 
that reality which names the Christian community, the response of a 
finite group to Jesus of Nazareth. It Is necessary to redress the 
balance by mentioning, albeit briefly, the existence of the "church" 
which Is the totality of the response to creative transformation. The 
Christian Church can properly be considered as just one aspect of that 
universal community ; It Is the aspect which names the process of
creative transformation Christ Jesus. Other "churches" are equally,
(but only Insofar as they reflect and respond to creative
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transformation), valid even though they may not confess Jesus Christ as 
their Lord and Saviour. Rather than developing this point at length I 
make two summary statements. Firstly, one notes that the physical 
Identification of the "Church" Is now rendered twice as difficult. Not 
only Is one confronted by the question of which Christian community best 
reflects creative transformation (In the Christian community this 
equates with the terms creative and redemptive activity) but also the 
question of how this relates to other communities which recognise
creative transformation. I think - perhaps I only hope - the second
point follows from the first. In a Process understanding of the Church 
It Is clear that there Is no room for any kind of dogmatic finality. 
Tolerance and the appreciation of the position of others are the crucial 
qualities which a Church must entertain. I do, however, accept that 
while It Is commendable and straightforward to produce such statements 
It Is not always obvious how they translate Into practice. Against a 
background of a multiplicity of, apparently Irreconcilable, attitudes 
towards all aspects of life It Is not self-evident that tolerance passes 
the pragmatic test, Royce's tolerance certainly conveys a sense of
naivety, "let your Christology be the practical acknowledgement of the
Spirit of Universal and Beloved Community. This Is sufficient and 
practical faith... All else about your religion Is the accident of your 
special race or nation or form of worship or training or accidental 
personal opinion, or devout mystical experience - Illuminating but 
capricious."(17).
The final consideration to be made about the Church replies to an
omission of the previous chapter. I discussed the relationship of Jesus
to God In a essentially mono-linear sense, Jesus* response to God’s
(17) Royce,Joslah. "Science and the Progress of Christianity", (Problem Christology xvl) In Classic American Philosophers. p24l. It may, of course, also be entirely commendable and correct.
— 203 —
The evaluation: Christ and the Church.
Initiative for him. That Is In a God - to - Jesus direction.
Similarly, our discussion of the Church has proceeded under the
assumption that the Important aspect Is how the Church responds to God,
the faith decision of the community which receives Jesus as the
revelation of God’s creative and redemptive nature. To rectify the
emission It Is necessary to review the relationship as a dynamic In the 
reverse direction, the world to God. That Is, how the world Is able, by 
Its response to him, to affect God. Of course, we are not Introducing 
new principles here but rather making explicit what has previously only 
been stated Implicitly. God’s action In the world Is God’s love for the 
world but, to use William’s words, "we do not love unless our personal 
being Is transformed through the relation to the other."(18).
The pyramid effect is the process by which minute actualizations of 
value are transformed, because of their Integration into a synthesized 
unit. Into events of macrocosmlc significance. The condition which 
enables the effect to succeed is that all the components maximise their j
respective potentials and thereby enjoy maximum value. Each tiny event j
!
permits the pyramid to continue if, and only if, it optimizes the j
possibilities generated for It by Its position In the fyramld. On the J
other hand, should any event fall to maximise Its own value then that j
Iparticular aspect of the process "breaks down". The thrust towards ever |
- significant complexities Is temporarily halted. Thus we see that the I
higher "up" the pyramid one goes, the greater is the dependence upon the 
lower levels. The actualization of significant value is dependent upon 
the "co-operation" of more trivial events. God, who can be considered 
the ultimate level, the source of the very thrust and urge of the 
process. Is therefore dependent upon everything if his own aim is to be 
actualized. On the trivial level, the merest "puff of existence" must
(18) Spirit and the Forms of Love p117.
- 204 -
The evaluation: Christ and the Church.
actually exist If God Is to experience It and, more significantly. If 
God Is to reveal his creative and redemptive nature to man It Is 
necessary that man recognizes and fulfils his creative and redemptive 
activity. Thus we understand the love of God to Include amor 
concuplscentlae In addition to amor benevolentlae. God desires the 
world to actualize particular values. We note that because Jesus Is the 
exemplary identification with creative and redemptive activity, God Is 
supremely dependent upon him. To state explicitly what might anyway 
seem obvious, God could not work In the world through the (Christian) 
Church unless Jesus had realized his own potential as the revelation to 
which the Churdh responded (19). I make that point In order to 
Introduce an additional aspect of the process by which novel 
opportunities are introduced in the present. I have noted in this 
present chapter that because Jesus is the focus of God’s activity for 
the Church, which itself generates possibilities for creative and 
redemptive activity. It is possible to conceive of Jesus as the 
motivating force behind activity In the present, the mediated cause of 
novelty. But if one considers the effect Jesus had upon God, God’s 
response to Jesus, it is possible to expand upon this mediated cause - 
effect relationship. Jesus, by his response to God - In - history, 
activated the possibility of the Church and also, therefore, the 
possibility for God to respond to a community whose defining 
characteristic Is his revelation, creative and redemptive activity. One 
ml^t say that Jesus presented God with a novel set of players with whom 
he could continue to unfold his cosmic drama. Novel, not by virtue of
(19) It is perhaps necessary to comment upon the notion that God Is dependent, which contradicts the traditional view of his self - sufficiency or & seltv. Hartshome, In his Illustration of a dog and a pillar (Divine Relativity p7) conveys precisely the sense In which a superior being Is dependent upon or relative to an Inferior being. Similarly, the quotation from Williams Illustrates that to love someone means to be transformed by that love: one Is dependent upon that person.
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merely being a new generation (a fact for which traditionally Jesus can 
take no credit) but by virtue of being a community aware of the 
revelation of God’s nature. God’s Involvement with the world became 
exDlicltlv creative and redemptive because Jesus authenticated the 
possibility of such a community. No other event can possibly be so 
crucial to God simply because the transition from the world’s Implicit 
awareness of God’s creative and redemptive nature to an explicit 
awareness of that revelation Is fundamentally novel. It authenticates 
and validates value and purpose In a way not possible prior to the 
conscious appreciation of the revelation of his nature. The analysis up 
to this point tends to suggest that Jesus "flicked the switch" and the 
cosmic process entered a new era. Although that makes explicit the 
active role assumed by Jesus, it fails to convey the sustaining role 
which must be played by, particularly, the Church. In the framework of 
Whitehead’s vision a single, static event cannot be solely determinative 
of all future events. So, although Jesus Initiated the explicit 
awareness of creative and redemptive activity, unless subsequent 
response re-affirms the revelation of his nature then the revelation is 
no longer explicit. The reaffirmation of this revelation Is, of course, 
faith because It Is faith which Is the creative and redemptive response 
to the revelation. Furthermore, it Is particularly relevant that the 
Church re-affirms the revelation because It Is In the Church In which 
the revelation Is recognised and named. Without the Church’s continual 
generation of possibilities for creative and redemptive activity the 
possibility for God’s creative and redemptive nature to work In the 
world Is rendered obtuse. It would become a mere historical quirk of 
our present cosmic generation. The Church, the present reality of the 
Christ - event. Is crucial In that It enables God to present, or 
"re-present", to employ Ogden’s phrase, the revelation of his saving 
work. This Is not to suggest that without the Church God Is Impotent to
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perform works according to his creative and redemptive nature. But It 
Is to say that without the Churoh such works could not be recognised as 
being revelatory of his nature. They would not be explicitly received 
as such. One concludes that Jesus, and subsequently the Churoh, 
contributes to the Divine life and the Divine vision by making It 
possible for God to relate to creatures who are consciously aware of 
that relationship and capable, therefore, of significant value.
This discussion of the Church has not been Intended as a complete 
description of a Process account. I have, nevertheless, attempted to 
Illustrate why the Churoh Is as essential to christology as Jesus and 
also some of the themes which revolve around that core statement. It 
has been superficial Insofar as It has not grasped the problem of the 
nature of the Church except to express that in terms of creative and 
redemptive activity - faith. To quote just one example of a possible 
approach, Janzen emphasises the need to Include the notion of Spirit In 
a contemporary definition (20).
Plttenger makes clear the need for "explicit development of the 
Implications of the Christ - Church complex"(21) but stresses the point 
that this process should be performed by those within the Church. 
Indeed, my emphasis on participation (or, to rephrase that, faith) 
states exactly that. The importance of the Church as an aspect of 
christology cannot be over estimated. The Christ - event, which has at,
(20) He accepts the bulk of Lee's thesis that the Church Is the Body of Christ but states the Intention to Include the Idea of Spirit which, he claims, is lacking In Lee's analysis, (op.clt. pl48f) Plttenger too has "lamented the de-emphasls of the third person In trinitarian belief and practice." See One God In Trinity Splceland’s article, "Process Theology" pl40 who cites Plttenger, The Holy Spirit, (Philadelphia 1974). Of course. In the context of this discussion It Is not sufficient to want to Insert the Spirit (or anything else) Into a theory of the Church. One must first ascertain that the concept has Intelligibility In a Process theology.
(21) Christology Reconsidered p147.
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and as, Its centre Jesus of Nazareth, Is present today as a living 
reality, able to promote creative and redemptive action through faith, 
as the Church. This synthesis of past, present and future Is adequately 
summarized by Royce's classic definition of the Church as "the community 
of memory and hope."(22).
(22) Williams,D.D., Spirit and the Forms of Love, p181. See The Problem of Chrlstlanltv 2vols., Macmillan 1914.
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The remainder of this chapter la dedicated to an evaluation of 
Process christology with respect to traditional and Biblical 
chrlstologlcal criteria.
The first aspect of the comparison refers to traditional 
christology. This Is taken to Imply the magnificent formulations of the 
Ancient Church, what Is usually referred to as "Christian 
orthodoxy"(23). It should be obvious that. In terms of words and 
concepts, such a comparison has no chance of success. It Is simply not 
possible to comment upon the similarity of two things which are so 
obviously dissimilar. Firstly, this Implies that any attempt to 
directly compare the two christoiogles Is awkward and irresistibly 
difficult. Secondly, and somewhat fortuitously, it also Implies that 
the comparison is, for all practical Intents and purposes, Irrelevant. 
That Is not to deny the Importance of research Into the historical 
development of Christian doctrine, but merely to state that In order to 
promote the existential relevance of Process christology today, one does 
not need to be concerned with a comparison of words. The quest for 
compatibility with "orthodoxy" Is made possible by shifting the emphasis 
away from the actual words of the doctrinal pronouncements. The words 
are not the essence of christology. The formulae and famous phrases, 
the aphorisms of christology, are simply the conclusions which summarize 
the corpus of chrlstologlcal belief and thought. They are the Icing on 
the cake, the most memorable and palatable aspect of the whole. And, If 
we are to evaluate Process christology with respect to orthodoxy, we 
must be prepared to delve beyond the advertising slogans and examine the 
kernel of the ancients' thinking behind the pronouncements. Why did 
they arrive at that conclusion? What was the purpose or Intention
(23) One should remember Cupltt's definition of orthodoxy as "merely the form of Christianity which happened to triumph over the others." "Christ of Christendom", Myth of God Incarnate p145.
— 209 •“
The evaluation: Christ and the Church. _
behind a particular expression? Similarly, Hartshorne writes, "Is this 
conception acceptable to religion? To answer this question we must 
consider not mere verbal habits common among theologians, however 
reputable, but the values that can be detected - other than the value of 
familiar or high sounding words - beneath the use of religious
terms...."(24). These reasons. Intentions and purposes cannot be 
adequately stated by convenient, albeit dramatic, phrases. They are, In 
fact, the general motivating themes which provide the foundation for all 
subsequent religious sentiment or theological thinking. Insofar as one 
Is able to Identify these themes, or "values", for any particular
system, one Is able to employ them as tools for a comparative study. 
Prior to stating what I believe these themes to be - space will cmly 
permit a representative selection - one notes that a similar situation 
arises if one attempts a comparison with the New Testament account of 
Jesus. To pretend that there Is a single New Testament account of the 
Nazarene Is futile. One only needs to glance at the work of any two
scholars of the New Testament to verify the truth of that statement. 
Fortunately, there are two points which stabilize the apparent liquidity 
and ambiguity of the Scriptures. Firstly, as was noted in the previous 
chapter, the sort of evidence required by a Process analysis does not 
consist of facts A, B and C - conceivably countered by facts X, Y and Z 
- but rather an overall picture or Impression gained from the whole
text. Kelsey writes, "one of the claims made on behalf of a Process 
Hermeneutics Is that It can invite and enpower the Interpreter to be 
equally attentive to all aspects of Biblical texts."(25). Consequently, 
the Process theologian does not require precise agreement with any one 
school of Biblical interpretation or with all Biblical statements. 
Bather, one seeks to achieve compatibility with am integrated view, an 
overall Impression which the Bible as a whole Inspires. The second
(24) The Divine Relativity p22.
— ' 210 —
The evaluation: Christ and the Church.
consideration which alms to neutralize the ambiguity of the various 
methods of Interpretation simply reaffirms an aspect of the first. We 
are not Interested solely In the famous phrases and chrlstologlcal 
definitions found In the New Testament, but on the totality of the 
religious feeling and character of Jesus which motivated the Initial 
response to him. Of course the high profile chrlstologlcal texts are a 
part of this picture, but they must not be allowed to dominate at the 
expense of the rest of the text. The notion that the New Testament Is a 
response to Jesus (as opposed to viewing the Gospels as being precise
records about Jesus himself) requires further comment. Ogden (26)
requires that the christology of "reflection" should be verified with
reference to the christology of "witness". The witness Is rooted In the 
New Testament. Indeed, the witness Is the New Testament. The 
Scriptural books present a picture of the community which surrounded 
Jesus. They tell the story of the primitive beginnings In the 
disciples' Individual responses to his person to the formation of an 
early Church community. There is no reason to doubt the authenticity of 
these records and to do so Is to promote an unprecedented assault upon 
the documented evidence of history. The problem arises when one begins 
to enlarge upon the relation between the records of the response and the 
original motivating force which Inspired those records. Bultmann's
legacy to New Testament scholarship has been to deny that It Is possible
to go beyond the response. There is no criterion by which one Is able
(25) The Theological Use of Scripture In Process Hermeneutics", Kelsey,David.H., Process Studies 13/3 Fall 1983, pl8lff. He makes the point that Inclusiveness can be considered In one of two ways. Either as a theory of interpretation which Is "inclusive of all methods of Interpretation" or a confused theory of Interpretation, "an M  hoc collection of exegetloaltools."(p183). But Lull responds, "Its methodological Inclusiveness Is protected frcm the charges of being gd hoc because of Its basis In a theory of perception - as Interpretation." Lull,David J., "What Is Process Hermeneutics?" Ibid. p189ff.
(26) Point of Christologv p4.
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to distinguish between authentic accounts of Jesus himself and those 
which are purely response. The latter category may have been Invented, 
edited or altered to suit the needs of the responding community. Etence, 
any passages which supposedly reveal Jesus' own self - understanding (as 
opposed to the reaction of the community to him) must be seen as 
vaticInla ex eventu. with little reference to Jesus himself. But, If 
one recognizes (as response) a novel set of beliefs then one Is forced 
to account for the origin of those beliefs. To admit that the response 
of the Christian community Is, In some radical sense, different frcm the 
set of prevalent beliefs of the age, requires an explanation. How and 
why did those beliefs evolve? To argue otherwise, a kind of belief ex 
nlhllo Is absurd, analogous to accepting a reflection In a mirror whilst 
denying the existence of the corresponding reality. If there Is an 
image, there must be an object. A preliminary step must be made before 
one can ascribe the origin of the beliefs to Jesus. It must be 
established that those beliefs were, Indeed, radically novel and not 
simply a collection or recombination of other eclectic Ideas (27). 
Muhlenberg observes that if the response was not original then "the 
question still remains why the Christian proclamation should have 
provoked rejection, hatred and storms of persecution"(28). The claim 
for novelty Is justified by noting how the authorities reacted to those 
who responded to Jesus. During this chapter I shall note that the Idea 
of the Logos Incarnate Is one possible source of this novelty.
(27) Note that this does not deny that the Christians could also Incorporate Ideas from other sources. Pannenberg states that, "In order for an 'Influence' of alien concepts to be absorbed, a situation must have previously emerged within which these concepts could be greeted as aids for the expression of a problem already present."(Jesus - God and Man p153). To state that the Christians used non - Christian concepts does not deny that Christianity was unique. It merely accepts that the Christians attempted to express tMt uniqueness In the terms available to them.
(28) "Divinity of Jesus In Early Christian Faith", Studla Patrlstlca vol.17 p136.
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The task of identifying the novel response in its entirety is not 
trivial. I suggest that the following six points represent the essence 
of the response which is portrayed in the New Testament and the 
essential aspects of Patristic christology.
1. The humanity of Jesps. This is stated in the Creeds and is most 
vividly illustrated by the Gospels.
2. Salvation. A crucial issue is whether the Christ of Process 
christology can appropriately be designated our Saviour.
3. The Logos. We have noted how Cobb makes explicit use of this idea in
the notion of creative transformation. Does the use of the idea in a 
Process christology satisfy the intentions of the Fathers?
4. The Divinity of Christ. Although this has been considered to be the 
crux of the christological debate (29) it has yet to be established in 
what sense, if at all, Process christology ascribes "divinity" to Jesus.
5. Existential relevance of Jesus. Does faith in Jesus make a 
difference? This question includes the idea of the Kingdom as a call 
which requires a response.
6. Worship. Christian faith has traditionally viewed Jesus as being 
worthy of worship. We must ascertain whether the Process account of 
Christ is potent to express that religiosity.
The list is not claimed to be exhaustive, for there are other 
features of Biblical or Patristic christology which might have been 
included. However, on examination the list is justifiably claimed to be 
representative. Other topics tend to be derivatives or subsets of the 
topics mentioned. For example the Virgin Birth (related to the Gospel
birth narratives and the theotokos doctrine) is primarily a statement of
the divinity and humanity of Christ. It adds nothing to the previous 
list because, in isolation from those topics, it is essentially rendered
(29) Note for example the furore concerning the "myth" debate.
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obtuse. By their general nature the topics I have selected are 
competent to respond to most issues in christology.
The one additional point I must make is that no amount of 
comparison with "orthodoxy" will guarantee religious acceptance for 
Process christology. That will only come if it achieves success in 
practice, to quote once again Mays* expression. The pragmatic criterion 
is ultimately convincing. The value of demonstrating theoretical 
success is, therefore, to enable one to promote the practical issues 
grounded on firm foundations. The first aspect to be examined concerns 
the humanity of Jesus. In Process christology it is clear that the 
"utter reality of the manhood of Jesus Christ" (30) is presupposed. 
Similarly, although from a totally different theological starting point, 
Daniel ou states that "there is an extraordinary normality in his human 
reactions"(31) and there is little problem in establishing that the New 
Testament account conveys precisely that message. Robinson, to take 
just one example frcm the many available, presents an analysis of Jesus* 
development, looking particularly at Hebrews. He notes, "the writer is 
quite clear that Jesus learned obedience through the things that he 
suffered, that he had to become what he was, to be made perfect, to go 
through the process of individuation and maturation like every other 
human being."(32), It is evident from Robinson*s studies that the New 
Testament testifies to Jesus* "growlng-up" process and his "learning by
(30) Pittenger Christology Reconsidered p22.
(31) Danielou,J. Christ and Us. p25.
(32) Robinson,J.A.T. Twelve More New Testament Studies. p159.He notes the following verses, 2:10;17f, 4:15, 5:5;8f, 6:20, 7:28. Similarly, the Sjrrophoenlcian woman (Matt. 15*21-28, Mark7*24-30) who forced Jesus "under pressure to a position he has apparently no intention of adopting at the outset" and Jesus* struggle in the garden at Gethsemane to align his will with that of his Father. Also, Cullmann, "the life of Jesus would not be really human if its course did not manifest a development. " (The Christology ^  the New Testament p97).
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experience". Sanders, in his study of the New Testament hymns, makes 
the point that the most dramatic and obvious statement of Jesus’ 
humanity is seen in the event of his death (33). In addition to those 
affirmations of his death, particular emphasis is given to the manner of 
death. There is no reason to doubt that the Gospel records, if not 
historical accounts in the strict meaning of the term, are not 
nevertheless factual accounts. Crucifixion was, after all, a very real 
part of the Roman world. It is, I think, crucially important that any 
christology does not lose sight of the humanity of Jesus, the vivid 
loving and suffering humanity which is portrayed by the New Testament 
texts. Process christology, with its emphasis on the dynamics of the 
whole developmental thrust which constitutes the human person 
dramatically conveys the intention of the Gospels on this point. That, 
of course, is the reason why it was essential to make Cobb’s analysis of 
the human person as relevant to Jesus as it is to all human beings. 
Having affirmed the humanity of Jesus is it rather more interesting to 
ask the next question, what kind of a man was Jesus?
If one is to attempt to answer that question one must first clarify 
the status of Scripture which is expected to furnish the details about 
Jesus. Here it suffices to note that the question does not demand 
precise facts about the man but rather Scripture must provide a picture 
which illustrates the type of experiences and reactions he exhibited. 
Of course, in addition to the "objective ambiguity" of the New Testament 
records, one should also stress that the evidence sought is dependent 
upon, and is a reflection of, the situation of the enquirer. As Hick 
notes, "in each case communal or individual imagination has projected 
its own ideal upon as much of the New Testament data as will sustain
(33) Sanders,J.T. New Testament Christological Hvmns p24. He notes the following passages, Phil.2:8, Col.1:18, 1 Tim.3sl6, 1 Pet.3*18.
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it."(34). Jesus will appear as a Liberator to those whose existential 
reality strives to convey the message of liberation, as an advocate of 
the "Just War" theory to certain Western Democracies intent on 
Justifying their possession of nuclear weapons. Hence, the reply I give 
to our question is not claimed to be the correct - or even the best - 
one, rather it is what strikes me as being particularly characteristic 
of Jesus as the Gospels portray him. That is, the one dominant aspect 
of Jesus' life appears to be his radical sense of freedom. This is seen 
in the manner in which he lived as a free - thinking individual. 
Kasemann isolates one aspect of this when he suggests that the 
distinctive character of Jesus' mission is found in the "but I say"
sayings, the antitheses of the Sermon on the Mount (35). There can be
no Judaic parallels to those sayings, for any Jew who claimed that
degree of Independence frcm the Law would automatically Isolate himself 
from the community. Discontinuity with respect to the authority of
Scripture and Moses was unprecedented. Kasemann draws three points in 
conclusion (36). First, the novel implication testifies to its 
genuineness; second, that the claim surpasses that of any prophet or 
rabbi; and third, it cannot be Integrated into contemporary Jewish 
piety. He has succeeded in showing that the "but I say" sayings are 
novel and we can agree with Harvey that "if a particular saying is 
unparalleled.. then far the most likely explanation of its presence in 
the Gospel record would seem to be that it was said by Jesus 
himself."(37). Thus we arrive as close to primary evidence as possible
(34) Hick,J. Myth of God Incarnate pi67.
(35) Kasemann,E. Essays, m  Ms. Testament Themes. p37. Cullmann mentions a similar feature at the trial before Caiaphas (Matt.26:64), "I will not answer this question but I will tell you something else." op.cit. p119. See also the chapter on Authority in Braun,H. Jesus of Nazareth, and Moltmann's "Jesus and the Law", "Jesus and Authority" in op.cit. p128ff.
(36) op.cit. p38.
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but the situation must not be misused. Kësemann maintains that "we 
possess absolutely no kind of formal criteria by which we can identify 
the authentic Jesus material."(38). However, he has identified 
something radically different and unusual about Jesus, the cause which 
can justifiably be claimed to have produced the effect, the response of 
the community. Jesus' freedom is also illustrated by his response to 
aspects of the Jewish Law. He demonstrated a remarkably flexible 
attitude towards it, noting that he ate with publicans and sinners and 
performed work on the Sabbath. In the context of his humanity this 
implies a surprisingly "modern" (39) interpretation of Law, that it 
exists to promote human growth and open possibilities rather than being 
intended as a via neaativa. restricting creativity. However, later in 
this chapter I shall note that Jesus' attitude in this respect is open 
to another interpretation.
At this stage, the point I wish to make is simple - the New
Testament account of the man Jesus shows him to be as interesting and as 
active as any other free - thinking human individual, engaged in the 
process of self - creativity which is at the heart of the Process 
analysis of the human person.
If that discussion has succeeded in establishing a compatibility
between the Process account of Jesus' humanity and the Biblical records,
the evaluation with respect to the credal formulations is not as
straightforward. Of course the Creed of Nicaea states that the Divine 
person "..was made man" but that simple phrase disguises a plethora of
(37) Harvey,A. (Ed). God Incarnate Story and Belief. p46.
(38) op.cit. p35. %  emphasis. The point is, although there is a lack of formal criteria, we can still gain an insight and balance the probabilities implied by Harvey with that lack of criteria.
(39) In the sense of its responsible flexibility rather than being undisciplined!
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complex meanings. The question to be faced is, given Pittenger's
comment that "Jesus was obviously a genuine human being physically and 
physiologically.. ..in our time it is more Important to insist oa the 
full reality of Jesus' human psychology,"(40) whether any contemporary 
definition of Jesus' humanity can be equated or reconciled to that 
expounded by the ancient theologians. Quite apart from the fact that 
human "psychology" - modern or otherwise - was not a relevant facet of 
their debate it would be absurd to suggest that a thinker in the first 
three centuries could conceive of a human self in the same terms as we 
do today (41).
I think it is probably a valid comment to state that the 
theologians of the early Church were not interested in the humanity of 
Jesus qua his humanity. They realised the force of the "what he has not 
assumed he has not healed" arguments, as expounded by Gregory of 
Nazlanzus (42), but one notes that the motivating factor is not 
"humanity" but rather "healing": salvation. That emphasis led to
"divinity" playing the leading role, to such an extent that the 
affirmation of humanity had to be moulded and forced so that it did not 
Interfere with or mitigate against Christ's redemptive power. We note 
points of divergence from a Process view at this point. Firstly, the 
Church Fathers began by defining Christ's redemptive function, biasing 
aiy subsequent affirmation of humanity towards that end. Secondly, 
their conception of "divinity" and "humanity" tended to imply two
(40) op.cit. p35.
(41) It is an interesting question as to who was the first theologian to give proper place to the "self". Augustine in his Confessions is arguable, although perhaps Luther has a stronger claim. The point remains, however, that no pre-twentieth century theologian analysed the "self" in the terms which are relevant today.
(42) See Creeds, Councils and Controversies p98. Note also, Irena eus, Christ "became Incarnate for our salvation". (my emphasis) New Eusebius pi15. Stevenson,J.
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opposing entities so that any affirmation of humanity to an already 
established divine being was fraught with problems. Any solution was 
inevitably somewhat artificial. Norris draws the most important 
implication of the first point, "one factor in Patristic thought about 
Christ was the conviction that he represented Original or proper or 
fulfilled humanity."(43). The notion of Jesus representing this "ideal 
humanity" is alien to any account of Jesus within a Process christology. 
The Process analysis of the self cannot be stated in terms of a 
universal "humanity" because to be human means to be an individual human 
being. However, one mig^t also note that Process christology does 
claim, in one sense, that Jesus is the ideal for a human being. Insofar 
as he can be thought of as integrating his presently becoming self with 
the facts (as he receives them) of his past and his anticipation of the 
future, he does indeed represent the exemplary instance of self - 
determination. Although that is a valid comment I think it is necessary 
to note that the argument is in danger of being forced to an unnatural 
and unhelpful conclusion. The Process conception of Jesus as the "ideal 
man" is not what the ancients meant by their notion of perfect or 
fulfilled humanity. That essential fact is not neutralized by employing 
similar terminology in an attempt to disguise the basic differences. 
Jesus is, for a Process christology, the ideal human person because he 
manifested God's love for the world in the world, by virtue of his own 
self - determination according to his reception of the revelation of God 
in the world. That is not to say that he is the second Adam understood 
as the new perfection who reinstates the original condition to universal 
humanity. The second point, how to affirm the humanity of Jesus 
assuming him to be divine is, of course, not directly relevant to the 
Process account. The problem of having to "mix" two separate things is
(43) Norris,R.A. "The Problems of Human Identity in PatristicChristological Speculation". Studia Patristics vol.17 pl49. Myemphasis.
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peculiar to Patristic christology (44) and in this context it is more 
important to emfdiasise that the man Jesus is the pre-supposition of 
christology. How - or if - Process christology can also affirm the
"divinity" of Jesus is the subject of a later section.
Perhaps the one statement which can be made with any degree of 
certainty is that the effort the Fathers went to in order to ascribe 
humanity to Jesus - in the face of the enormous difficulties of 
reconciling that to a divine Jesus - is a clear indication that in their 
view an "orthodox" christology must affirm that Jesus is human. One can 
conclude, therefore, that the Process account is eminently suited to 
conveying the Christian position in that respect.
I have noted that the primary concern of the Patristic theologians 
lay with the reality of Christ as Saviour. For example. Raven says of 
Apollinarius that he "accepted as axiomatic the principle that Christ 
was Saviour" (45) and "at the heart of all the debates about the nature
of God was the question of the salvation experienced through Christ in
the power of his Spirit."(46). Salvation is, more than any other single 
concept, the key behind the theology of the Early Church. Hence 
Sellers, "the teaching of Athanasius and the later representatives of 
the school of Alexandria comes before us as a striking example of the 
dependence of Christological on Soteriological thought"(47) and "there 
are good grounds for saying that the Antiochenes are interested in 
soteriology ..we find that one of their fundamental ideas is that If man
(44) Given those terms I find myself agreeing with Hick, who suggests that to say Jesus is God and man is to say that one has drawn that familiar friend of the theological community, the square circle, op.cit pi78.
(45) Raven,C.E. Apollinarianism. p229.
(46) O'Donnell,J.J, S.J. Trinity and Temporality. p34.
(47) Sellers,R.V. The Council of Chalcedon. p132.
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is to be redeemed there must come into the world a man who in his 
perfect obedience to the will of God will be the Man, the second Adam, 
the firstfruits of a renewed humanity and a r^aewed creation. "(48),
Our examination of salvation, or redemption, will take three 
stages. After an initial - and necessarily brief - comment on the 
Patristic doctrines I shall develop a Process interpretation based upon 
the christology of this study. This will then be evaluated in the terms 
of the function it is required to perform by "orthodoxy". The third 
stage will note some Biblical ideas and the section is closed with a few 
general observations. To suggest that it is possible to present a 
survey of the Patristic doctrine of redemption in as short a space as 
can be permitted here will be anathema to anyone even remotely 
fascinated by Early Church doctrine. Hence I state at the outset that 
my intention is merely to guide the discussion through a sample of the 
themes developed by the Fathers, in order to set the scene for the 
Process interpretation.
Perhaps the dominant idea was first stated in an authoritative 
version by Irenaeus. This is the theory of deification through
(48) Sellers,R.V. Two Ancient Christologies. pi 16. Similarly, Melanchthon's famous dictum, "who Christ is becomes known in his saving action" (Preface to the loci communes 1521) illustrates how important the dependence was throughout the Church. It is interesting to note that Turner inverts the dependency and views redemption as a secondary factor in the formulation of theology, subordinate to the "primary principles of the Christian faith", God and Christology (Turner,H.E.W. Patristic Redemption ol8).He qualifies the statement by noting that "if the via crucis were all the time being followed religiously, the theologia crucislagged somewhat", thereby emphasising that redemption, the Way of the Cross, was always the dominant aspect of the religious life. It must also be noted that in the modern context the supremacy of the doctrine of salvation is no longer VEuLid. Sponheim makes this point, albeit sarcastically, in his comment, "safe in the arms of Jesus, who will hesitate over definitions of God."(op.cit. pl80). That, of course, is precisely the reason whychapter three of this study is so necessary, to clarify the doctrine of God before stating a christology and a doctrine of salvation.
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incarnation (49). Hence Athanasius explained that man was originally 
intended to participate in the Logos and that this was fulfilled through 
Jesus Christ. Kolp's article (50) illustrates the way in which 
Athanasius used II Peter 1:3-4 to support this: "... You may escape
from the corruption that is in the world because of passion, and become 
partakers of the divine nature." The most important aspect of that verse
is the notion of "participation", which gives rise to four central
questions: the "in-what, wl^, when" and "how" do they participate?
Athanasius employed the distinction between divinity by nature and 
divinity by participation. Christ, he assumed was divine by nature 
because it is in Christ in which creatures must participate in or3eir to 
become divine. And, he argued, the nature in which one participates to 
become divine must itself be divine. The incarnation is the reason 
"why" believers participate, they "do not have it by nature and can 
never obtain it through their own efforts."(51). It follows that it is 
by virtue of participation in Christ that the "how?" is answered, and 
the concept of immortality replies to the "when?". Wiles draws 
attention to the fact that "the argument depends upon the general 
principle that one can only communicate to others that which is in the 
fullest sense one's own."(52). And, as he asserts, it is by no means 
obvious that the principle is valid. This has important implications 
for christology, particularly for the sense in which Christ must be 
divine in order to satisfy the requirements of redemption. It is clear 
that if the principle is not valid it is unnecessary to make the strict
(49) See Pannenberg,W. Jesus - God and Man. p40f.
(50) Kolp,A.L. "Partakers of the Divine Nature: The Use of IIPeter 1:4 by Athanasius", Studia Patristica vol.17 plOlSff. Inthe same volume see Kannengiesser,C., "Athanasius of Alexandria" p98lff.
(51) Kolp, op.cit. p1021.
(52) Wiles,M. "In defence of Arius", Journal of Theological Studies vol.XIII 1962. p346.
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identification for that particular purpose. The crucial point to note 
is that Athanasius is claiming that participation in Christ ensures one 
of partaking of the nature which is Christ's.
A variation on the theme of participation is found in an "ethically 
determined" line of Patristic thought, particularly, for example, in 
Origen, the Antiochene concept of unity and the christology of Theodore 
of Mopsuestia (53). The ethical ideal of Middle Platonism is the
constant struggle towards participation in the idea of the good which 
is, itself, achieved through the struggle. And, since for Plato (54) 
the good is the divine, the striving towards participation in the good 
is striving towards participation in the divine. One can recognise how 
this notion of human effort could lead to Pelagianism on one hand and, 
the counter - reaction, to an emphasis on the need for grace on the 
other. Is this striving possible without the assistance of the Divine? 
A similar question arises when one considers the exemplarist and 
objective theories of redemption. The exemplarist theory maintains that 
Jesus is essentially an example to be followed, and the act of believing 
in and imitating him is the method of gaining salvation. An initial 
objection to this type of theory is that it places too much importance 
on the relationship a person has to the example. It bestows upon 
certain individuals, merely by virtue of their spatio - temporal 
location with respect to the example, particular privileges which make 
salvation more accessible than for others. Furthermore, Augustine
objected to Pelagius on the grounds that by "praising the capabilities 
of human nature" (55) the value of the Cross was diminished. Although 
Dewart argues that Augustine's charge fails it does, nevertheless,
(53) See Pannenberg op.cit. p40.
(54) e.g. Republic VI.
(55) Dewart, J,MoW. "The Christology of the PelagianControversy", Studia Patristica vol.XVII pi228.
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illustrate the tension Wiloh was present in the necessary attempt to 
balance what Christ achieved with what we can achieve. That the two 
aspects must be balanced is obvious. Turner writes that some kind of 
"example" language was necessary to prevent redemption being seen as 
solely "achieved by any external transaction or some device whether of 
quasi - physical insemination or of mystical transmutation which might 
save us apart from ourselves."(56). Any adequate doctrine of salvation 
must incorporate both aspects.
At this point in the discussion it is valuable to Introduce a 
further issue which will also function as the departure point for the 
consideration of a Process perspective. The notion of redemption 
implies the sense of redemption from something and it is this 
"something" which must be considered. The discussion might easily 
become engrossed in "Original sin" and other complexities of Patristic 
anthropology - cum - theology: this must be avoidedI The vital point
to mention is that humanity was thought to exist in a form which was a 
corrupted derivative of its original state. The Initial "perfection" 
had "fallen". Hence we see the Fathers employing the imagery of Christ 
as the Second Adam, the new perfected humanity who restores the human 
race to its former glory, a new creation. Salvation is therefore 
essentially a restoration. If that statement fails as a satisfactory 
summary of the Patristic doctrine of redemption it certainly succeeds in 
highlighting a radically different vision of mankind to that expounded 
by Process theologians.
In the context of Process thought the idea of a fallen humanity 
which requires restoration is meaningless. One must immediately note 
that it does not either advocate a view of a perfect humanity. Indeed, 
neither of those views are intelligible. Process conceptualities insist
(56) Turner, op.cit. pi17.
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that mankind is adequately defined by those actual individuals who are 
engaged in the process of self - creation and those perished individuals 
who have contributed in the past. There is no overall or absolute value 
judgement about initial or present states. Value is generated by the
present generation and may, on an arbitrary cosmic scale, be less than 
or greater then the total value as defined by a previous generation. 
The hope is that there is an overall increase in value. That is to
claim that the present state of "humanity" is somehow "superior" to a
former state, a rise as opposed to a "fall". It is worth repeating, 
moreover, that the use of the term "superior" indicates a ccmparison of 
the relative value of one state to another. It is not an absolute term. 
It is an inherent feature of Whitehead's vision that the process is 
orientated towards novel harmony (57). I employ the term "novel" in 
order to distinguish this from any notion of a return to a Leibnizian 
pre-existing harmony. The direction of the whole thrust of creativity 
is towards the telos. a goal anticipated by God. Consequently one can
understand how God's activity is always creative and redemptive. It is 
creative because it promotes novelty, redemptive because it aims towards 
establishing harmony. This general notion of God's activity gives rise 
to the . idea that the process of creativity, considered on the cosmic 
scale, is itself a process of salvation. To reiterate and emphasise the 
contrast, whereas the Ancients viewed creation as a downward spiral of 
concupiscience and "passion", as understood in a negative sense, the 
very essence of Process consists of the generation of value, a movement 
towards harmony driven by a passion which is now understood as a 
positive quality.
This basic difference between the two understandings has
(57) If Process and Reality is the philosophical account of this, Adventures of Ideas relates the human face of this creative advance.
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significant implications. The Patristics, faced by the need for
restoration on a grand cosmic scale, were forced into making extravagant 
claims for Jesus. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a Saviour who is 
appropriate to that task who is not defined by universal and abstract 
perfections. The Process concept is not confronted by the same issues. 
Firstly, it could be argued that since the process is itself redemptive, 
by virtue of God's creative and redemptive activity, there is no need to 
postulate a Redeemer other than God himself. At the level of the 
Cosmos, the totality of the creative advance into novelty, that argument 
cannot be refuted. However, recalling that in Process terms "humanity" 
is not a universal quantity but a finite set of individual qualities, 
one can propose that a notion of individual salvation does lend itself 
to the idea of an individual Saviour. Rather than advocating a cosmic 
restoration, the view of salvation which is appropriate to Process 
theology is an individual reconciliation. This proposal must be
formulated in the context of a cosmic process which is itself
redemptive. The key to this understanding is that, although the cosmic
process may be redemptive, any one individual component of that process 
is not, necessarily and at any given time, participating in the aim 
appropriate to the optimization of harmony. In the terms of the pyramid 
effect, in which the optimum peak is dependent upon the cooperation and 
contributions of the relevant constituents, one can say that in reality 
the majority of "peaks" fail to be realized. Individuals do not always 
fulfil their own potential. This implies a reduced level of possibility 
for subsequent generations, thereby rendering them impotent to fully 
realise the value properly relevant to their location. Redemption, I 
argue, is not, primarily, the task of "correcting" that historical fact 
but rather the process of reconciling one's purpose, as a self - 
determining individual, with the overall telos of the cosmic whole. The 
sequence is not one of sin, repentance, forgiveness and reward, which
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acts retrospectively with reference to the initial "sin", but rather it 
is an intention to create new growth and value from whatever state 
exists at the time. The corollary of this is that redemption must be 
considered as a reconciliation with the whole, because it is in the 
totality of the cosmic process that the value of novel creativity is 
achieved. Thus, individual redemption is inextricably bound up with the 
notion of the universal redemptive process. It is the failure of the 
individual to respond adequately to cosmic redemption which Implies the 
necessity for individual reconciliation with the process of creative 
advance. Furthermore, the locus of individual redemption is the 
totality of the Redemptive Process.
The "whole", in relation to which individual salvation is required 
and in which salvation occurs, consists of God, the universe and the 
self. Redemption is futuristic with reference to God, the universe and 
the self but retrospective only in relation to the self. An action in 
the present becomes available as data for the future, it gains the 
status of a fact to which the future is able to respond. Therefore, any 
action in the present is either redemptive, in which case it generates 
value and, furthermore, novel possibilities for the generation of value, 
or it fails to contribute anything positive beyond the value of its own 
actualization. Hence, a redemptive act in the present enables future 
possibilities for value to be realized. In relation to the self, the 
redemptive act is also retrospective. The analysis of the human person 
in chapter three showed that in order for a person to be identified as a 
true "self", it was essential that continuity existed with antecedent 
members of the same series of becoming. This may take the form of mere 
reiteration of previous states but in order to be redemptive one must 
also suppose that the person acts to reinstate, reiterate or reaffirm 
the purpose which defines that "self", by virtue of its past. A
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redemptive act in the present reconciles the person to his or her own 
"self". Second, that purpose must itself be redemptive with respect to 
the cosmic process. The purpose which defines the self must reconcile 
that self to the telos. Clearly, an act which reaffirms a purpose which 
is not itself a reponciliatory intention cannot be considered a 
redemptive act.
It is possible to give a summary of the discussion so far. It was 
noted that the Process of Creativity, which lies at the heart of 
Whitehead's vision, is a redemptive process. God's creative and 
redemptive activity in the process lures it towards states of ever - 
increasing degrees of harmony. However, it was subsequently emphasised 
that this does not imply that all individuals who are engaged in that 
cosmic process are necessarily aligned with that harmonious aim. This 
gave rise to the notion of individual redemption, in which the self is 
reconciled to the telos appropriate to the cosmic whole and to the 
purpose which is the defining characteristic of that self. However, 
unless the Process scheme can give intelligibility to the notion that 
Jesus Christ is our Saviour, it must remain deficient and inadequate to 
the needs of faith. As Griffin expresses this, "every doctrine of 
Jesus' person is to be judged in terms of its adequacy to the Scriptures 
as currently understood and to the particular doctrine of Jesus' saving 
significance with which it is combined."(58).
As previously stated, the idea that the Process is itself a process 
of redemptive creativity requires no reference to Christ. It is in the 
realm of individual redemption in which Christ becomes relevant to the 
discussion. Of course, by "Christ" it is meant the whole christological 
reality, Jesus and the Church. The role of Christ in salvation is 
two-fold. As the revelation of God's creative and redemptive activity
(58) A Process Christology p143.
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Jesus authenticates the Church as the community in which that activity 
is explicity recognised and which becomes the motivating power in which 
the community participates. Moreover, and as a corollary to the 
previous point, Jesus - and the Church - affect God in such a way that 
God's lure for the world, particularly through the Church, is an 
explicit aim towards creative and redemptive activity. Both these 
points require further discussion.
By stating that Jesus is the revelation of God's creative and 
redemptive activity, the Churoh (which is the community response to 
that) must participate in its own action which is creative and 
redemptive. That is hew the Church is defined. Furthermore, that is 
immediately to state that the Church is the locus of redemptive 
activity, simply by virtue of the fact that the Church's activity is 
redemptive. One can extend the argument to emphasise that point. I 
have mentioned the concept of individual reconciliation, noting that the 
self must become reconciled to the cosmic whole. But this implies that 
reconciliation demands community and, since the Church is the redemptive 
community, individual reconciliation takes place within the Church. Or, 
to rephrase that making explicit the reference to Jesus, one can say 
that Individual reconciliation takes place by participation in Jesus who 
is present in his Living Body, the Church.
This essential relation between salvation and the Church might well 
imply that extra ecclesiam nulla salus - although one must recall that 
"church" in this context is understood in a radically different sense 
than that conveyed by that particular dictum!
This analysis of salvation has stressed its subjective aspect, 
similar to an exemplarist view. The individual subject makes a decision 
to participate in Christ, in Jesus and the Church, and that response is
- 229 -
The evaluation: Christ and the Churoh.
redemptive. The individual is reconciled through his or her 
participation in the revelation of Jesus to the creative and redemptive 
activity of God which is his lure for the world. To employ Cobb's 
phrase, the faith decision implies that Jesus co-constitutes the self of 
the individual who responds to him. By making Jesus the purpose of 
one's own life, accepting his revelation of God's creative and 
redemptive activity as the motivating centre of one's own being, one is 
participating in the Grand Opera of the redemptive process. However, if 
one is tempted to view the Process account as providing an entirely 
optimistic analysis, it is worth providing the balance by quoting 
Marshall (59), "it is true that, at times in history when man seems to 
be civilized and almost able to pull himself up with his own boot
strings.. ..at such times it almost seems that......the exemplary view
of the atonement goes far enough. However, when I read Golding's The 
Lord of the Flies or newspaper accounts of the events at the people's 
Temple in Guyana, I realize that man's predicament is far more 
terrifying than that and that the Incarnation must be a bolder and more 
profound statement rooted in a metaphysic and not merely a largely 
cosmetic improvement for the face and image of mankind." Although the 
point has been made by an appeal to the emotions, it is a valid point to 
make and forces us to look beyond faith's acceptance of Jesus as Saviour 
and respond to the requirement for an objective aspect to redemption. 
The Process account does this by stating how the Christ - event alters 
God's inner experience. Essentially, this theme is developed employing 
the idea that God is able to use the community, which is the response to 
the revelation of his creative and redemptive nature in Jesus, as the 
vehicle for explicit creative and redemptive action in the world. Prior 
to the existence of the Church, God's involvement with the world was,
(59) Mar shall, M. "The Person of Christ in the Experience of theChurch", Myth/Truth of God Incarnate p42. See also Sano,R."Jesus as Saviour and Lord" ibid. p85ff.
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although necessarily creative and redemptive, only implicitly so. Jesus 
made explicit in his life and message the idea that God's purpose as
expressed in his activity in history could be conceived as
oo-constituting one's own self. Such a person becomes an organon of the
divine will. One notes that God's creative and redemptive nature is 
explicitly known in the world because of the response of Jesus. It is
only through his life that the world recognised the divine nature. 
Therefore, the fact that Jesus lived his life as a revelation of God has 
literally and objectively affected God's future. Jesus made possible 
the opportunities for explicit creative and redemptive activity in the 
world, through the Church. One can say that because of his response to 
God, his revelation of the Divine nature, Jesus effected redemption 
because new possibilities for the radical and explicit fruition of God's 
love were made available. Barnhart writes in terms of God becoming 
aware of the human situation, "because of Jesus, God's potential
(primordial) humanity is new actual (consequent) humanity."(60). The 
human experience of Jesus enables God's consequent nature to be the
fulfilment of his primordial nature. However, it seems to me that, 
although Barnhart is correct to emphasise the fulfilment of God's 
humanity, he fails to encapsulate the sense in which the redemptive 
efficacy of Jesus lies in the total fulfilment of the divine vision. By 
enabling novel possibilities for creative and redemptive activity it is 
God's nature which is fulfilled, not merely his humanity. His
primordial vision is realized through those possibilities. Pailin
expresses the same theme in terms of two people who love one another, 
"they will claim that as they increasingly love each other so they 
increasingly become sympathetically aware of each other's feelings and 
experiences."(61). In short, they identify with one another.
(60) op.cit. p229.
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I have tended to state this relationship in positive terms. That 
is, I have considered hew the world achieves the enjoyment of value as a 
result of God's initiative. The response of the world to the revelation 
of God's creative and redemptive nature redeems the world. There is, 
however, another aspect of this process. God's desire, his erotic love 
for the world, is never fully realized. The initiative is never wholly 
appreciated by the world. One notes that even the response of Jesus, 
although it was the ideal human response, was not a perfect response 
simply because it was limited by the imperfections of humanity. This 
unrequited love means that God suffers as the world fails to respond to 
his initiative (62).
The fact that God made possible, and Jesus initiated, the process
(61) op.cit. p306. See also Griffin, A Process Christology pl89 "to love someone in any real sense means to be affected by their experience." It is worth noting as a corollary that this attributes a significant degree of uniqueness to Jesus. He, and he alone, is responsible for effecting the shift from implicit, unrecognised, creative and redemptive activity to that made possible in the community which is the explicit response to the divine initiative. The notion of redemption as being effected by Jesus and made possible by him through the Churoh is, in fact, implicit in Cobb's analysis of Creative Transformation. Although Creative Transformation occurs whenever there is incarnation of the Logos, it is only after this is named "Christ" that the awareness and reception of Creative Transformation is explicit. It may be claimed that the distinction between implicit and explicit redemptive activity is too tenuous a notion to respond adequately to the Christian idea of the role played by Jesus in effecting salvation. However, I defend myself against that charge by pointing out that, in the terms, of Process theology, the possibilities and opportunities for novel creativity are significantly greater for conscious (explicit) action than activity at the prereflective or pre-thematised (implicit) level, which tends to emphasise reiteration. Thus, the fact that Jesus made explicit the revelation and authorised a conscious response to it is a radical achievement.
(62) Pittenger relates how Hartshorne and, to a lesser extent, Whitehead both use that notion. Hartshorne regards Jesus as a symbolization of the suffering of God. See Pittenger, Process Thought and Christian Faith p68ff., and "The Christological Symbol of God's Suffering", Baker,J.R., in REPT. The metaphor is not one which I find particularly constructive. Our understanding of love conveys the necessary aspect of suffering but without isolating it as a special feature.
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of explicit redemptive activity does not deny the need for a continued 
faith response to it. Without the response of the Churoh, which is 
itself creative and redemptive activity, the possibilities in the world 
for God to reveal his love are minimised. The Churoh, therefore, has 
the responsibility for maintaining the opportunities for the work of the 
divine vision. Christology, Jesus and the Church, must be adequate to 
both those aspects; the initial revelation and the continuing 
revelation. To summarize, the Process scheme of salvation is a 
combination of three aspects, representing the idea that the aim of the 
created world is reconciled with God's purpose for it. First, there is 
a sense of individual salvation (which is Pelagian if anachronisms must 
be used) in which the self must strive to incorporate God's purpose into 
his or her own self - becoming. Second, this is reflected by the Church 
or ccmmunity response, through which the divine vision is realized and 
made available for the world. Third, Jesus may be praised as the 
Saviour or Redeemer because, through his own response to God, he 
generated the community which is the explicit recognition of God's 
creative and redemptive activity. By virtue of its own faith, the 
community expresses that recognition in its own creative and redemptive 
activity, thereby sustaining the revelation of God in the world.
Our discussion of salvation has emitted any reference to the 
concept of "immortality". It is difficult to present a brief and 
adequate account of the Issues so, rather than attempting to do so, I 
shall simply make a few relevant points. Firstly, it is imperative to 
note that Process theologians find themselves divided on the issue, 
particularly between the ideas of "objective" or "subjective" 
Immortality (63). The notion of objective Immortality causes few
I
(63) See for example, Pittenger, "The Last Things" la & Process Perspective. Bartshorne's chapter "Time, Death and Everlasting Life" in Logic of Perfection and Suchocki's "The Question of Immortality", Journal of Religion 57/3 July 1977.
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problems. God prebends all reality as it responds - on all levels of
the pyramid of activity - to his initiative. The divine "memory" 
synthesises these responses and subsequently uses them as essential 
components in the divine vision and lure for future generations. 
Simply, "preservation is of all qualities, all fact, and there is no 
stipulation limiting it to good qualities or facts"(64). Secondly, 
because objective immortality ensures immortality for all qualities and 
facts it is necessary to comment upon the quality of the Immortality. 
Everything is immortalized because everything is relevant to God's 
knowledge and vision, nothing can escape his universal awareness. But
actual occasions and, of course, societies of actual occasions, differ
radically in the extent to which they contribute positively, by 
generating value and harmony. Events which contribute maximally are 
clearly of greater significance to God because they convey greater 
potential for the introduction of new beauty into the world. But that 
is precisely our definition of the redemptive act, one which is capable 
of promoting further acts of novel creativity and value. Hence, one is 
able to conclude that, although all events are objectively immortalized, 
only those which satisfy the condition of being redemptive are "saved" 
(65). This appears to me to be a satisfactory reply to Neville who 
suggests that because "in the long run there is a metaphysical guarantee 
that people cannot damn themselves" there is no human freedom since "the 
possibility of self - damnation seems to me a touchstone of 
freedom. "(66). On the contrary, damnation is possible, it is the 
attainment of immortality without redemption, a state of, literally,
(64) Hartshorne, "The Immortality of the Past: Critique of a Prevalent Misinterpretation." Review of Metaphysics. 7 1953, p99.
(65) Employing the word "saved" in crder to connote a significant religious meaning as opposed to merely a philosophical notion of preservation.
(66) op.cit. p9.
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worthless preservation. This is one instance when we see that "genuine 
theology" is not reducible to metaphysics. The principles of the latter 
give us good reason to postulate "immortality", but without the 
christology of the former we are impotent to translate that eternal 
preservation into a significant sense of "being Saved". Salvation is 
based upon acts which are creative and redemptive, not the totality of 
"qualities and facts" good and bad.
The debate surrounding subjective immortality is complex and in a 
footnote I add a brief comment (67). Without entering into the 
philosophical complexities it is pertinent to note that the Biblical 
picture of "immortality" is certainly not one which obliges us to hold a 
belief in a personal survival after death. For example, Hamilton 
comments that "in recent years a number of theologians have attacked our 
Western tradition to individualize the Gospel."(68).
It is to the Bible that it is now necessary to turn, with the 
intention of examining how a Process christology expresses the sense of 
the Kingdom of God. With perhaps just a hint of "poetic" licence it is 
fair to say that, of the New Testament, there are as many 
interpretations as there are Interpreters. Scripture's message 
concerning the Kingdom of God is a dramatic demonstration of that fact. 
Consequently our task of evaluating Process christology with respect to 
the "Kingdom" is far from trivial. Nevertheless, we can identify 
certain relevant factors upon which to build the Process account. Once
(67) Christian's arguments (op.cit. p329f) are, in my opinion, convincing reasons to dismiss the concept of subjective Immortality. However, one notes that both Hartshorne (see e.g. Logic m l  Perfection p253) and Cobb (A Christian Natural Theology p70) present arguments to the contrary. See also Schilpp, "Whitehead's Idea of God" in The Philosophy of Alfred Nor-th Whitehead. Schilpp,P.A.(Ed). Whitehead himself was neutral on the subject.
(68) Hamilton,P. The Living God and the Modern World. p129.
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again, I only present a sample, although representative, selection of 
views. There are three basic questions which shall concern us, the 
"when?", the "what?" and the "where?".
The first of these, which asks about the timing of the Kingdom, is, 
perhaps, the one to which New Testament scholarship has devoted the 
greatest degree of variety. Conzelmann presents a summary of these 
views and is able to give Scriptural references to support what are 
apparently conflicting positions. On one hand the New Testament Implies 
that the Kingdom is already present while, on the other, it suggests 
that it is a future reality, not yet present (69). References which 
apply to the former include Luke 10:18; 14:16-24, Matt.11:12; 11:5, Mark 
2:19 and, of relevance to the latter, the Beatitudes, Luke 6:20ff, the 
Lord’s Prayer, Luke 11:2, Matt.8:11, Mark 14:25, Luke 11:31f; 12:8 (70). 
Griffin illustrates the two positions and concludes that there exists a 
consensus among New Testament scholars that Jesus preached the Kingdom 
as both a future and present reality. In this context I avoid any 
further debate on that subject, noting that the sample references from 
the Gospels certainly appear to support the integrated view. Perhaps of 
greater relevance, and definitely of more interest, is Schillebeeckx‘s 
comment that "throughout the Bible, the ccaning of the Kingdom of God is 
the coming of God as salvation for human beings. "(71). That answer to 
the "when?" question is relative - it depends upon the "coming of 
salvation" - and is particularly noteworthy because it makes explicit 
the connection between the Kingdom and salvation. This has important
(69) Conzelmann gives the following examples among New Testament scholars; C.E.Dodd "has already arrived", J.Jeremias "process of realization", Bultmann and Schweitzer "future and imminently near" and W.G.Kummmel "a present and a future power". Jesus p71.
(70) Griffin, A .Pr.pS-Ojg.S. Christology p199.
(71) Schillebeeckx,E., Interim Report on the Books Jesus and Christ, pi05. !
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Implications for the "where?" of the Kingdom. However, prior to that - 
and, indeed with the intention of adding support to that connection - we 
must confront the "what?" question.
Braun writes that "the essential intention of Jesus' preaching 
about the end is not entertaining advice about events in the near future 
but an unprecedented sharpening of accountability" and, "Jesus intended 
to flummnn people because of the end"(72). But if Jesus made that call 
for action what is the locus of the response? Our answer to that, the 
"where?" question, must be that the response is made in the Church. 
Firstly, because, and with reference to Schillebeeckx, salvation occurs 
in and through the Church and, second, because the community which Is 
responding to Jesus' call !§. the Church. One notes that Braun also 
states that "Jesus... calls the individual to make his own obedient 
decision" (73) which appears to identify the locus of the Kingdom in the 
individual. However, I have previously shown that the Church the 
response of individuals (an individual cannot respond to Jesus without 
contributing to the church) which draws these two strands together.
The notion that the Kingdom of God is present in the Church enables 
us to understand hew it is both a present and a future reality (74). It 
is a present reality for two reasons. The call for response - the
(72) Braun,H., Jesus of Nazareth p41*2.
(73) ibid. p48.
(74) This analysis essentially depends upon Whitehead's notion of anticipation, "the relevant future consists of those elements in the anticipated future which are felt with effective intensity by the present subject by reason of the real potentiality for them to be derived from itself." PR p27. The decision in the present anticipates a contribution in the future. It also incorporates the notion (from Heidegger) that an anticipation of the future (a hope) contributes to the quality of the present (the decision). The latter is validated by Kline's agreement with Heidegger that there is a "certain phenomenological priority of one's existential future". Kline,G., "'Past', 'Present' and 'Future' as Categoreal Terms and the 'Fallacy of the Actual Future'". Review of Metaphysics Dec.1986 vol.XL no2. p2l8.
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action of faith - is a call for action now. Furthermore, it is the 
nature of faith, redemptive activity, which gives intelligibility to the 
idea of God's Kingdom. The Kingdom has meaning for us now because of 
the quality of our present response. It must also be a future reality 
because, as Griffin notes, only then are we able to avoid "absolutizing" 
the present (75) or "politicizing the transcendent."(76).
It is a future reality because the reasons and motives for the 
call-to-faith do not remain in history but anticipate the future. Of 
course, they are not divorced from history because without tradition the 
scheme is discontinuous and exists without order. Rather, one is called 
to respond precisely because God's creative and redemptive activity, 
made explicit in Jesus, reveals his vision, the lure towards the future. 
The realization of that vision is the Kingdom of God. Present, because 
one responds to the call immediately: future, because it lures one
towards radical and novel creativity. Ford raised the epistemological 
problem of how we gain an insight into Jesus' self. I suggest that in
his proclamation of the Kingdom we see Jesus' understanding of God at
work in history and the constituting role that perception played in his 
own self. The preaching of the Kingdom reveals Jesus' commitment to it 
and, recalling the quotation from Williams (77), a commitment to 
something is constitutive of the self. Jesus was obedient to a 
principle of interpretation which revealed God's activity in the world, 
and his obedient response was the proclamation of the Kingdom. Marjorie
(75) A Process Christologv p201.
(76) Cupitt,D., Mvth of God Incarnate p145. Without the future element, what is is what ought to be. But if that is true then the need for faith (action) is obtuse which, in turn, impliesthat there can be no Church and, therefore, no Kingdom of God.One should note Whitehead's "fallacy that all types of seriality necessarily involve terminal instances"(PR pi11) which denies Teilhard de Chardin's omega point, the "consummation and terminus of history". Ford, Lure of God pi13.
(77) "I am... what I hope for..." PPCT p442.
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Suchocki has made the interesting point that a "surprising feature" of 
Jesus' teaching about the Kingdom is that it is "discontinuous" with the 
past (78). This appears to deny Jesus' continuity with history,
essential to the claim that he employed his interpretation of God - in - 
history as the constitutive element in his self - understanding and 
becoming. This apparent contradiction is avoided by noting that the 
"discontinuity" stated by Suchocki is really a reversal of past values.
It illustrates the importance Jesus had for his past even if, as is the 
case, he overturned that past.
To summarize this section which has examined the doctrine of 
salvation, I make the following points. Process theology cannot deal in 
the abstract universels which entertained the Ancients, so any notion of 
the "restoration of humanity" is irrelevant. The emphasis lies on the 
reconciliation of the "self", its purpose and its central being, with 
the divine vision. The call to realize the Kingdom is a call to respond
to the Will of God, as mediated by Jesus in his proclamation. This
takes place in and throu^ the Church. Indeed, one can say that this j
Iredemptive process is the church in action. Furthermore, the New J 
Testament conveys the essential point that the Kingdom is both present
and "not-yet". I illustrated how a Process account of the Churoh 
expresses that same point precisely and constructively. The one aspect 
which I confess to having rather avoided is personal immortality. But 
that is not so much an admission of guilt or error, but a statement that 
for myself the notion of a "life eternal" is not central to a confession 
of Christ as Saviour. The next stage in our evaluation concerns the 
relationship of Process christology to the Logos doctrine of the 
Fathers. According to Cullmann the Logos concept became the "dominant 
designation for Jesus in the classical Christology of the ancient
(78) God Christ Church pl68'9, she cites Matt.13:44 in support.
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Church."(79). That is a startling development because the concept only 
occurs in three instances in the New Testament, the Prologue of John's 
Gospel, the first verse of 1 John and Rev. 19:13. New Testament 
scholarship has centred around the pre-Christian "Gnostic redeemer myth" 
(80) and the relation of Logos to the Wisdom and Word of the Old 
Testament. Of particular concern is the apparent process of 
hypostatization which moves from 1 Genesis to Sap.18, indicating that 
the New Testament use of Logos is a natural development from Jewish 
Wisdom literature (81).
However, and despite the complex arguments which invigorate the 
"myth" or "hypostatization" debate, one thing is clear. That is, the 
"incarnation" of John 1:14 is a novel introduction of Christianity. 
Never before was the Logos identified with a human individual. That is 
true regardless of the thread of inheritance which enabled the Christian 
authors to have access to the concept. The Fathers developed the 
doctrine along philosophical lines which essentially ignored any Old 
Testament continuity. Basic to the development of the concept is the 
idea that God's general activity in human existence is the logos 
spermatikos and his specific activity in Christ is the logos sarkotheis 
(82).
(79) op.cit. p249.
(80) The major alternative to Bultmann's myth is expounded by C.H.Dodd in The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel, see Sanders who presents convincing arguments against Dodd in New Testament Christological Hvmns which also gives a good account of Bultmann's position. The most interesting feature is the process of reduction which took place, the Gnostic cosmology being dislodged by a belief in creation and the concern for the God - man relationship. As Sanders says, "the soteriological interest has become primary."(p39).
(81) See Sanders p49. The notion of hypostatization can be traced into the beginnings of history.
(82) Pittenger, Theology 88 1985, "Redemption: A 'ProcessTheology' Interpretation" p452. See also Ogden, The Reality of ÜSÉ p172.
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Kelly notes how Justin used this idea as an elementary christology, 
the Logos' presence in Christ should be understood as being similar in 
kind to his universal presence, though much greater in degree (83). 
Origen "regarded the world as the scene of an educative process carried 
on by the Logos, who as Master and Healer was gradually inducing all 
free creatures to return to the good"(84). However, he took the 
implication a stage further than Justin, to suggest that the incarnation 
of the Logos in Jesus represents the pre-eminent instance of the Logos' 
intervention in human affairs. Exactly how this was to be understood 
was the subject of debate between the two great schools of Patristic 
theology. If this can be summed up in a few lines, the Alexandrians 
postulated a Christ composed of Logos and body, the Antiochenes a Christ 
composed of Logos and complete humanity, body and soul. In the first 
case. Logos is incarnate by virtue of displacement while in the second, 
it becomes incarnate by virtue of "co-constitution". Of course, I 
employ that term in order to convey a point. Logos, in Process 
christology follows the Antiochene type rather than an Alexandrian 
formulation. In the following section I shall note how this theme 
implies the "divinity" of Christ. Prior to that it is fruitful to 
mention how the Logos in Cobb's theory of Creative Transformation "fits" 
the classical mould. Logos, as the cosmic principle of order and the 
source of purpose, is analogous to the logos spermatikos. and the 
incarnation (presence and actualization) of Logos, who is named the 
Christ, is the logos sarkotheis. So, Cobb's use of Logos relates to the 
doctrines of the Church Fathers in that it is concerned with the 
principle of universal intelligibility, made available to man. The 
Antiochene concept of unity or, to use Lohse's words on Origen, the 
union between Jesus' soul and the Logos was "so close that the... soul
(83) Kelly.J.N.D.. Early Christian Doctrines pi46.
(84) Danielou,J., Origen p269.
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of Jesus took the Logos wholly into itself"(85) captures the imagination 
of a Process theologian because it is an early statement of the 
"co-constitution" idea. Not all Process christologies have made use of 
the Logos concept in this way. For example, Spencer Bonnell (86) has 
developed a view, totally different in its approach. He draws a 
distinction between Logos and Spirit and, whereas Logos is equivalent to 
Cobb's definition, Bonnell uses Spirit to create the creature's 
creativity. By so doing, he denies that the inherent creativity of the 
world is sufficient which, to me, separates his position from a 
Whiteheadian one. Furthermore, it is not clear how his use of Logos is 
a more adequate expression of the Father's thought than Cobb. And, most 
significantly, his position is retrospective. It attempts to state a 
contemporary christology by employing themes and concepts from the 
historical context. Of course one must seek continuity, but that does 
not imply the need to restate theology in identical terms. That 
principle is of direct relevance to the following section which 
discusses the sense in which the Jesus of Process christology may be 
said to be "divine".
Perhaps the New Testament opinion on whether Jesus was "divine" is 
best summarized by Ogden who, quoting Knox, says, "that where a greater 
or lesser name is proposed for Christ, it is always the greater that is 
adopted."(87). That adequately epitomizes the tendency to maximize the
(85) Lohse,B., A Short History of Christian Doctrine p77.
(86) Bonnell,S., God Who Dares to be Man; Thao&ogy fon Praver and Suffering Seabury Press 1980. This is from Griffin's review. Process Studies 13/3 Fall 1983. p237ff.
(87) Point of Christologv p77, from The Early Church and the Coming Great Churoh. But, in contrast, Lohse states categorically that the disciples "knew, in fact, that in a certain sense Jesus is himself divine."(op.cit.p72 my emphasis). Furthermore it is possible to give an alternative interpretation to the "But I say" sayings, quoted previously. Rather than being illustrative of a radical human awareness of freedom, they could be interpreted as depicting divine authority.
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status of Jesus. But why was such a tendency present? I have already 
noted that the Patristic theology of Salvation necessitated extravagant 
claims about Christ, notably the idea that if one is to become divine by 
participation that in which one participates must be divine by nature. 
One can conclude that the victory of Athanasius over Arius was a victory 
of soteriology over cosmology. Such was the demand for this victory 
that the "most famous word in the whole history of Christian doctrine" 
should properly be attributed to Arius himself (88). The idea of 
homoousios. as stated in the Nicene Creed to mean that the Son is fully 
God has a history which follcws a characteristic pattern. Motivated by 
soteriological considerations, a christological doctrine was formulated 
which satisfied those requirements. This doctrine was developed in the 
terms of a certain model. In the case of the two natures of Jesus the 
Patristics employed "materialistic and chemical" (and "painfully 
artificial")(89) analogies in order to describe the combination. But 
Wiles quotes Theodore, "homo homini oonsubstantialis est. Deus autem Deo 
consubstantialis est" (90) noting that Theodore himself favoured 
personal analogies, eudokia (goodwill) replacing ousia. Raven states 
that "love in action" (91) is an adequate translation of his thought. 
Pittenger describes this in terms of an "intimate cooperation" or a 
"union in moral terms."(92).
Process christology must respond enthusiastically to the suggestion 
of a union between God and Jesus based upon the model of "love in
(88) Wiles,M., Journal of Theological Studies vol.XVI 1965."homoousios" p454*5.
(89) Raven op.cit. p301.
(90) Wiles, "homoousios" p458. He says, "the point whichTheodore is making in this passage is simply the utterimpossibility of any mixing of the two natures."
(91) op.cit. p302.
(92) Christology Reconsidered p13.
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action". Insofar as Jesus reveals the creative and redemptive nature of 
God, by his own creative and redemptive nature and that inspired by him 
in the community which responds to him, it may be possible to state that 
Jesus jLa God's creative and redemptive nature. He is God's love in the 
worlds He is "God" in the world. But that only describes one aspect of 
christology. The Church, too, is "love in action" (insofar as it 
responds in faith) and for that reason one must include the Church in 
the locus of the incarnation. <%od incarnated in the world is the whole 
process of Creative Transformation or, to use the alternative phrase, it 
is creative and redemptive activity. Hence, although Process 
christology recognises an identity between Jesus and the Father, the 
empathy identification of Barnhart at the "love in action" type of moral 
union, it must also insist that a similar identification exists between 
the Church, the present Lord, and God. One should note that Process 
christology is made deficient if the incarnation is limited to Jesus. 
Such a limit makes it impossible to affirm the reality of creative and 
redemptive work in the Church, which obliges one to deny the living 
Lord. (93)
Perhaps the most dramatic way in which I can convey my impression |
that the ascription of divinity to Christ is fundamentally irrelevant, j
(in the Process framework), is by noting that if it were ascribed of him I
nothing would be gained. Our attention would remain focused upon Jesus' I
activity, the centre of God's creative and redemptive activity and the j
(93) It is necessary to reply to Protestant objections to the iidea that the Church is the extension of the incarnation. Such |objections arise from the need to avoid ascribing infallibility Iand sinlessness (seemingly perfections of the incarnation) to the iChurch. I think the criticism can be adequately responded to by jnoting that the Church, the community response to and Iappropriation of Jesus, is not seen in terms of those qualities.It is the continuing consenting cause of the incarnation only insofar as it enables the revelation, through Jesus, of God's Icreative and redemptive action. The Church is the continuing consenting cause of the incarnation to the extent that it reveals the Living Lord.
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origin of the Church's creative and redemptive activity, its faith. 
Questions about "being" or "nature" in Process theology are inevitably 
reduced to questions about activity, because the self is defined by a 
process of becoming, a self which acts. Here one notes that because 
Jesus aligned his own self, the purpose and aim of his life, to the 
divine vision his self was co-constituted by the Logos. Thus, Jesus' 
decisions and actions (which made him who he was) were, at least partly, 
determined by (and therefore identified with) the Logos. But, that 
sense of identification is stated without any reference to an 
ontological identification. If one invokes Wiles, who says that "the 
language of the divine activity seems fully as appropriate as the 
traditional language of the divine being"(94) then one begins to 
appreciate the full impact of the Process dynamic and its relevance to 
the task of expressing the unity of Jesus and God in a contemporary 
context.
Throughout this study I have emphasised how Process christolo^r
promotes and demands action. Revelation was seen to become revelatory
only if it brings forth that which it reveals, the creative and
redemptive nature of God. I defined the Church on the basis of its
being a response to Jesus, in which faith is creative and redemptive
action in the world. Similarly, I noted hew the New Testament pictures
Jesus as calling for a response to the Kingdom which is, itself, the
realm of creative and redemptive activity. Again, redemption is thought
of in terms of a reconciliation with the divine aim. This is not a
passive purpose but a purpose which requires its actualization. But one
(94) Wiles, Making sL Christian Doctrine p179. Similarly, Hick, "when someone thus embodies some ideal or idea or attitude or value three - dimensionally, in his life, we can say, in a self -explanatory metaphor, that this ideal is being incarnated in that life."("Evil and Incarnation", Incarnation and Myth p83). It is also worth stressing the title of Pittenger's paper, "'A Thing is What it Does'* A Discussion of 'God'", The Modern Churchman 15 1972.
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should note that even if one accepts the theoretical analysis as valid, 
it is only a theoretical analysis. It lacks content in the sense that 
it has not yet defined precisely what action faith actually calls forth, 
apart frcm the oft - repeated condition that it is "creative and 
redemptive". There is, a sense in which the admission of that failing 
relieves one of the responsibility to correct the omission. It does so 
because it dismisses the accusation of dogmatic adherence to the phrase 
"creative and redemptive" activity which might, otherwise, have seemed 
to be rapidly gaining the status of an idol. It is equally valid to 
note that it is not possible to clarify hew the call for action 
translates into practical activity for all conceivable situations. 
Faith is not only dynamic, it is also subjective and flexible, and any 
attempt to dictate what faith implies is inadmissible - except, of 
course, to say that it demands action which conforms to the ideal of 
being creative and redemptive. What I propose to do in response to this 
issue is to examine just two aspects. First, I wish to suggest that the 
Christ event can resolve the "freedom and/or responsibility" dilemma 
(95). In the light of Ellul’s quotation it is necessary to illustrate 
the radical and significant meaning which Process christology gives to 
the concept. Freedcan, at the level of macrocosmic societies, describes 
three processes. The person is free to choose his or her cwn relevant 
past, free to choose a desired future and free to act upon those choices 
in the present. As noted in the third chapter, this freedom is not
(95) The reference to a dilemma is a bias. Perhaps it is Ipossible to state "freedom" and "responsibility" without |introducing a degree of conflict. However, I would argue in *response to that, once "freedom" is attributed one must be clear ^about that in respect to which one is free. That necessitates a discussion of responsibility because to accept responsibility is jto restrict one's freedom. It is significant that Jacques Ellul tcan write of Kasemann, "he seems to me to be the only modern jtheologian to give freedom the central place which is its idue".(The Ethics of Freedom. Fn.1 p104), perhaps indicating that 1Process theology has not yet presented an adequate account of freedom, at least it has not "advertised" itself as a "freedom" Itheology.
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unlimited because the environment dictates the type of possibilities 
which are available to be chosen. Within those limits, however, the 
person is free, or self - creative. On the other hand, the notion of 
responsibility appears to counter that definition of freedom. If one is 
responsible then the something to which one is responsible places an 
additional limit upon freedom. This "something" has three aspects, the 
"self", the universe and God, each one functioning as an imperative 
implying that there is a decision one "ought" to reach if one is 
responsible. Although on one level it is clear that this does not 
mitigate against freedcan, because one remains free to ignore that 
imperative, such a solution leaves one with an uneasy sense of conflict. 
A more satisfactory approach is one which will emphasise freedom ââ the 
consequence of responsibility.
This, I suggest, is achieved through Christ. Firstly, one notes 
the role played by the three tenses in the definition of freedom and the 
Church. The Church is rooted in, and validated by, the past. It is the
living manifestation of a historical reality and as such is able to
exhibit the dynamic activity of a society. But it is also 
eschatological in nature in that its message, the message of Jesus, 
calls its adherents towards the realization of future value. 
Furthermore, that call is, of course, made by, and is relevant to, the 
present decision. Thus one can understand how the individual who 
participates in the Church is, in fact, sharing in the self - creating 
process, continuity, novelty and activity. Participation in the Church 
implies responsibility for creative and redemptive activity in the world 
but that very process is the process by which the self becomes a true, 
and free, "self", related to the past but not bound by it, called
towards the future by a lure towards novelty and invoked to make a 
decision in the present. The responsibility implied by the faith
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decision, one's participation in the Church, la the freedom to become an 
individual, a free self. Hence the Church, because it is a process of 
continuity, novelty and decision, represents the freedom available to 
mankind through Christ. Knox argues, and I think a Process christology 
must agree with him, that the Resurrection is the event which brings the
Church to an awareness of this (96). Once the Church understands how
Jesus is present in its body, it can affirm itself as a present reality 
exhibiting continuity with God's work and the vehicle for the 
realization of his vision. The Church is able to recognise, because of
the resurrection which transforms the dead Jesus into the Present and
Living Lord, that Jesus' responsibility to follow God's purpose for him 
was not a limiting factor in his life but his essential freedom. Jesus, 
because he exercised responsibility to God's call, is free even to the 
extent that people are still able to call him - so naming the process of 
Creative Transformation - the Living Saviour.
In the previous chapter I stated that the resurrection is 
existentially relevant to people today because it illustrates the 
"victory" of value over death. The resurrection is thus the 
"incarnation of the divine Word addressed to the human situation."(97). 
In the Church's affirmation cf the resurrection of Jesus the believer is 
brought to realize that the self who responds responsibly to God Is. the
(96) The Church and the Reality of Christ p69. He says that the notion of a revived corpse is irrelevant because it is impotent to explain the presence of Christ now. Ford comes close to identifying the Church with the resurrection, "We argue for the bodily resurrection of Christ, but the body of Christ's resurrection is none other than the body of Christ which is the Church." Lure of God p78. It seems to me that the language of resurrection is a powerful religious metaphor for the process in which God is the ground for the re-presentation of past realities as present possibilities. Furthermore, it is because the Church talks of the living resurrected Lord that our awareness of revelation is through mediated immediacy. It is mediated (the essence of the pyramid effect) but it is immediate (present as the reality of the incarnation in the Church).
(97) Ford.L., Lure of God p79.
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self who is free. Griffin expresses the same point thus, "the opposite 
of selfishness is not complete selflessness, but a selfhood which 
includes other individual's needs and contributions, sufferings and 
joys, in its own quest for fulfilment."(98). Jesus fulfilled his own 
self not by the selfish exercise of his freedom but through a free 
response to God's call, even to the extent of death. In the section 
which looked at the humanity of Jesus I identified "freedom" as a vital 
element. This can be re-affirmed here, noting once again that it was 
not a freedom to be "disobedient" (with respect to the Law) but a 
freedom which fully realized mankind's potential to act responsibly in 
relation to the world and God. Freedom, in this context, is dynamic 
freedom, in the sense that it leads to greater freedom. Not only for 
oneself but also for the community in which one participates freely and 
in relation to which the self is constituted (99). |
At the outset of the thesis I stated an intention to benefit our j
understanding of the world through the formulation of a Process |
Christology. This necessitates that the "Kingdom of God" is given some |
1practical content. Similarly, how should an individual exercise freedom I
in a responsible way? A world in which the equality of opportunity and j
the liberation from oppression exists for all men is, I think, the !
minimum description of the Kingdom. Suchocki captures this when she j
describes the Kingdom in terms of Justice (100). Any attempt to j
disguise that fact is - and I say this deliberately bluntly - 
un-Christian. And, incidentally, at variance with the equalities
(98) A Process Christology p2t1.
(99) Because the self becomes according to a synthesis of |freedom and responsibility, one can say that man is created in the Image of God. God's role in the creative process is to jpersuade (thus recognising freedon) the process to actualize )novelty and harmony, given the demands of the greater whole (thus ensuring responsibility). Williams,D.D., PPCT p446.
(100) op.cit. pl69.
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Implied by Process philosophy. It is only in an atmosphere of freedom 
that the love of God, his creative and redemptive activity, can be 
realized in the world to its fullest possible extent. The Kingdom is 
actual new only to the degree to which the world presently manifests 
that equality, liberation and harmony (101). Hence the Church must be 
involved in feeding those who are starving, free those in captivity, and 
liberate humanity into a state of equality. A "Church" which does not 
risk its dignity in those actions is not the community in which Jesus is 
the Christ. It is not the purpose of this study to comment further on 
that point, but I do wish to indulge myself by quoting Pittenger, ".... 
the sad thing has been the freezing of that institutional form, so that 
for many it has become a strait - jacket rather than a liberating 
agency, while for others it has become an idolatrous substitute for the 
dynamic and vitalizing response in its proper fullness."(102). Is 
Process theology a Liberation theology? I prefer to make the point that 
the message of Process theology is a message of liberation. Basinger
relates how Cobb, Griffin and Ogden "at least implicitly criticize many
of the 'liberation theologies'"(103) for failing to base their praxis in 
a liberating doctrine of God. One notes that many liberation theologies 
find their inspirations in the evils of the socio- politico- and 
economic climates. A Process theology, on the other hand, derives its 
power for liberation from the Process conception of God. Liberation and
(101) So is it present? I can only resort to an Abelardian sic et non. It is interesting to note Cupitt's comments whichillustrate hew the Kingdom as understood today differs frcm thatexpounded by Jesus, "for (Jesus) the call of the Kingdom was away from family roles, not into them. The idealization of the family is a modern cultural creation which the Churches have validated, and new no modern Bishop would dream of publicly endorsing Jesus' views about the family." "The Christ of Christendom", Myth of God Incarnate pi33. This shift is justified within a Process interpretation because it is the totality of the Christ - event, Jesus and the Church, which is determinative of the Kingdom.
(102) Christology Reconsidered pi46.
(103) op.cit. pl6l.
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equality are Implied by the reciprocity of God's relation to the world. 
Thus, the terrestrial tasks of justice do not merely follow on frcm a 
Process christology but they are inherent aspects of it. As Cobb states 
this point, "my interest as a process theologian is to shew how process 
theology can become a political theology committed to the indivisible 
salvation of the whole world."(104).
The final issue to be raised in this process of evaluation concerns 
worship. Is the Christ of Process christology worthy of worship? As 
Schwobel states, "the soteriological intent of his agency, no less than 
his awful transcendence, suggests why God as agent is worthy of 
worship"(105) and, as we have seen, God's soteriological intent, 
conveyed through Jesus, is appropriated by us insofar as we participate 
in the redemptive process. This participation is worship, as Hartshome 
writes, "the way to serve and glorify God is to promote the creative 
process.... "(106). We participate in, and promote, the creative 
process when we, as members of the Church, confess our faith in the 
Living Lord. Hence Jesus, who reveals the creative and redemptive 
nature of God, is the one through whom we are able to worship. Without 
Jesus, without that revelation and without the authentic Church, there 
is no possibility for worship. Jesus, therefore, is the necessary 
complement to worship. Indeed our acceptance of, and faith in, Jesus jLg. 
worship. The point of crucial importance is that there can be no
(104) Process Theology as Political Theology p44. Camus was essentially correct; whatever fulfilment men can achieve must be obtained in this life. But, and this is where, for example. The Rebel is impotent to actually transform the world, this liberating force is derived, not from man, but from God.
(105) Schwobel,C., "Divine Agency and Providence", paper presented to the Society for the Study of Theology, Univ. Exeter March 1985. p5.
(106) The Divine Relativity pi33. This is in stark contrast to "obscurantism", "the theory that we can best praise God by indulging in contradiction and semantical nonsense."(ibid.pi49).
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distinction between "worship" and the world "out - there". Worship 
takes place primarily in the world, although its focus may justifiably 
be argued to remain in the "Church". The World, insofar as it is the 
response to the manifestation of the love of God revealed through Jesus, 
is worship. One cannot praise God without promoting the reconciliation 
of the world to Him.
At the beginning of this chapter I stated my intention to evaluate 
Process christology with respect to the various themes of "orthodoxy". 
It may be objected that in each of the these themes I have not actually 
stated any definite conclusions to the evaluation. That omission has 
been quite deliberate. Throughout the study I have attempted to 
formulate a christology which is, in my opinion, a valid and adequate 
account of Jesus Christ - with reference to Whitehead's vision and the 
Christian faith. However, whether I think or claim that it is, is, of 
course, irrelevant when the reader makes his or her own decision about 
its adequacy. I have argued that it is entirely consistent with the 
principles of Whitehead's vision, but perhaps it is possible to 
interpret those in other ways. Similarly, I have presented Process 
christology alongside some of the notions of traditional "faith". 
Perhaps my sample is insufficient or inadequate, as faith is felt and 
lived by another reader. Faith is a multi - faceted subjective reality 
and no one argument can be allowed to dictate or determine the faith of 
another person. As Moltmann says, "Christians cannot regard themselves 
as judges, but only as witnesses."(107). It is in the quality of the 
witness which is inspired by Process christology that the judgement is 
made. Unless one's faith, the participation in the creative and 
redemptive activity which is the revelation of God, is creative and 
redemptive, the witness fails.
(107) Th& Crucified God p83.
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The adventure in christology is over. The following chapter is 
intended to offer some comments and conclusions about the discussion and 
add some personal observations.
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John Arlott relates the following cricket story: "the Australian
commentator who, giving the score In Australian fashion said that 
Australia were 'four for 142', understood by a staggered English 
listener as *441 for two'."(1). Ambiguity can have a certain poetic 
eleganceI The story can also be used to Illustrate a serious point.
What the commentator actually said was precise. It was accurate and, In 
and of Itself, was not ambiguous at all. And yet the English listener 
was justifiably (sic!) "staggered". That, It seems to me. Is an 
essential feature of Process thought. At one level, the mlcrocosmlc, 
the process exhibits the precision of Initial aim, the feeling of that 
as the subjective aim and the actual entity's concrescence. Purpose, 
God's aim for creation. Is always and everywhere "the best for that 
Impasse". But there Is also the ambiguity which results when God's
purpose Is mediated by the pyramid effect. The ambiguity Is not the 
result of a morally ambiguous God but It Is the result of God's activity 
In the Imperfect world. It Is not a lack of precision In the Divine 
vision for humanity, but It is mankind's blurred perception of what that 
vision actually Is. In Process christology we maintain that our blurred 
vision Is focused by Jesus and the Church. God's purpose or lure for 
humankind Is given existential significance as It Is revealed by and 
through the Christ - event. The model used to express the mediation or 
revelation of God's lure Is one of Initiative and response. In that 
respect. Process thought Is fractal because, at whatever "magnification" 
one examines the process, the pattern remains the same. One Is always 
confronted by Initiative and response. At the highest "magnification", 
the level of the microcosmos, the process Is a balance between the 
Initial aim which lures towards novelty and the Inheritance from the 
past which ensures continuity. The actual entity responds, synthesizing 
Its Inheritance with the lure towards the future. On the macrocosmic
(1) Another Word from Arlott p40.
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level, at which point, of course, no "magnification" Is required - It Is 
the sphere of direct sense experience - human persons are faced by the 
same decisions, the reconciliation of a lure towards future novelty with 
continuity with their past. In human terms, this Is the balance between 
freedom and responsibility. I have argued that Process christology 
enables us to show that freedom jLa responsibility and that 
responsibility lâ freedom. Christ frees the self when the self responds 
with faith to God's creative and redemptive activity as revealed by 
Jesus. To conclude this thesis I wish to offer a few observations on 
that theme. These will serve to Illustrate why I think the 
Christological Adventure succeeds.
One notes that I am not claiming that all aspects of Process 
christology are unique to the Process way of doing theology. There are 
two points I add to that observation. I SSSL claiming that the Process 
account of the Christ - event, Jesus and the Church, synthesizes 
"christology" In a unique way. It conveys Ideas of God's Initiative and 
man’s response (Jesus and the Church) as a single Integrated whole. 
Process christology exhibits the same pattern as any other aspect of the 
creative process. It Is continuous. In the sense that it does not 
support an unprecedented Intrusion Into the world from beyond the world, 
because It employs one model: Initiative and response. I Illustrated
that even a revelation christology Is based upon that model. Revelation 
becomes revelatory only when a subject receives It as such. On the 
other hand, and this Is equally Important, one should be reassured by 
the fact that Process christology Is not thoroughly unique. For, If It 
were. It would not be obvious hew It could convey the Christian faith. 
The previous chapter was an attempt to highlight areas In which Process 
christology Is continuous with faith. Combining these two points I 
think It Is valid to claim that Process christology Is best described as
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a novel re-presentatlon of faith. This defends Its continuity with
faith whilst It argues for the radical novelty with which faith Is
presented.
There are four aspects of Process christology which, I believe, 
demonstrate the validity and value of a christology derived from 
Whitehead’s vision.
Firstly, I believe Process christology Is philosophically valid. 
Of course this Is assuming the validity of Whitehead’s vision, with 
reference to which I have judged It to be adequate. And, as stated In 
the Introduction, that Is the "leap of faith" behind this work. But If 
Process christology Is consistent with the principles of Whitehead's 
vision. It also exemplifies them. Christ Is not merely described in
terms of initiative and response but he Is the supreme example of what 
It means for a human to respond to the divine Initiative. This implies 
that the christological relationship (God, Jesus and the Church) Is
normative for the "self" because It exemplifies the decision which 
constitutes the self: novelty and continuity, freedom and
responsibility. Process christology, which Is derived from 
philosophical principles, becomes normative for our understanding of how 
those principles refer to ourselves, the process of our own self -
becoming. In order that we can understand Christ to be normative In
that respect It Is necessary to define God's purpose, the lure of divine 
love, In a manner which Is experlentlally credible and existentially 
relevant. Hence the task of the third chapter was to move the
discussion concerning the divine lure beyond the theory of Initial alms. 
And yet the elegant simplicity of Process thought - Its fractal pattern 
- was maintained. The elements of novelty and continuity, vital to 
one's understanding of the mlcrocosmlc process, were manifested with 
equal vigour, stated as freedom and responsibility. The pyramid effect
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was Introduced as the link between the micro- and the macro- cosmos. 
The divine lure Is Integrated and synthesised In the events of history. 
We see that the principles of Process philosophy permeate Process 
christology and the roles of Initiative and response are exemplified. 
If God Is the chief exemplification of the metaphysical principles, the 
Christ - event Is the chief exemplification of those principles jaa they 
correspond la the lives af men and women. Christ Is the Lure of Divine 
Love as It Is Incarnate In human terms.
The second area where I believe Process christology makes a 
significant contribution Is Christian faith. This Is not a thinly 
veiled attempt to deny the essential subjectivity of faith. Indeed, 
rather than attempting to Illustrate the objective validity of Process 
christology as a statement of faith, I want to stress one simple point. 
Process christology Is dynamic. Perhaps that falls to convey my point
with sufficient Impact: Process christology Is a living faith. Hence
It cannot be defined or closed, but must remain open to future
developments and Influences. If that was not the case then the 
christology of Process would be self - defeating. It is not possible to 
propose that a christology which Is based on Initiative and response and 
which advocates real growth and development (creative and redemptive 
activity or freedom and responsibility) Is a final statement. I don’t 
think the point can be expressed with greater clarity than by Kelsey 
who, referring to the Bible, speaks of the "religiously exciting
possibility that what the text might come to mean could be more
Important than what It has meant. "(2). That quotation Is a magnificent
statement of the potential for christology. As It Is lived It Is
constantly revealing God's Word to men and women who participate In the 
faith. The act of participation Is endowed with the potential for novel
(2) Process Studies 13/3 pl87.
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Instances of revelation. Faith, an activity In response to God’s 
creative and redemptive activity, generates new opportunities for 
revelation. Furthermore, Process christology Is a powerful affirmation 
of the Living Lord because Jesus Is present In his Body, the Church. 
This Is not a static presence, but a dynamic living reality. It Is true 
not by virtue of some obscure metaphysical formula but Is valid only 
Insofar as the Church today - those who are engaged In the process of 
self-becoming - manifests Christ, the revelation of God’s creative and 
redemptive activity. In the world. If the revelation of God Is 
ambiguous (which, I believe. It must be because of the complexities of 
the pyramid effect and the flnltude of human awareness), that Is not to 
devalue It. Indeed, quite the opposite. The ambiguity of revelation - 
the reception, not God’s Intention - Is the synthesis of freedom and 
responsibility. It Is Interesting, It Is exciting and it is beautiful. 
It prcanotes freedom because It Is non-dogmatlc and, for the same reason. 
It promotes responsibility. Choice enables freedom and It requires 
responsibility. It Is this free act of participation In the life of 
Jesus and In the life of the Church which illuminates the person by 
God’s vision. By accepting the responsibility to become Involved - 
Identified with - God’s action In history, one’s becoming self is 
co-constituted by the guiding hand of God. There can be no better 
statement of faith.
The third justification I offer for the adherence to Process 
christology Is that It Is emotionally satisfying. This, of course. Is 
thoroughly subjective. But as Schlelermacher wrote, "If dependence on 
Christ was of no significance for one’s personal character... then 
Christ himself Is of no significance. "(3). Emotions are an important 
facet of one’s personal character and unless Christ evokes feeling and
(3) Hermeneutics p139.
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emotion he Is, In those respects. Irrelevant. It might be argued that 
because Process christology does not consider Jesus to be divine In the 
traditional sense, he does not appeal to the emotional faculties with 
the authority of the classical model. The eleventh century gold loon 
and the Victorian stained glass window certainly evoke tremendous 
"transforming power" by virtue of their portrayal of the divinity of 
Christ. And yet they also evoke human sensuality because they portray 
Jesus as a human person, engaged In the agonies and ecstasies of human 
growth. The sheer emotional Identification with the fellow human 
sufferer Is more than adequately conveyed by a Process account. The 
Cross of Jesus Is the most powerful portrayal of human flnltude In the 
history of mankind. And, the crucial corollary to that, the 
resurrection Is the dramatic victory of freedom and value over the fact 
of death. Jesus died and yet the Churoh proclaims him the Living Lord! 
Process christology enables us to emphasise the Immediacy of Jesus In 
the Church, not by affirming his divinity but by affirming our humanity. 
It Is our human response to Jesus (the participation of faith) which 
affirms him as the revelation of God; as God In history: as God.
Inspired, of course, by the insistence that God Is always and everywhere 
active In the world.
Pittenger *s claim that his christology Is a variation on the theme 
of love stands alongside 1 John 4:8 as the essential statement of 
Process christology. Affirmed not simply by an appeal to a static 
definition or statement but affirmed by an event. Indeed, by the 
participation In that event. When one confesses one’s faith one Is 
affirming that God Is love.
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My final consideration concerns what might be termed the political 
adequacy of Process christology. The comedian Ben Elton has a 
catch-phrase, "Social Comment! Very Alternative!". In the context of 
Process christology nothing could be further from the truth. The 
emphasis on participation and the resolution of the freedom /
responsibility dilemma necessitates social comment. The revelation of
God’s creative and redemptive nature demands that the faith response Is
liberating. Crucially, this Is not based on an arbitrary human 
political, social or economic judgement about the world, but rather the 
transforming power Is called forth by the metaphysical principles. One 
cannot adhere to Whitehead’s vision, based as It Is on Initiative and 
response, without demanding the transformation of the world. The 
philosophy requires "justice". Process christology Is precisely that 
message translated Into an existentially appropriate, and religiously 
satisfying, medium; the Kingdom of God. Of course one must avoid the 
transition frcm one form of dogmatism to another, as Hartshorne wrote,
"that God has an absolute goodness of purpose..• lends no absolute
’sanction’ to anything else... For It is impossible that anything less 
than the eternal divine abstract purpose should be eternally valid."(4). 
We are forced to conclude that humanity will never be able to give a 
definitive content to the Idea of the Kingdom as It Impinges upon the 
world. It Is not possible to translate. In any direct and final way, 
how the creative and redemptive nature of God Is best actualized by 
human society. Life will always be a synthesis of "freedom and
necessity"(5). But that essential ambiguity of the mediated revelation 
of God’s love for humanity constitutes the freedom to exercise our human 
responsibility to create the Kingdom on earth. It. demands freedom. It 
demands responsibility. It Is the process of the becoming self.
(4) The Divine Relativity p128.
(5) See Sickness Unto Death, Kierkegaard,S. pi7.
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Our blurred perception of the divine lure Is clarified by our 
participation In Jesus Christ. Whitehead speaks of the "reconciliation 
of freedom with the compulsion of truth"(6). That reconciliation Is 
achieved In the Christ. As the Ideal response to God’s Initiative, 
Jesus represents the freedom which Is called forth by the reality of the 
process of creative transformation. Our free participation In the 
Christ - event Is the realization of our freedom reconciled to the 
truth. But the ambiguity must not be forgotten. That Is what makes 
life exciting. That Is what makes faith beautiful. That Is what makes 
Process christology worthwhile.
(6) Adventures jof Ideas p68.
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